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Abstract 
CEO Option Incentives, Firm Risk-Taking and Shareholder Value: Evidence from 
Australia 
by 
Chao Bian 
 
Abstract 
 
This study aims at examining the effects of Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) option incentives on 
corporate risk-taking and share market performance based on a panel data set drawn from the 137 
largest (by market capitalisation) Australian public firms, for the period 2003 to 2012. The current 
study also investigates the moderating effects of CEO characteristics on the relationship between 
corporate environmental responsibility (CER) engagement and corporate financial performance 
(CFP). The results show that pay-risk sensitivity (vega) has a positive effect on corporate risky 
financial policy measured by book leverage; while CEO pay-share price sensitivity (delta) has a 
negative effect on CEOs’ risk-taking behaviour. Further, the study results suggest that out-of or at-
the-money options, coupled with longer remaining time to expiration, have substantially positive 
impact on CEOs’ incentive to take more risks. The results reveal an inverted-U relationship between 
CEO delta and firm market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q. In addition, using provisions 
for site rehabilitation as a new proxy for CER engagement, the results show that short-tenured and 
high-cash paid CEOs are more likely to use CER engagement as a compensation management tool. 
The results also document positive association between CER and CFP only in an industry’s cooling-off 
period. 
Keywords: option incentives, risk taking, book leverage, Tobin’s Q, corporate social responsibility, 
corporate financial performance, CEO, minerals and metals 
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Chapter 1 
Overview of the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
Following overseas development in corporate government legislature, such as the US Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, Australian disclosure requirements were reinforced when the government passed the 
Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act 2004. This legislation required more thorough 
recognition and disclosure of executive remuneration detailed information such as performance 
hurdles, proportion of performance related remuneration, and proportion of short term incentives to 
long term incentives. Converging with the international development of accounting standards, from 
January 2005, the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) issued AASB 2 Share-based 
Payment requires companies to show how short-term and long-term incentives are assessed. 
Based on the recommendation made by the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMA) 
in April 2010, the latest round of legislation requires listed companies to include a ‘clawback’ clause 
in executive contract. Under the ‘clawback’ principle, listed companies are expected to amend 
employment agreement under which bonus and other components of remuneration would be 
clawed back when there is a material misstatement in the financial reports. If the company fails to do 
so, the board will be required to provide detailed explanation to shareholders. If the shareholders 
are not satisfied with the explanation, then under the ‘two-strike’ rule, they would be able to vote 
against the remuneration report and the board of directors would face re-election (Featherstone, 
2012).   
With increasing pressure from government regulations and general public, board of directors and 
remuneration committees in Australia are more proactive in designing Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
remuneration packages. One common practice to align executives’ interests with shareholders’ 
interests is to introduce equity-based payments such as share options, performance shares and 
performance rights (equivalent to restricted shares in the US). This study aims at examining whether 
the risk incentive embedded in a CEO’s equity-based payments encourage the CEO’s risk-taking. This 
study also aims at investigating the effects of CEO option incentives on the firm’s share market 
performance. 
Option-based compensation incentives influence a CEO’s utility function and can motivate the CEO to 
pursue riskier firm policies (Ross, 2004; Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2006). This is because if a CEO has a 
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greater option holdings, then the CEO’s wealth is very sensitive to the increase in the volatility of 
share returns. In this case, the CEO has a high pay-equity risk sensitivity or high-vega.  
Previous studies argue that CEOs’ vega is a risk-increasing incentive (Coles et al., 2006; DeYoung, 
Peng, & Yan, 2013). Vega is defined as the change in the dollar value of a CEO’s wealth for a 1% 
change in the volatility of share returns (Core & Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 
2011). Schultz (1998) points out that the human brains send some signals to stimulate humans to 
take actions to pursue a reward, when there is a high level of uncertainty coupled with future 
reward. Schultz’s paper may help to explain why high-vega CEOs (who are rewarded by volatility) are 
expected to have more incentives to take risks.  
One of the ways to increase vega is to grant CEOs more options. However, not all option payments 
have the same incentive effect. Previous literature shows that option moneyness, or the degree to 
which an option is in the money (the spot price of the underlying share is larger than the option’s 
exercise price), weakens the incentive effect brought about by greater call-option payments. This is 
because if a CEO is granted in-the-money options, then the CEO can buy an option at a cheaper price, 
and sell it on the market with a guaranteed gain. Consequently, the CEO becomes less incentivised to 
take risky projects in order to increase the firm’s market share price (Bulan, Sanyal, & Yan, 2010; 
Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011). 
Opposite to vega, pay-performance sensitivity (delta) has a negative impact on the CEO’s risk-taking 
behaviour (Low, 2009; DeYoung et al., 2013). Delta is commonly defined as the change in the dollar 
value of a CEO’s wealth for a 1% change in share price (Core & Guay, 1999; Bulan et al., 2010). One of 
the ways to increase delta is to grant CEOs more common shares. This argument is based on the logic 
that, as the firms’ share prices fluctuate, the returns to the equity-based compensation become 
uncertain and the CEOs, whose personal wealth, skills and knowledge are highly undiversified, will 
experience a great amount of equity risk. Therefore, high-delta CEOs are less likely to make risky 
corporate decisions.  
In addition, the Australian tax environment is different from the US and UK, which may affect the 
firm’s preference for borrowing and the incentive effect of CEO option compensation. Since 1987, 
Australia has introduced a dividend imputation tax system, where corporate tax of a dividend-issuing 
company can be used by individual shareholders as a tax rebate in their taxable income. This system 
is clearly different from the US double taxation model, where corporate tax of a dividend-issuing 
company cannot be distributed as a tax credit for its investors. As a result for individual investors, the 
dividend imputation tax system reverses debt over equity tax preferences and the total level of 
Australian firms’ debt level decreases (Twite, 2001). Further, the Rudd Labour government 
implemented some adverse changes in tax treatment of employee share schemes (ESS) in 2009. One 
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controversy of the 2009 tax changes was the ‘deferred taxing point’ in which managers pay tax 
immediately when their shares or options become vested (exercisable) rather than when the shares 
are sold. The 2009 tax reforms were designed to align the interests between executives and 
shareholders by preventing highly-paid executives from artificially decreasing their income tax 
liability by channelling income towards shares or share options under an ESS (Tax Laws Amendment 
Bill Explanatory Memorandum, 2009). However, there have been claims that the 2009 tax reforms 
contribute to the firms choosing to close down ESS and moving offshore (Tax and Superannuation 
Laws Amendment Bill Explanatory Memorandum, 2015). As a result, there is a call for reversing the 
ESS tax treatment to its pre-2009 form (Godfrey, 2015). 
Further the low level of new options and the high degree of option moneyness in the Australian 
capital market may potentially undermine the risk-taking incentives of a CEO’s option portfolio. Thus, 
this study aims to test the effects of a CEO’s deltas and vegas on the firm risk-taking and firm value in 
the Australian capital market. 
Australia is also a unique a nation in that the minerals and metals (M&M) industry has been the pillar 
of the nation’s economic development for decades. For example, the M&M industry contributed 
about 10% of Australia's Gross Domestic Product in the year 2008 to 2009 and around 55% of 
Australia's exports between 2010 to 20111. The M&M companies also account for a large portion of 
public companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). On the other hand, the 
imminent threat of the Australian M&M industry is the depleting nature of the mineral resources 
(such as metals and ores). For example, Mudd (2010) argues that the present Australian resources 
such as gold, lead and zinc will last for less than thirty years. In addition, Mudd (2010) reports that 
the M&M industry faces more challenges --- the average ore grades have been deteriorating over 
time. In addition, the degree of waste rock/overburden and tailings exceeding the ore mined has 
been increasing. Hence, the sustainability of the M&M industry has been identified as a key to 
Australia’ future economic prosperity. 
The public is also concerned about the increasing environmental and economic costs of the M&M 
industry. This is because the value of those natural resources (such as iron ores) is translated through 
intensive exploration, extraction, processing and handling activities by the M&M firms (Kinnear & 
Ogden, 2014). These processes absorb substantial water and energy consumption and cause severe 
pollution to the environment. Therefore, on a larger scale, it is imperative that the M&M industry 
commits more resources to corporate environmental responsibility (CER) in order to build a more 
sustainable natural environment.  
                                                            
1 Year Book Australia, 2012. Available from the website of Australian Bureau of Statistics, accessed on 11/03/2013. 
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A CEO’s characteristics may have some effects on a firm’s CER engagement level, and thus the firm’s 
corporate financial performance (CFP).  For instance, a long-tenured CEO who has been serving a firm 
for a relatively long period is assumed to formulate and implement long-term environmental 
sustainability decisions. However, as the long-tenured CEO becomes more entrenched, the CEO may 
have greater power to influence the board of directors to introduce less-risky firm polices. 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.2 states the motivation for this study. Section 1.3 
presents the research questions of this study. Section 1.4 outlines the research objectives. Research 
contribution is presented in section 1.5. Section 1.6 documents CEO remuneration practices. Section 
1.7 documents the main theoretical framework of CEO remuneration. Section 1.8 documents the 
main regulatory and corporate governance framework of CEO remuneration. Section 1.9 presents 
the outline of this thesis. 
1.2 Thesis Motivation 
It is the overall incentive structure (including incentives embedded in the previously and newly issued 
options) that influences a CEO’s risk preference (Bulan et al., 2010). If a firm stops issuing new 
options, then the incentive effect of option discontinues (Core et al., 2010). Hence, Core et al., (2010) 
suggest that it is important to re-balance a CEO’s option portfolio by continuously adding new 
options.  The Australian capital market is ideal to survey the incentive effects of delta and vega 
because of the following: first, Australian firms have adopted option compensation scheme, are 
reluctant to use it (Matolcsy & Wright, 2007). To be more specific, the current study finds that about 
only 40% of the observations have granted their CEOs new options. That percentage is much lower 
than the findings of Core and Guay (1999) where 74% of the observations actually made options 
grants. This low level of new options may potentially decrease vega’s risk-increasing effect.  
Second, the Australian dividend taxation environment is different from that in the US, which may 
affect the firms’ capital structure. Since 1987, Australia has introduced a dividend imputation tax 
system, where corporate tax of a dividend-issuing company can be used by its individual 
shareholders as a tax rebate in their taxable income (Twite, 2001). This system is clearly different 
from the US double taxation model, where corporate tax of a dividend-issuing company cannot be 
distributed as a tax credit for its investors. The introduction of the dividend imputation tax system 
causes a decline in Australian firms’ level of total borrowing (Twite, 2001). This is because for 
individual investors, the dividend imputation tax system reverses debt over equity tax preferences 
(Twite, 2001). Hence, this study is motivated to find some comparable evidence that the incentives 
embedded in non-US CEO equity-based compensation plans have the same effects on CEOs’ risk-
taking behaviour and shareholder value as those documented in the US studies. 
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Third, both Lewellen (2006) and Core and Guay (2002) argue that CEOs who are granted out-of-the-
money options (share sport price is smaller than strike price) are incentivised to take risky initiatives 
in order to increase the spot price and profit from their call options. However, in-the-money options 
make CEOs’ portfolio more sensitive to changes in share price, and as a result, CEOs will be more risk-
averse (Lewellen, 2006). Interestingly, we find that in-the-money options account for around 64% of 
our total 1370 firm-year observations. There is also a high proportion of in-the-money vega (47%) in 
our observations. The proportion of in-the-money delta is even higher (60%). This high degree of 
moneyness of Australian CEOs’ option portfolio may potentially increase the CEO’s risk aversion 
(Lewellen, 2006; Bulan et al., 2010). Thus, it appears that the Australian CEOs face a dilemma: their 
option-based personal wealth is linked to share price, thus, they need to increase the firm’s risk in 
order to profit from the options; on the other hand, they are not willing to take risks due to their in-
the-money options. This dilemma provides an opportunity for the current study to test whether 
Australian CEOs have incentives to implement risky firm policies so as to increase the firm’s value 
when their options are largely in-the-money. Taken altogether, it is worth to test the relationships 
between option incentives, firm risky policies and firm value in the Australian capital market. 
This study is also motivated by the fact that the empirical evidence on the relationships among CEO 
incentives, and CEO risk-taking behaviour and shareholder value are inconclusive due to endogeneity 
involved in estimation models. To allow mutual causation between our variables, we specify a 
simultaneous system of equations with the contemporaneous vega and delta, and use the 2-stage 
least squares (2SLS) estimation method to control for firm fixed effects. 
There is also a gap in the literature with regards to the examination of the impact of a CEO’s option 
incentives on firm policy and firm value in Australia. Previous studies have focused mostly on levels 
of CEOs’ remunerations. For instance, Hutchinson (2003) finds a negative pay-performance 
relationship using a proportion of CEO share options value in total compensation, whereas Merhebi, 
Swan, Pattenden, and Zhou (2006) find a signiﬁcant positive relationship using CEO total pay. The 
most recent study conducted by Schultz, Tan, and Walsh (2010) shows no causal relationships 
between a CEO’s fixed pay and variable pay and shareholders’ value. 
Moreover, most prior empirical studies have not examined the relationships among CER, CFP and 
CEO characteristics. Possible CEO entrenchment from CEO tenure could potentially affect the 
relationship between CER and CFP. Additionally, little study has shed light on the moderating effect 
of an industry’s ‘boom-burst’ cycle on the CER-CFP relationship. CER engagement level is more likely 
to have a positive impact on CFP in the non-boom period. This is because a CEO, whose pay is 
partially equity based, may have more incentive to engage in value-enhancing CER when there is a 
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downturn; on the other hand, during a boom period, the CEO is less likely to commit to CER 
engagement, since the firm’s market value is already high. 
1.3 Research Questions 
What is the relationship between CEO option incentives and corporate risky policies in the Australian 
share market?  
What is the relationship between CEO option incentives and the firm’s market-based performance in 
the Australian share market?  
Do CEO characteristics have any effect of on the CER-CFP relationship in the Australian M&M 
industry? 
Does the Australian M&M industry’s ‘boom-burst’ cycle have any moderating effect of on the CER-
CFP relationship? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
1. To investigate whether high-vega or low-delta CEOs are more likely to implement risky financial 
and investment policies in the Australian share market. 
 2. To investigate whether delta has a mixed (inverted U) relationship with market return in the 
Australian share market. 
 3. To investigate whether short-tenured CEOs are more likely to use CER engagement as a 
compensation management tool than long-tenured CEOs . 
 4. To investigate whether the CEOs differ their commitment to CER engagement during an industry’s 
boom-cooling off cycle. 
1.5 Research Contributions 
As discussed in the previous section, Australian corporate landscape is unique in terms of different 
dividend tax system, high level of option moneyness, and strict option-vesting conditions. Our results 
show that option incentives still can have a positive impact on the firm’s risk-taking. Thus, our results 
highlight the importance of setting the optimal CEO incentives to influence the CEO behaviour. 
Bulan et al. (2010) find an inverted-U relationship between CEO delta and firm productivity. On that 
ground, Bulan et al. infer that CEO delta should have an inverted-U relationship with firm market 
performance. This study adds to the delta literature by providing new evidence that that productivity 
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measured as total factor productivity (TFP) is the feedback channel through which delta has a mixed 
impact on the firm’s market value.  
We conduct a thorough scanning of our sample firms, and find that nearly 80% of the firms that 
adopted the option-based compensation scheme exhibit performance-based vesting conditions. This 
finding confirms the argument of Hill, Masulis, and Thomas (2011) that the performance-contingent 
vesting conditions of options are widespread in Australian CEO employment contracts, but 
uncommon in the US. These tight performance-contingent contractual provisions may help to explain 
why a high-vega CEO has more incentives to use more book leverage: in order to satisfy the option’s 
vesting requirements, the CEO may wish to increase the firm’s share value through increasing 
leverage. 
It is documented that prior empirical studies have not examine the relationships among CER, CFP and 
CEO characteristics. The current study attempts to fill this gap by revealing that CEO entrenchment 
from longer tenure as a key factor influencing the CER-CFP association. Further, this study finds 
evidence that the industry cycle has a strong moderating effect on the CER-CFP association.  
1.6 CEO Compensation Practices 
This current study focuses on compensation practices of CEO and managing director (when a CEO is a 
member of board of directors, the CEO becomes managing director). CEO compensation generally is 
divided into three components, a short-term incentive, a post-employment benefit plans and a long-
term share based incentive plan (Murphy, 1999). For instance, in the 2010 audited remuneration 
report of Austin Engineering, an Australian listed company, the first component of CEO pay is termed 
as short-term benefits including cash salary plus bonus, a variable short-term incentive component 
which is linked to some performance measures and non-cash benefits. The second component is 
post-employment pay which includes superannuation or retirement funds and long-term leave. The 
third component is share-based payments such as value of share options, performance shares or 
performance rights, which is highly related to performance hurdles contained in long term incentive 
plans (LTIPs)2. In terms of the incentive effect of the components’ remuneration, Hall and Liebman 
(1997) find that options and ordinary shares provide 53 times more incentives to executives than 
base salary and bonuses. 
LTIPs refer to long term incentive plans which consist of at least a performance option program. The 
vesting (share-based instruments becoming exercisable) period for LTIPs ranges from three to five 
years. Share options, performance shares, performance rights are the three most commonly used 
                                                            
2See 2010 Austin Engineering Ltd Annual Report, pp. 10. Available from: http://www.austineng.com.au/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/Annual-report-2010.pdf, accessed 13/05/2013.  
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share-based payments in LTIPs. Share options give executives rights to buy certain number of stocks 
at spot market prices when they are awarded within a certain time period (Guay, 1999). With 
performance shares, a number of ordinary shares are granted to the executives upfront during the 
performance period; however, the number of shares vested depends on the predetermined 
performance conditions (Hill et al., 2010). With performance rights (or called restricted shares in the 
US) program, an executive is conferred a right to acquire one ordinary share of the firm with zero 
consideration (in this case, performance rights are equivalent to options with an exercise price equal 
to zero) (Coles et al., 2006). Performance hurdles take a form of accounting hurdles (for example, 
earnings per share growth rate or earnings before interest tax depreciation and amortisation growth 
rate) or market based performance hurdles such as Total Stock Return (TSR)3 of a relative group of 
comparable firms (Hill et al., 2010). Only when those performance hurdles are met, the options or 
rights under LTIPs could become exercisable and turn into a fully paid ordinary share, which is either 
purchased from the market or newly issued by the company (Hill et al., 2010).  
CEO share-based remuneration grew at an amazing rate in the US and other western countries 
during the 1990s (Ofek & Yermack, 2000). Ofek and Yermack attribute the explosion of CEO equity 
compensation to the belief of shareholder activists and institution investors, that managerial 
ownership could reduce agency problems. Morgenson (1998) studies the 200 largest US companies 
and finds that 13% of their common shares were earmarked for compensation purposes. 
Shareholders encourage increasing share-base payments to executives because they believe that 
equity ownership could weaken agency problem (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
2000). However, Ofek and Yermack (2000) find that when managers own a large chunk of shares 
prior to grant of share-based incentives, those managers diversify the equity risk created by the grant 
by selling pre-owned shares, as a result, the effect of share-based incentive plan is limited.  
1.7 Outline of Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the important literature related to 
the current study. Chapter 3 presents the research methodology, variable definition, data collection, 
sampling method and method used to compute CEO option incentives delta and vega. Chapter 4 
reports and discusses the research results. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis.  
 
 
                                                            
3Which is equal to dividends pay-outs plus capital gain of holding a period. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the theories and literature related to CEO remuneration. This chapter also 
reviews some recent empirical studies on the links between CEO remuneration incentives, firm policy 
and firm market share performance. Section 2.2 presents the regulatory and corporate governance 
framework of CEO remuneration. Section 2.3 reviews the theoretical background related to CEO 
remuneration and Section 2.4 reviews the models of CEO remuneration. Sections 2.5 discusses the 
role of board of directors in setting CEO remuneration and Sections 2.6 presents the literature on 
CEO compensation levels and components in Australia, US and UK. Section 2.7 examines the studies 
on delta and vega. A review of the prior studies on effectiveness of the use of LTIPs is documented in 
Section 2.8. Section 2.9 documents the relevant literature related to firm growth option. Section 2.10 
reviews the studies relevant to a firm’s CER literature. Section 2.11 concludes the chapter.  
2.2 Regulatory and Corporate Governance Framework of CEO Remuneration 
Corporate governance can be defined as the monitoring of firms and the methods used to assure the 
firm’s policies meet the interest of concerned parties’ (Barnett & Hoffman, 2008). As a subset of 
corporate governance system, executive compensation has been attracting a great deal of attentions 
from both the public and the academic. 
Shareholders are owners or principals of a company, however, managers run the company. Due to 
the separation of ownership and control, self-serving managers are inclined to take projects with 
cash flows that are relatively certain and rejecting those risky projects that could enhance 
shareholders’ return. Consequently, misaligned interests exist between managers and investors, and 
agency problem arises (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
There are some controlling mechanisms over managers’ discretion to allocate investor’s funds. Those 
mechanisms include concentrated ownership through large shareholding, hostile takeover, bank 
finance, legal protection of shareholders and incentive plans (La Porta et al., 2000). Share-based 
incentive plans could increase the CEO’s wealth effect. However, CEOs are undiversified compared 
with shareholders, thus the share-based incentive plans increase CEOs’ risk-aversion effect as well 
(e.g. Guay, 1999; Chava & Purnanandam, 2010).   
The focus of our study is on Australian firms, however, majorities of executive remuneration research 
is on the US and the similarities in the national culture exist between the UK and Australia. 
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Therefore, it is appropriate to compare relevant executive remuneration legislations, regulations, 
practices, and theories on executive compensation in the US and the UK. 
Futher, there are two corporate governance models, i.e., shareholder model adopted by US, UK and 
Australia, and stakeholder model used by Germany (Aguilera et al., 2006). Under the shareholder 
model, corporations are governed to maximise shareholder wealth, whereas, the stakeholder model 
stresses cooperative relationships among shareholders, boards, financiers, managers and employees 
in the interests of labour harmony and corporate efficiency (Mintz, 2005). The evolution of 
regulations and corporate governance framework under the Anglo-Saxon model regarding disclosure 
of CEO pay are presented in this chapter. The development of accounting standards requirements 
regarding executive remuneration disclosure in US, UK and Australia are also documented. 
2.2.1 Australian corporate legislation regarding CEO pay 
As a commonwealth country, Australia adopts a case law or judge-made law system which is similar 
to those in the US and UK in light of governing corporate governance practices. However, there exists 
a paucity of case law regarding director and executive pay in Australia. As a result, regulations 
regarding executive pay could be found in a combination of statutory and principle-based rules (Hill 
et al., 2010).  
In 1986, schedule 5 of the Corporations Regulations was issued to require Australian public listed 
companies to disclose executive pay with remuneration $10,000 interval exceeding $100,000 
(Tomasic, Bottomley & McQueen, 2002). Details of each pay component to (including cash salary, 
bonus, options and rights) all directors and the five highest-paid executives were not made 
compulsory to disclosure until the release of Company Law Review Act 1998 (CLRA 98) in 1998, a 
direct result of Australian government’s initiation of a corporate law Economic Reform Programme 
(CLERP) in 1997 (Farrar, 2008).   
There was a great deal of debate of the Company Law Review Bill 1997, the draft of CLRA 98 over 
inadequate linkage between executive remuneration and firms’ performance (Tomasic et al., 2002). 
Consequently, Section 300A was inserted into the Corporations Act, the statutory foundation for 
executive pay. The section encouraged listed companies to disclose more detailed executives and 
directors compensation information in their remuneration report. Specifically, Section 300A stressed 
the relationship between executive pay and firm performance by requiring firms to discuss boards’ 
remuneration policy regarding proportion of executives’ pay relative to performance (Farrar, 2008). 
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In March 2003, Section 300A was further developed in ASX Corporate Governance Council Principles 
of Good Governance and Best Practices Recommendations4. This document emphasised the need to 
compensate executives relative to firms’ performance. Although these ‘soft’ laws are not 
compulsory, companies are expected to point out and explain any non-compliance (Black, 2008). 
As amendments to the Corporation Act 2001, the Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act 2004, 
based on Company Law Economic Reform Program 9 (CLERP 9), adopted the accounting standards 
issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) following overseas development in 
corporate government legislature, such as the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Farrar, 2008). The 
Australian legislation requires more thorough recognition and disclosure of executive remuneration 
detailed information such as performance hurdles, proportion of performance related remuneration, 
and proportion of short term incentives to long term incentives.  
Specifically, the Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act 2004 made the following changes 
regarding executive pay to reinforce the regulatory framework: 
 Extending the application of the disclosure requirements beyond the listed company to 
include the corporate group; 
 Enhancing the specific disclosures made; 
 Giving shareholders greater ability to hold directors accountable for their decisions regarding 
remuneration; and 
 Providing shareholders with a greater say in relation to the amount of termination payments 
(Tomasic et al., 2002). 
The Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act 2004 influenced Australian corporate governance on 
a great scale. For instance, based on the Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act 2004, section 
300A (1) made important amendments to the Corporations Act regarding the relationship between 
performance and pay, in particular, valuation of options is emphasised. Those clauses include: 
 Discuss the relationship between remuneration policy and the company’s performance 
(Section 300 A (1) (b)); 
 If an element of the remuneration of a director or executive is dependent on the satisfaction 
of a performance condition, a detailed summary of the performance condition, an 
                                                            
4Following public feedback, ASX Corporate Governance Council revised this document and released Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations (2d. ed. 2007) in 2007 and Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations with 
2010 (3d. ed. 2007) Amendments in 2010. 
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explanation of why the performance condition was chosen, and a summary of the methods 
used in assessing whether the performance condition is satisfied (Section 300 A (1) (ba)); 
 If a portion of remuneration consists of securities, and that payment is not dependent on the 
satisfaction of a performance condition, an explanation of why it is not dependent on the 
satisfaction of a performance condition  (Section 300 A (1) (d)); and 
 For each of the specified directors and executives: 
a. the relative proportions of remuneration that are related to performance and those 
elements that are not; 
b. the value of options that are granted during the year as part of their remuneration; 
c. the value of options that lapsed during the year; 
d. the value of options that are exercised during the year; and 
e. the percentage of the value of the director’s or executive’s remuneration that 
consists of options (Section 300 A (1) (e))5. 
The recent development in tightening the director and executive pay is the opportunity for 
shareholders to vote on a firm’s remuneration report at the general shareholder meeting. 
Shareholders will have a greater say regarding the firm’s remuneration policy and thus will mitigate 
executive excess pay problem (Cai & Walkling, 2011). Released in December 2009, the Productivity 
Commission’s final 17 recommendations addressed issues of remuneration principles and 
shareholder engagement among others. One of the PC’s recommendations is the ‘two-strike’ rule, 
which states that if more than 25% of the shareholders vote against a firm’s remuneration report at 
the general shareholder meeting for consecutive two years, then the board of directors will be re-
elected6. In July 2011, Australian government makes ‘say on pay’ into a new amendment into the 
Corporation Act. According to Featherstone (2012), at least fifteen ASX 200 firms recorded a vote of 
at least 25% of the shareholders vote against a firm’s remuneration report at the general shareholder 
meeting. 
In order to solve the ‘golden parachute’ problem (termination pay had been excessive for executives 
and directors), in November 2009, the Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on 
                                                            
5 The Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act 2004. Available from: https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2004A01334, 
accessed on 08/07/2013. 
6See Australian Government Productivity Commission, Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No. 49, Executive 
Remuneration in Australia, Recommendation 15 (19/12/2009). 
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Termination Payments) Act gained Royal Assent to put a upper boundary on executive or director’s 
termination pay, which is limited to one year’s salary.7 Another legislation change on CEO pay is the 
introduction of the amendment to the tax laws in 20098. One of the 2009 changes was the ‘deferred 
taxing point’ in which managers pay tax immediately when their shares or options become vested 
(exercisable) rather than when the shares are sold9. As a result, firms choose to close down 
employee share scheme and the incentive effects of the managers’ existing option portfolio may  
Table 2.1 Chronological outline of key events relating to Australian executive compensation reforms, 
2003-2012 
Year Event Impact 
2003 Section 300A was inserted into the 
Corporations Act 
The section was further developed in ASX 
Corporate Governance Council Principles 
of Good Governance and Best Practices 
Recommendations. 
2004 the Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure 
Act 2004 passes 
The act was based on Company Law 
Economic Reform Program 9 (CLERP 9), 
adopted the accounting standards issued 
by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB). 
2007 Rudd-Gillard Government was elected. The Minister for Superannuation and 
Corporate Law is created. The new 
Minister is responsible for regulating 
corporations’ compensation policy. 
2009 In November, the Corporations 
Amendment (Improving Accountability on 
Termination Payments) Act gained Royal 
Assent. 
The Act puts an upper boundary on 
executive or director’s termination pay, 
which is limited to one year’s salary. 
 
In October, Tax Laws Amendment was 
passed. 
It proposes that employee share-based 
incentive plans should be taxed.  
In December, the Productivity 
Commission’s releases final 17 
recommendations addressed issues of 
remuneration principles and shareholder 
engagement among others.  
One of the PC’s recommendations is the 
‘two-strike’ rule, which became law in 
2011. 
2010 Corporations and Markets Advisory 
Committee (CAMA) releases Executive 
Remuneration: Information Paper. 
This latest round of legislation requires 
listed companies to include a ‘clawback’ 
clause in executive contract. 
2011 Section 206J of the Corporations 
Amendment (Improving Accountability on 
Director and Executive Remuneration) Bill 
2011 was passed. 
It prohibits executives or directors from 
hedging activities. 
 
reduce as the option closes to vesting. Futher, this 2009 change in tax legislation uses termination of 
employment as the tax-trigger point, despite of the arguments that this could contradict with the 
                                                            
7See Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Termination Payments) Act 2009 No. 115, 2009 
8See Tax Laws Amendment (2009); Assistant Treasurer, Press Release No. 103, Passage of Budget Bill Delivers $835 Million 
to Bottom Line, 2 December 2009. 
9Australian Taxation Office. Available from: https://www.ato.gov.au/General/Employee-share-schemes/In-detail/ESS-
interests-with-a-taxing-point-before-1-July-2009/, accessed 13/09/2014. 
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best practices to defer executives’ equity payment in order to mitigate managerial short-sightedness 
problem (Hill et al., 2010).  
Based on the recommendation made by the CAMA in April 2010, the latest round of legislation 
requires listed companies to include a ‘clawback’ clause in executive contract. Under the ‘clawback’ 
principle, listed companies are expected to amend employment agreement under which bonus and 
other components of remuneration would be clawed back when there is a material misstatement in 
the financial reports10. If the company fails to do so, the board will be required to provide detailed 
explanation to shareholders. If the shareholders are not satisfied with the explanation, then under 
the ‘two-strike’ rule, they would be able to vote against the remuneration report and the board of 
directors would face re-election potentially.   
Dealing with the problem that executives or directors could short shares previously owned to hedge 
the equity risk for the share-based compensation, the Australian government amended the 
Corporations Act to prohibit executives or directors from hedging activities. Section 206J of the 
Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive Remuneration) Bill 
2011 states: 
“No hedging of remuneration of key management personnel. A member of the key management 
personnel for a company that is a disclosing entity, or a closely related party of such a member, must 
not enter into an arrangement (with anyone) if the arrangement would have the effect of limiting the 
exposure of the member to risk relating to an element of the member’s remuneration.”11 
Table 1.1 presents a chronological outline of key legislations and regulations relating to executive 
compensation in Australia. 
2.2.2 Australian accounting disclosure requirements regarding CEO pay 
Details regarding the valuation of equity-based pay were not made compulsory until January 2004, 
when AASB released AASB 1046 Director and Executive Disclosures by Disclosing Entities (AASB 
1046)12. Para. 6 of AASB 1046 requires firms to valuate options, rights and other share based 
components of compensation at ‘fair value’: 
‘In the case of share options and rights, the method of determining the fair value of the equity 
instrument depends on the circumstances. If an equivalent option or right is quoted on an active and 
liquid market, the market value at the grant date is used. If an option or right is not traded but the 
                                                            
10See Discussion Paper ‘The Clawback of Executive Remuneration: Where Financial Statements are Materially Misstated,’ 
Released by the parliamentary secretary to the Treasurer, Dec 2010. 
11Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive Remuneration) 
Bill 2011 No. 5, 2011. 
12AASB 1046 was revised in late 2005 as AASB 124 Related Party Disclosures. 
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underlying instrument is publicly traded, an accepted option-pricing model, such as the Black-Scholes 
(modified for dividends) or a binomial model can be used.’13 
Based on a sample of 100 Australian public companies, Clarkson, Lammerts Van Bueren, and Walker 
(2005) suggest that CEO compensation disclosure has been improved significantly since the 
introduction of AASB 1046. 
Converging with the international development of accounting standards, from January 2005, AASB 
issued AASB 2 Share-based Payment requiring companies to show how short-term and long-term 
incentives are assessed. In particular, AASB 2 requires fair value of the options granted to be 
estimated with an option pricing model. 
The value of share-based executive pay components such as performance options, performance 
rights or performance shares is required to record on the date when those instruments are awarded. 
When it comes to valuing performance shares (exercise of those shares is dependent on satisfaction 
of some performance hurdles such as growth of earnings per share or total shareholder return 
compared to that of a group of companies in the same industry), the firm has to estimate how many 
shares are expected to be vest each year. 
The Black-Scholes (BS) option pricing model recommended by AASB 2 is share-based payment of 
options and rights granted during the year which could be accurately valued and reflected in the total 
pay. However, ambiguities surround BS model. First, share options in LTIPs are not tradable within a 
short time; vesting period often lasts three to six years (McKnight & Tomkins, 1999). Moreover, both 
Huddart (1994) and Cuny and Jorion (1995) argue that the best exercise policy is different from the 
BS assumption, because of CEOs’ risk aversion. More importantly, BS formula holds only theoretically 
due to its assumptions. For example, there are transaction costs and short term interest changes 
over time instead of staying constant. 
2.2.3 US corporate legislation regarding CEO Pay 
US corporations operate through a classic shareholder model. The board of directors is responsible 
for providing advices and monitoring managers, ensuring mangers’ interests aligned with 
shareholders’ interests. These functions are carried out through a number of committees, primarily 
the audit committee, the remuneration committee, and the nomination committee (Mintz, 2005).  
Similar to that in Australia and the UK, director and executive compensation in the US have been 
traditionally regarded by the courts as a matter of internal management (Hill et al., 2010, pp. 13). 
However, as a result of a number of corporate scandals, particularly the collapse of Enron, many 
                                                            
13AASB 1046 Director and Executive Disclosures by Disclosing Entities, January 2004, pp. 23. Available from: 
https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/F2005B01348, accessed on 9/02/2014. 
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judicial changes have been implemented in order to protect shareholders interests (Barnett et al, 
2008). In 2002, the landmark Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed to improve corporate governance of the 
companies registered with Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). Although the focus of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act is to enhance audit quality and director independence, there are two provisions associated 
with director and executive pay. A ‘clawback’ provision in Section 304 is described as follows:  
“As a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer 
for --- 
1. any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received by that person 
from the issuer during the 12-month period following the first public issuance or filing with 
the Commission of the financial document embodying such financial reporting requirement 
and  
2. any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12-month period.”14 
In addition, personal loans made to executives or directors to buy equity-based incentives are 
banned in Section 402 (Enhanced Conflict of Interest Provisions). 
The legislative response to executive pay was silent in the Post-Enron era in the US compared with 
that in Australia (Hill et al., 2010). However, since 2009, there have been some reform initiatives to 
restore shareholders belief in the market, which was heavily damaged during the global financial 
crisis ignited by the sub-ordinated debt crisis. In terms of executive compensation, the Dodd –Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was passed in 2010 to emphasise the independence 
of the compensation committees, clawback and pay-performance relationship15. “Improving 
executive compensation practices is an essential part of our broader efforts towards comprehensive 
regulatory reform,” Mr Geithner, the US Treasury secretary, stressed the focus of the reform. 
Moreover, he stated the Act: “will encourage companies to set pay in ways that are aligned with 
sound risk management and long-term value, moving away from the practices of the past that 
helped contribute to the financial crisis.”16 
                                                            
14See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, July 30, 2002, 107 P.L. 204, Title III, Section 304, 116 Stat 745. 
15 See Dodd-Frank Bill: Some Executive Compensation Action Items. Available from: 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/08/12/some-dodd-frank-executive-compensation-action-items/, accessed on 
03/07/2013. 
16E., Luce and S., O'Connor, US House votes for executive pay regulation, July 31, 2009 , The Financial Times, available from: 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/229271054?accountid=27890, accessed on 6/5/2013. 
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2.2.4 US accounting disclosure requirements regarding CEO pay 
Corporations have been blamed by the governments and shareholder activists for the missing link 
between executive pay and companies’ performance for a long period of time in the US (Brownstein 
& Panner, 1992). Under such pressures, in October 1992, the SEC, the main capital market regulatory 
authority, enhanced executive compensation disclosure rules, as described by Dew-Becker, “those 
rules are perhaps the best known changes in policy regarding executive pay, at least among 
economists”.17 Those rules include: (1) a summary compensation table for the firm's highest paid 
executives for the last three pre-proxy years, (2) a table describing a company's executive share 
options, share appreciation rights, and other long-term incentive awards, (3) a compensation 
committee report discussing the criteria used for making the compensation and (4) a graph of the 
firm's cumulative share returns compared to a published industry index or a broad market index such 
as the S&P 500 (Dew-Becker, 2009). In a sample of 200 firms included in the Forbes compensation 
survey for fiscal year 1992, Vafeas and Afxentiou (1998) find an improvement in the pay-for-
performance relationship following the implementation of the 1992 new rules. 
Accounting scandals such as the collapses of Enron and WorldCom showed necessity to amend the 
executive pay disclosure rules.  Executive perquisites (such as limousine and corporate jets) have 
escaped public attention due to disclosure loophole. Prior to 2006, if the aggregate value of perks did 
not exceed $50,000, firms did not need to disclose perks at all. Even when the aggregate value of 
perks exceeded $50,000, Yermack (2006) points out that, the total cost of perks may not have been 
observed directly, because some companies disguised it with other cost items such as above-market 
interest on deferred compensation. In 2006, the SEC fixed this problem by introducing the 
requirement to disclose executive perks.18 The purpose of these new rules was to ‘help investors 
keep an eye on how much of their money is being paid to the top executives who work for them.’19 
Under the new rules, the previous $50,000 threshold is decreased to $10,000, and subject to this 
aggregate threshold, each individual perk must be disclosed. Further, any individual perquisite item 
valued at greater than $25,000 or 10% of total perquisites must also be separately accounted20. 
The accounting and tax treatment of executive share-based compensation in the US is unique. 
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) in the mid-1990s prohibits corporate tax deductions 
for annual compensation beyond $1 million unless it is performance related21. Murphy (1999) notes 
that the company and executives escaped from being taxed upon the granting of an executive share 
                                                            
17I. Dew-Becker, How Much Sunlight Does it Take to Disinfect a Boardroom? A Short History of Executive Compensation 
Regulation, CESifo Economic Studies 434, 2009, pp. 55. 
18 J., Lublin and K., Scannell, They Say Jump: SEC Plans Tougher Pay Rules, Wall Street Journal, accessed on 11/1/2006. 
19See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, SEC Release No. 33-8732A, August 29, 2006. 
20Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure SEC Release No. 33-8732A; 34-54302A; IC-27444A, 2006. 
21See M., Conway, Money for nothing and the Shares for Free: Taxing Executive Compensation, 17 Cornell Journal of Legal 
and Public Policy, 2008. 
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option, and it is only at the excise date that both are taxed, with the favourable tax treatment. 
However, Bebchuck et al. (2002) observe that the US IRC does not treat in-the-money options as 
performance-based compensation. In the post-Enron era, the most significant change made 
regarding executive pay is the IRC section 409A, which limits executives to defer remuneration and to 
accelerate payments22. 
2.2.5 UK corporate legislation regarding CEO Pay 
As the origin of the common law system, British courts were reluctant to make legislations to 
regulate executive and director pay. The regulation was based on an industry ‘self-regulation’ 
system. However, after a series of accounting scandals, the UK government puts a more strict 
legislative constraint on executive and director remuneration (Dignam, 2007).  
In terms of the statutory law, executive and director remuneration in UK are governed by the 
Companies Act 1985. In Schedule 4 ‘Disclosure of Information: Emoluments and Other Benefits of 
Directors and Others’, companies are required to disclose the aggregate amount of the director’s 
emoluments in addition to the number of directors whose ‘emoluments fell within each of the 
following bands—not more than £5,000, more than £5,000 but not more than £10,000, more than 
£10,000 but not more than £15,000, etc’23. 
After the collapse of Enron, the UK government started some legislative reform initiatives to protect 
shareholders. One of such initiatives is to amend the Companies Act 1985 in 2006. Section 439 in the 
amended Companies Act 2006 empowers shareholders to vote on director remuneration at the 
annual shareholder meeting.  In addition, section 420 requires firms to disclose details of executives 
and directors pay in a Directors' Remuneration Report (DDR). Conyon and  Sadler (2010) attempt to 
evaluate the effectiveness of mandatory say-on-pay (SOP) and find that less than 10% of the 
shareholders vote against the firm’s DRR resolution. More importantly, Conyon and Sadler fail to find 
that CEO pay level decreases in firms that previously experienced high levels of shareholder voting 
against DRR resolution. Hence, Conyon and Sadler conclude that the mandatory ‘say on pay” 
regulation has not reached its goal: aligning CEO interests with the shareholders’ interests. 
In a recent study, Ferri and Maber (2013) attempt to examine the effect of mandatory SOP laws on 
CEO compensation. The authors find that advisory UK SOP laws are positively related to the link 
between CEO and firm performance. However, when the advisory SOP laws become mandatory, 
binding SoP laws are not related to improved delta. Thus, Gordon (2009) cautions the governments 
                                                            
22See Arsenault, S and Koprowski, W., The Policy of Regulating Deferral: A Critique in Light of Internal Revenue Code Section 
409 A, 7 Houston Business &Tax Journal, pp. 243, 2007. 
23Companies Act 1985, 1989, c. 40, Schedule 4, Section 6(4), http://www.uk-companies-act-1985.co.uk/s-3E, accessed 
15/5/2013. 
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considering mandating SOP laws and advises the mandatory regime should be restricted to some 
largest public companies by market capitalisation. 
In addition, under the the UK Enterprise Management Incentives (EMIs), managers do not pay tax 
immediately when their shares or options become vested (exercisable). Instead, managers can defer 
paying the capital gain tax until the shares are sold24.  In contrast, the Australian 2009 tax reforms 
claim that it is good to align the interests between executives and shareholders by taxing managers 
immediately when their shares or options become vested (Tax Laws Amendment Bill Explanatory 
Memorandum, 2009). Hence, this study attempts to test whether there is a need to reverse the ESS 
tax treatment to its pre-2009 form similar to the UK’s EMIs tax scheme. 
Regarding executives contracting, in Section 188 a ‘shareholder resolution’ is needed to consent an 
executive or a director’s contract lasting more than a two year term compared to a 5 year term in the 
Companies Act 1985. Moreover, section 215 deals with ‘golden parachute’ problem (excessive 
termination payments for executives and directors regardless of performance) by prohibiting 
payments for loss of office25. 
2.2.6 UK accounting disclosure requirements regarding CEO pay 
The UK corporate governance system has been operating on a ‘self-regulating’ philosophy. In terms 
of executive compensation, the disclosure requirements were influenced by three committee’s 
recommendations. 
The first recommendation regarding board of directors’ importance of remunerating company 
officers was made by the Cadbury Committee headed by Sir Adrian Cadbury in 1992. In addition to 
the recommendation that main board should consist mainly of nonexecutives, there is another 
recommendation that the remuneration committee, should be composed wholly or mainly of 
nonexecutives26.  
In 1995, in order to solve the issue of directors’ conflicting interests in determining their own pay, 
the Greenbury Committee recommended that there should be no executives on the remuneration 
committee. Another recommendation was replacing non-performance based share incentives with 
                                                            
24 UK Tax and Employee Tax Schemes, available at:https://www.gov.uk/tax-employee-share-schemes/enterprise-
management-incentives-emis, accessed 10/9/2016. 
25Companies Act 1985, 2006 c. 46. Available from: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46, accessed 11/5/2013. 
26Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance, Gee and Co, London, 1992. 
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long term incentive plans (performance period at least lasts three years), thereby linking closely 
executive pay with long run firm performance27. 
In 1998, the Hampel Committee incorporated the Cadbury and Greenbury recommendations into 
one code known as the combined code and further recommended firms disclose more clear 
remuneration details including hidden pay components such as the full pension costs28. 
Consequently, the Financial Reporting Council in the UK released a new Combined Code of Corporate 
Governance in 2003, which requires that the audit and remuneration committees be wholly 
independent (Idowu, 2013). 
Those recommendations made by three committees are implemented by London Share Exchange 
(LSE). Remuneration policy of public companies has to comply with the Listing, Prospectus and 
Disclosure Rules issued by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) replacing Bank of England as the 
chief regulator modelled on the SEC (Dignam, 2007). 
The UK companies were reluctant to recognise the expense of share options for the cost of options 
granted to employees. However, after the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standard 
(IRRS), UK firms are required to record the fair value of employee share options granted is recognised 
as an expense (Stathopoulos, Espenlaub, & Walker, 2004). 
2.2.7 Summary of the corporate governance legislations in the US, UK and Australia 
For all three countries, the directors carry out their monitoring and advisory duties through audit, 
remuneration and nominating committees. In the post-Enron era, governments in the three 
countries are more proactive in designing corporate governance rules and regulations. However, 
conformation to corporate governance rules and standards is stricter in the US than in the UK and 
Australia, where the compliance is operated on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. More specifically, in the 
UK and Australia, there are some corporate governance recommendations either from ‘hard’ law or 
from ‘soft’ law that encourage firms to adopt. If a firm does not choose to adopt certain rules or 
standards, the firm has to explain the reason for not complying with those rules or standards 
(Barnett et al, 2008). 
The focus of this study is CEO remunerations practices in Australia, where the recognition and 
disclosure of executive remuneration is more constrained than those in the US and UK. For example, 
CLERP 9, which took effect in July 2004, requires firms to link pay to performance though disclosing 
performance hurdles, proportion of performance related remuneration, and proportion of short 
                                                            
27Study Group on Directors Remuneration, Directors Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard 
Greenbury, Gee and Co, London, 1995. 
28Committee on Corporate Governance, Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance, Gee and Co, London, 1997. 
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term incentives to long term incentives. Since January 2005, AASB 2 Share-based Payment has been 
the milestone in terms of expensing executive share-based payments. Since prior research was 
conducted, the legislations have tried to give more ‘say to pay’ to shareholders by recommending 
‘double-strike’ rule and ‘clawback’ provision. Moreover, the Corporations Amendment 2009 puts an 
upper boundary on executive or director’s termination pay, which is limited to one year’s salary. The 
Corporations Act Amendment 2011 prohibits executives or directors from hedging activities. 
In summary, the Australian legislation requires explicit recognition and disclosure of executive 
remuneration information such as performance hurdles, proportion of performance related 
remuneration, and proportion of short term incentives to long term incentives. As a result of these 
tightened executive remuneration disclosure requirements, it is opportune to examine the executive 
pay-performance relationship and determinants of executive remuneration components in Australia.  
It is probable that the weight of each pay component may have changed due to the continuous 
amendments to the regulations. Hence, this study could be used to evaluate the influence of the 
changing regulatory environment on CEO remunerations by comparing current remuneration 
practices to those in previous studies. 
2.3 An Overview of Executive Remuneration Literature 
2.3.1 The agency theory 
Due to separation of ownership and control, there exist conflicts of interest between shareholders 
and the rational, self-serving CEO (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Under the agency theory, CEO’s utility 
function differs from shareholder’s utility function (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Such a discrepancy is 
likely due to asymmetric information and as a result, CEOs as agents, act opportunistically, and not 
necessarily in the best interests of principal (shareholder) (Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Lambert, Larcker, 
& Verrecchia, 1991; Dalton & Dalton, 2011).   
A compensation contract (mainly extrinsic motivation) could drive the CEO to achieve corporate 
objectives instead of self-serving objectives (Dalton & Dalton, 2011). Therefore, the compensation 
contract should be capable of delivering incentive-alignment incentive and reward for risk-taking 
(Bruce, Buck & Main, 2005). 
Incentive plans can increase CEO’s utility as well as CEO’s risk aversion. This is particularly the case 
for CEOs whose compensation is equity based and who suffer from more non-diversifiable risk. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Smith and Stulz (1985), and Jensen and Murphy (1990) suggest that 
when a manager holds common stock or stock options, then his or her wealth depends on the firm’s 
share performance. As the firm share price fluctuates, the return to this incentive plan becomes 
uncertain and the manager experiences equity risk. As a result, for risk-averse managers, they 
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require additional compensation for bearing an additional non-diversifiable risk (Smith & Stulz, 
1985). 
Pratt (1964) argues that a risk-averse person is indifferent between receiving risk and certainty 
equivalent, which is equal to expected utility minus risk premium:  
                     Certainty equivalent = E (Wealth) – Risk premium.                                              (2. 1)                    
Differentiating equation (2. 1) with respect to equity risk (standard deviation of share return denoted 
by (ߪ) yields the following: 
డ ஼௘௥௧௔௜௡௧௬ ௘௤௨௜௩௔௟௘௡௧
డఙ
=  డ ா(ௐ௘௔௟௧௛)
డఙ
 - డ ோ௜௦௞ ௣௥௘௠௜௨௠
డఙ
.                                                (2. 2) 
Smith and Stulz (1985) and Lambert et al. (1991) divide the effect of the firm equity risk on managers 
preference into two parts, డ ா(ௐ௘௔ )
డఙ
, or wealth effect which measures change of expected wealth 
as firm’s equity return changes; another is డ ோ௜௦௞ ௣௥௘௠௜௨௠
డఙ
, or risk-aversion effect which measures the 
risk aversion effect on the manager’s utility. The total level of the manager’s risk aversion depends 
on the magnitudes of the wealth and the risk-aversion effects. For managers facing limited 
diversification of capital investments, they tend to decrease the firm cash flow variation by forgoing 
risky variability-increasing projects but with positive Net Present Value (NPV) (Guay, 1999). However, 
for shareholders who hold a well-diversified portfolio, they want mangers to take on positive NPV 
projects to maximise the firm’s value. In order to offset this agency problem, the magnitude of 
wealth effect needs to be increased.   
2.3.2 Managerial power theory 
Power is the ability of an individual to influence others to achieve a desired outcome (Pfeffer & 
Lammerding, 1981). Williamson (1985) suggests that social forces play an important role in the 
boardroom. Theoretically, Pfeffer (1972) was one of the first to document the influence of board 
power distribution. Empirically, O'Reilly III, Main, and Crystal (1988) and Manner (2010) demonstrate 
the significance of management power and social influence in corporate governance.  
Executive power theory (also known as ‘rent extraction theory’) asserts that remuneration 
arrangements are heavily influenced by socially-derived executive power (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; 
Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, 2002). This power could be easily found in the director appointment 
process. Westphal and Zajac (1995) suggest that the CEO has a substantial influence over the 
appointment of new directors. Westphal and Khanna (2003) show that when a director opposes a 
CEO remuneration arrangement, he or she does not dare to vote against the CEO due to the CEO’s 
coercive power. Other sources of CEO power include ownership power, measured through the 
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percentage of shares held by a CEO structural power (Westphal & Zajac, 1995), measured through 
the CEO’s tenure on the board (Hill & Phan, 1991). Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) argue that CEO’s 
tenure and seniority in the firm increase the CEO’s reference power in the board of directors in which 
there are a large crowd of CEO’s followers. The ratio of inside directors to outside directors plays an 
important role in determining the CEOs’ power. Inside directors are more willing to conciliate to the 
CEOs’ preference in designing remuneration packages, because there is a huge power distance 
between them and the CEOs (Fredrickson et al., 1988); whereas, outsiders are supposed to be less 
accommodating than insiders (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). When a CEO is also the chairman of the 
board, the CEO has a substantial legitimate power over the board, at the expense of losing board’s 
independence monitoring the executives’ activities (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Harrison, Torres & 
Kukalis, 1988). 
Managerial power scholars, such as Bebchuk and Fried (2004), recognise the agency problem. 
However, in their book Pay without Performance, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) point out the decoupling 
between pay and performance in the US. Similarly, Finkelstein (1992), Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-
Mejia (2002) and van der Laan, Van Ees, and Van Witteloostuijn (2010) argue that the arms’ length 
bargaining assumption does not hold in practice. Those studies show that executives and directors 
make executive compensation decisions regardless of the influence of shareholders and the board is 
compromised by the CEO’s influence over director nomination.  
Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998), and Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia (2002) suggest that option-
based LTIPs theoretically can motivate CEOs to act in the shareholders’ interests. Acting as an agent 
of the shareholders, the board of directors should design compensation contracts to mitigate CEO 
self-serving decisions. However, when it comes to implementing LTIPs in practice, Zajac and 
Westphal (1994) argue that powerful CEOs influence the board to introduce compensation packages 
detached to performance. This phenomenon could be attributed to risks involved in non-tradable 
LTIPs, which also make compensation contingent on the firm’s future financial performance (Zajac & 
Westphal, 1994; Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002). 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) and Palia (2001) suggest that CEO age is positively related to share-based 
incentives, based on the argument that as CEOs approach retirement, potential horizon problems 
could be mitigated by increased option incentives. However, Hallock (1998) discusses that CEO’s age 
can serve as a proxy of CEO’s referent power because it is an estimate of human capital. Based on a 
sample of large Canadian firms over the period 2001 to 2004, Chourou, Abaoub, and Saadi (2008) 
find that CEO age negatively affects the weight of share options in total compensation. Similarly, 
Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) find that CEO age has a significant negative relation to vega in a 
  
 24
sample of US banks. The authors suggest that older CEOs are less subject to monitoring by regulators 
which encourages risky investment.  
Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia (2002) refer CEOs ability to influence board decisions as ownership 
power. If a CEO is a board member, then it is very likely that other executive directors will be 
influenced to vote in favour of the CEO when it comes to voting on the compensation policies. 
Moreover, CEOs will be asked to undertake more risk-increasing and value-enhancing projects when 
there are more non-executive directors monitoring closely on CEOs than executive directors in the 
board.  
Based on a sample of 1500 S&P companies from 1999-2004, Kay (2004) finds that CEO ownership of 
share options predates and causes high level of firm performance which is expressed by the total 
returns to shareholders and EPS growth. Moreover, the author presents the percentage change in 
CEO total cash compensation is very sensitive to the firm performance. Hence, Kay (2004) concludes 
that the executive pay model (pay-for-performance) works in the US. There is a need to fix the model 
rather than to discard the model. 
2.3.3 Stewardship and stockholder theory 
Stewardship theory departs from strict economic thinking on motivation and the relationship 
between executives and the corporation and is based as an alternative to agency theory (Davis et al., 
1997). Davis et al. (1997) refer mangers to stewards whose pro-organisational behaviours have 
higher utility than individual self-serving behaviours in agency theory. Facing a choice between self-
serving behaviour and collectivistic behaviour, a steward’s behaviour should be congruent with the 
interests of his or her organisation.  
Following the stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997), stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1983) holds a 
less sarcastic view of executives. More specifically, senior executives make important corporate 
decisions in the shareholders’ interests rather than in their own immediate self-interest (Mitchell, 
Agle & Wood, 1997). In addition, Mitchell et al. (1997) suggest the ‘salience’ of different stakeholders 
varies under different institutional circumstances. 
2.3.4 Institution theory 
North (1990) and Williamson (2000) make significant contribution to the evolution of institution 
theory in management studies from the sociology perspective. Williamson (2000) declares that the 
institutional environment including laws, policy, judiciary and bureaucracy, is critical in examining the 
development of nation states or businesses. 
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Institutional theory provides four interconnected levels of social analysis, namely social 
embeddedness (social theory), institutional environment (positive political theory), governance 
(transaction cost economics) and resource allocation and employment (agency theory aligning 
interests) (Williamson, 2000). In other words, institutional theory incorporates agency, power and 
stewardship theory. To some extent, the executive compensation must be influenced by the firm’s 
institutional environment. In this current study, we incorporate company institutional environment 
including legal environment and the industry impact on mitigating agency problem.  
2.4 Models of CEO Compensation and Option Incentives 
The most cited model of executive remuneration is the human capital model (Becker & Neuhauser, 
1975), which indicates that executive remuneration is related to the manager’s personal traits such 
as age, experience, tenure and educational background. Becker and Neuhauser (1975) argue that the 
levels and structure of executive compensation differ due to the differences in managers’ human 
capital traits. 
Within the corporate growth model, firm size is a significant determinant of CEO remuneration 
(Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). According to Hill and Phan (1991) and Westphal and Zajac (1995), 
size of a firm is highly related to the firm’s compensation. However, Schaefer (1998) suggests that 
pay-performance sensitivity seems to be negatively associated with the square root of firm size.  
Tournament-based pay models depicts that employees are motivated by pay differentials in different 
position across the firm hierarchy to compete for promotions (Rosen, 1981). Hence, CEO 
compensation will be viewed as a trophy to motivate lower level managers to compete for 
promotion (Rosen, 1981). 
The last model is social comparison theory for executive remuneration (Festinger, 1954). This model 
suggests that executives’ compensation should be compared with peer firms in the same industry 
(Festinger, 1954). However, some researchers argue that firms choose peers opportunistically, and 
chosen peers are larger and better performing than firms in the labor market (Plath & Gale, 2008; 
Faulkender & Yang, 2010; Bizjak, Lemmon & Nguyen, 2011). 
There are two streams of research models for CEOs’ portfolio holdings of option incentives (Core & 
Guay, 2002). The first stream is the determinants of managerial ownership (Himmelberg, Hubbard & 
Palia, 1999; Palia, 2001).The second stream covers the determinants of share-based compensation 
(Core & Guay, 1999; Guay, 1999; Chourou et al., 2008). 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) hypothesise that firm size and monitoring difficulty are two major 
determinants of managerial equity ownership. They argue that if the optimal firm size is large, the 
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dollar cost of an equity ownership is also correspondingly large. Thus, larger firms are hypothesised 
to possess a lower percentage ownership. On the contrary, Smith and Watts (1992) and Baker, 
Ruback, and Wurgler (2004) argue that larger firms need talented executives who are expected to be 
highly compensated. Thus, larger firms are hypothesised to possess a high percentage equity 
ownership.  
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) also hypothesise that monitoring costs increase as the environment in 
which the firms operate gets less predictable, or noisier. Due to the increased in monitoring costs, 
firms operating in noisier environments are expected to demonstrate a higher percentage of equity 
ownership. 
The second strand of research focuses on the determinants of share-based compensation. Both Guay 
(1999) and Core and Guay (2002) argue that there is a positive relation between CEO tenure and 
equity incentive levels. Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002) employ a common factor analysis to 
form a single variable for investment opportunity sets (IOS) to reduce the noise among IOS 
components. The authors reported a positive relation between vega and IOS.  
Dechow and Sloan (1991) point out that as CEOs approach retirement, potential horizon problems 
could be mitigated by increasing option incentives. In addition, CEO tenure may serve as a proxy for 
CEO wealth (Guay, 1999). Palia (2001) finds a positive relation between CEO option incentives levels 
and CEO experience. Further, Chourou et al. (2008) find that CEO share ownership is negatively 
associated with the use of option-based compensation. Hemmer et al. (2000) argue that convexity 
should be introduced into CEOs’ compensation contracts when CEOs have moderate relative risk 
aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion. In addition, convexity of share-based compensation 
plans can be reduced by decreasing the skewness in share price gamma distribution (Hemmer et al., 
2000). 
2.5 Board of Directors and CEO Compensation 
A company’s board of directors represents shareholders’ interests and according to Jensen (1993), it 
serves as the interest alignment mechanism to mitigate the agency problem. The board of directors 
is an integral internal corporate governance mechanism in monitoring senior management and 
determining executive pay (e.g. Jensen, 1990; Westphal & Zajac 1994; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). 
2.5.1 Outside directors 
Outside directors or independent directors can be defined as non-executive directors (Zajac and 
Westphal, 1994). Researchers have shown the importance and effectiveness of outside directors in 
light of monitoring executives (Zajac and Westphal, 1994). First, outside directors have strong drives 
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to signal other employees their managerial expertise (Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Weisbach, 1988). 
Second, outside directors normally possess competency in internal organisational control (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983b). 
However, there is an array of literature which suggest that outside directors are ineffective in 
monitoring executives. First, Finkestein and Hambrick (1996) find that the monitoring quality of 
outside director is low due to the director’s low equity holdings. Second, if an outside director was a 
former executive or recently appointed by the CEO, then the independence of that outside director 
would be a problem (Zajac and Westphal, 1995). This is because the ‘inside-dominated boards imply 
problematic self-monitoring, and particularly weak monitoring of the CEO, since the CEO is likely to be 
in a position to influence the insider directors’ career advancement within the firm’ (Zajac and 
Westphal, 1994, pp.125). 
Regarding the relationship between outside directors and executive pay level, researchers show that 
the relationship is not necessarily a negative one. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), and Conyon and 
Peck (1998) fail to find the negative impact of the outside directors on CEO compensation. Moreover, 
there are some studies which show a positive association between CEO pay and outsider directors 
appointed by the CEO (Main, O'Reilly & Wade, 1995). 
Brockie Leonard and Mishra (1996) point out that the influence of outside directors and the board 
monitoring is not just on the determination of compensation level. An important task of outside 
directors and the board is to design a motivating compensation contract so that executives have an 
incentive to behave in congruent with shareholder interest (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003).  
2.5.2 CEO duality 
One significant difference between the UK andUS corporate governance system is the greater 
amount of constraint on the exercise of CEO power(Aguilera, Williams, Conley & Rupp, 2006). In 
theUS, it is common that a CEO is also the board chairman. Similarly in Australia, there are no rules 
separating those two duties. However, in UK, the Combined Code of Corporate Governance in 2003 
recommends firms split the role of chairman and CEO, because separating these duties can increase 
the power of the board of directors to operate independent of executives and effectively monitors 
managerial discretion (Aguilera et al., 2006). 
If a CEO is the chairman of the board, then effective monitoring of the board will be significantly 
reduced, and as a result, the firm’s performance will suffer (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Hence, 
the roles of CEO and chairperson should be separated (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). As a result, non-
executive board chair will facilitate objective evaluation of the CEO and top management team 
performance (Boyd, 1994). Influenced by this trend, the Cadbury Committee in the UK recommended 
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that there should be a clear division of responsibilities at the firm’s strategic level, implying that the 
roles of the chair and CEO should not be combined.  
The issue of CEO duality is regarded by researchers as a dimension of management power. Boyd 
(1994) points out that being a figure head of the board chair would give the CEO with a wider power 
base and locus of control. Similarly, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) observed that CEO duality is 
another indicator of CEO power over a board.   
2.6 Review on the Levels and Components of CEO remuneration 
Remuneration policy plays a critical role in determining organisational success (Jensen & Murphy, 
1990). This section focuses on studies that detail the levels and structures of executive remuneration 
packages among US, UK and Australian firms.  
2.6.1 Significance of levels and components of CEO remuneration 
The amazing growth of CEO pay levels over the past three decades has spurred academic, political 
and public interest (Harford & Li, 2007; Matolcsy & Wright, 2007). CEO pay contracts should be 
designed to mitigate the agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983b). Based 
on a wide variety of data sources, Murphy (1999) categorises executive remuneration packages into 
three components: a base salary, a performance-based annual bonus, and a share-based pay 
(including option, rights and performance shares in short-term and long-term incentive plans).  
According to the ‘marginal productivity’ theory (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997), base salary is a 
reflection of the mangers’ responsibility and risk which depend on the firm’s size, complexity, and 
the corporate risk. However, agency theorists argue that salary by itself is not enough to reduce the 
misaligned interests between owners and the managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Bonus given to 
executive should be based on a single year firm’s accounting performance or the return from the 
change of share price plus dividends (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Agency theorists also suggest that 
shareholders encourage increasing share-based payments to executives because they believe that 
equity ownership could weaken agency problem (La Porta et al., 2000); subsequently, by extending 
the time span to align executives’ interests with shareholders’ interests, LTIPs are gaining increasing 
prevalence globally. 
The levels of CEO remuneration may play a significant part in motivating CEOs, the importance of pay 
components (such as the proportion of cash salary, bonus, and share-based incentives to total pay) 
has been stressed by Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Mehran (1995) in the light of mitigating agency 
problem. If the pay components are not addressed in our study, then it would be difficult to present 
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a clear picture about what type of pay is the most effective form in the light of mitigating agency 
problem. 
2.6.2 Level and components of Australian CEO remuneration 
In a sample of the top 200 Australian public listed companies from 1999 to 2002, Chalmers, Koh, and 
Stapledon (2006) find that cash salary decreased to about 60% of executives’ total remuneration in 
the period. This is probably because share options contribute about 20% of average executive pay, 
whereas cash bonuses account for approximately 15% (Chalmers et al., 2006).  
After the study by Chalmers et al. (2006), Matolcsy and Wright (2007) studied a sample of the top 
500 Australian companies from 1999 to 2001. They find that 34% of the firms use cash-only pay, 
whereas the rest offer their CEOs a combination of cash and share-based pay. Only four firms did not 
pay CEOs a base salary, which is a very small portion of the total sample. Of the total sample, 34% 
provide CEOs with a cash bonus, less than 51% reported in the study by Coulton and Taylor (2002). 
Taking industry type into consideration, Matolcsy and Wright (2007) suggest that both cash and 
equity-based pay exist for all industries. However, they observe that 70% of manufacturing firms 
adopt equity-based compensations schemes. 
Based on a total of 2598 firms from 2006 to 2009, Rankin (2010) investigated the impact of CLERP 9 
(Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act 2004) on the level and structure of top executive 
remuneration. CLERP 9 made substantial changes to executive compensation disclosure requirement 
in Australia (Rankin, 2010). Rankin finds that base salary accounted for approximately 60% of CEO 
total pay. In addition, use of a bonus plan increased dramatically in 2009 (85% of the sample), 
compared with other years where the average is between 53% and 57%, which is similar to the 51% 
observed in Coulton and Taylor’s (2002) study. The weight of cash bonuses in total pay increased 
from 16% to 20%. Rankin also observes that over 70% of the sample firms use options-based LTIPs, 
and only 25% use common shares as long-term incentives. Rankin reports that the average LTIPs 
increase from $166,819 in 2006 to $299,838 in 2009. The author studied the impact of industry as 
well and reports that the financial sector pays the highest levels of cash salary; however, the ratio of 
cash salary to total pay is the lowest. Mining company bonuses account for the smallest proportion in 
total pay. Financial firms use the highest levels of LTIPs, although the ratio of cash salary to total pay 
is once again the lowest. 
Hill et al. (2010) report that Australian CEOs’ base salary accounts for a higher portion of total 
compensations than that of US CEOs. Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and Murphy (2012) reach the same 
conclusion with the base salary constituting 46% of CEO total remuneration and shares and share 
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options account for 18%, whereas these two components of CEO compensation account for only 25% 
and 39% in US CEOs’ total compensation. 
Only a few studies have investigated the relationship between CEO compensation and firm 
performance in Australia. For example, Hutchinson (2003) regresses the firms’ ROE on the firm total 
risk, controlling for executive incentives (number of options divided by the sum of number of options 
and number of common shares). Their results show that, for executives who received more option-
based payments, the negative relationship between firm risk and performance was weaker. 
Hutchinson attributes his finding to option-based payments that provide executives with an incentive 
to adopt risky, but performance-enhancing projects. 
In contrast, Merhebi et al. (2006) find a positive relationship between CEOs’ total compensation and 
shareholders’ wealth. In a sample of 722 Australian ﬁrms from 1990 to 1999, Merhebi et al. (2006) 
regress the change in the logarithm of CEOs’ total compensation on the change in the log of 
shareholders’ wealth. They find that the coefﬁcients on both the current and one-year lagged 
changes in shareholders’ wealth are positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Thus, they conclude that 
CEOs’ pay increases for continual increases in shareholder wealth. 
Using Australian data, Schultz et al. (2010) find no pay-performance relationship. They examined ASX 
200 firms from 2000 to 2007 using a range of panel data estimation methods. Schultz et al. (2010) 
find that when less-robust pooled OLS and the firm fixed effect methods were used, there was 
significance influence of the CEOs’ compensation variables on the firms’ total return. However, after 
accounting for endogeneity in the regressors and more robust dynamic GMM methods were 
employed, the previous parameter estimates lost their significance. Hence, Schultz et al. (2010) 
suggest that the endogeneity problem caused the insignificant influence of the CEOs’ compensation 
variables on the firms’ value. 
2.6.3 Levels and components of US CEO remuneration 
To test whether performance based pay has been more increasingly prevalent, Conyon and Murphy 
(2000) studied 1,700 public companies and confirm that trend. They find that 63% of total pay was 
performance related. In addition, share options account for 42% of the total pay, the largest weight 
of any other pay components. 
Athavale and Avila (2005) examine 92 public insurance companies in 1999 and 2001. The authors find 
that CEO remuneration structure was not significantly different. However, pay structure differs 
across organisation ranks. More specifically, base salary accounted for 46.5% for the highest-paid 
executive (not necessarily the CEO), however, that component increased to 53.4% for the third-
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highest-paid executive. On the other hand, options constituted 24.1% for the highest-paid executive, 
and decreased to 18.1% for the third-highest-paid executive. 
In testing the convergence toward US CEO pay levels and structure by non-US firms, Fernandes et al. 
(2012) performed comprehensive research of CEO pay across 14 countries with strict CEO 
remuneration disclosure requirements. The authors find that, in 2007, the US CEO pay premium 
significantly decreased from 58% in 2003 to 2% while controlling for firm, board and ownership 
characteristics. The authors conclude that ‘US-style’ share-based CEO pay is being ‘exported’ to non-
US firms that are increasingly exposed to US capital, technology and managerial labour markets. 
2.6.4 Level and components of UK CEO remuneration 
CEO remuneration in the UK is categorised into the following components: a cash salary, a 
performance-based annual bonus, options or LTIPs (Conyon & Murphy, 2000), perks and pension 
(Bender & Moir, 2006). Based on an examination of CEO compensation contracts in the 200 largest 
UK companies for the year 2007, Conyon et al. (2000) find that base salary constituted approximately 
54% of CEO total pay, the bonus accounted for 24% and LTIPs contributed 22%. In terms of the levels 
of CEO pay, the authors observe from their data, the mean (median) salary is £293,300 (£264,000), 
and the mean (median) total cash compensation is £451,400 (£389, 500). 
 In a response to the Greenbury report recommendation to replace non-performance based share 
incentives with LTIPs, share-based payments have shifted from options to LTIP grants (Conyon et al., 
2000). Stathopoulos et al. (2004) find that approximately one third of companies replaced options 
with LTIPs and about 60% of CEOs took part in LTIPs. 
Eichholtz and Kok (2008) studied a sample of 39 property companies from 1998 to 2003 and 
observed that, in 2003, about 80% of the sample firms used the bonus as cash remuneration, 
whereas nearly 50% of the sample firms implemented LTIPs and about 80% of the firms still used 
options, compared with 74%, 35%, and 65%, respectively, in 1998. The authors find that the yearly 
mean CEO base salary was £203,490, the mean value of the cash compensation was £408,810 and 
the mean value of share options was £391, 840. Eichholtz and Kok (2008) also find that, during 1998-
2003, the base salary dropped from 46% to approximately 32% of CEO total pay, the portion as cash 
bonuses in total pay decreased from 18% to 11.9%, LTIP shares increased from 1% to 10.3% and 
options increased from 34.3% to 45.7%. 
2.6.5 Conclusions on level and structures of CEO remuneration 
Worldwide, levels of executive remuneration have grown at an amazing rate over the past three 
decades. The total CEO remuneration of US S&P500 firms increased over 150 times over the period 
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(Minnick & Noga, 2010). There has been a pay premium for CEOs in the US with the highest total pay 
and in the proportion of equity-based pay in the pay structure (e.g., Matolcsy & Wright, 2007; Hill et 
al., 2010; Fernandes et al., 2012). Although CEO remuneration structures in Australia are different 
from those in the US, the CEO pay-performance relationship is similar in the two countries (Matolcsy 
& Wright, 2007).  
According to Fernandes et al. (2012), the ‘US-style’ share-based CEO pay is being ‘exported’ to non-
US firms that are increasingly exposed to US capital, technology and managerial labour markets. As a 
result, the pay gap is shrinking (Fernandes et al., 2012). 
2.7 Components of CEO remunerations CEO Option incentives (Delta and 
Vega) 
Delta refers to the change in CEO total wealth with respect to the change in share price (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Buck, Liu and Skovoroda (2008) define delta ‘as the 
absolute increment to pay associated with a 1000 unit (e.g., $) increase in shareholder value’. 
Agency theorists believe that CEO remuneration contracts, if designed appropriately (a high 
correlation between pay and performance), can mitigate the agency problem (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Dechow & Sloan 1991; Baker 2004). As a result, delta has been the main focus of the 
western CEO pay literature (Bebchuk et al., 2002). 
In order to examine delta, the first step is to measure performance. According to Lambert and 
Larcker (1987), there are two measures of a firm’s economic performance: return on assets and 
share returns. The first measure depends more and is under the discretion of managers. The 
problems with the return on assets measure include the focus on short-term profits at the expense 
of longer-term profitability and possible accounting fraud by managers. The second measure, share 
returns, represents the shareholders’ benefits and the long-run value of the firm, which is more 
difficult for managers to manipulate. One drawback in the use of share returns is that share prices 
are subject to general market movements and other non-diversifiable risks (Firth, Fung & Rui, 2006). 
The literature reveals two possible impacts of delta on the agency problem. According to the 
incentive effect, increasing delta can better align the interests of CEOs and shareholders and, thus, 
induce managers to more aggressively undertake risky projects maximizing shareholders’ value. 
However, increases in delta will increase CEOs’ risk aversion because of their poor diversification 
compared with shareholders who are well diversified (Guay, 1999; Core & Guay, 2002). In addition, 
managers’ human capital is closely tied to the firm’s performance (Stulz, 1984; Smith & Stulz, 1985; 
Smith & Watts, 1992). Guay (1999) and Ross (2004) point out that the concavity of the manager’s 
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utility function may dominate the convexity of the compensation payoff inducing managers to be 
more risk-averse. Thus, managers are not willing to pick risky projects with positive NPVs. 
2.7.1 Delta literature 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) were among the first researchers to examine delta. They performed 
ground-breaking research on CEO pay in 1990 and admitted that, though there were serious 
problems with CEO compensation in the US, excessive pay is not the real problem. Based on the cash 
salary, bonus and share options information from a comprehensive sample of 2,505 CEOs in 1,400 
public companies from 1974 to 1980, the authors suggest that the real trouble of CEO pay was the 
weak delta.  
The next milestone literature on delta was conducted by Hall and Liebman in 1998. The authors re-
examined Yermack’s (1995) sample of 792 companies with compensation data from the Forbes 
survey over 1980-1994 and observe that the median CEO losses were $435,000 for a tenth percentile 
firm performance and gains of about $8.6 million for a ninetieth percentile firm performance. Hence, 
Hall and Liebman (1998) conclude that CEO remuneration was highly associated with firm 
performance. They also find that share-based payments increase median CEO wealth by about $1.25 
million in response to a 10% increase in firm value. They conclude that delta was contributed to by 
the value of common shares and share options (Hall & Liebman, 1998). 
Using annual compensation data among S&P 1,500 firms for 1994 to 2005, Chang, Choy and Wan, 
(2012) find that the delta of CEOs’ share options has decreased substantially in the post-Sarbanes–
Oxley Act era, which indicates that the incentive alignment between shareholders and CEOs 
substantially weakened after SOX (Chang et al., 2012). 
Main et al. (1995) were the first to examine delta in UK public companies. The authors find firm size 
is a determinant of executive pay level. More specifically, pay-firm size elasticity (PSE) is 0.21 for the 
highest-paid director and 0.14 for all directors. The PPE increases from 0.23 to 0.9 for the highest-
paid director and increases from 0.15 to 0.71 for all directors when share options are incorporated in 
total pay. Similarly, Benito and Conyon (1999) find a significant positive delta and report PPE is 0.26 
for CEOs’ total compensation. They also find that CEO compensation is positively associated with 
previous shareholder returns and firm size. 
Based on a sample of 390 non-finance UK companies from the FTSE All Share Index for 1999-2005, 
Ozkan (2011) shows that the PPE for CEOs in UK is smaller than that for US CEOs. Specifically, the 
author finds that PPE is 0.075 for cash compensation and 0.095 for total compensation, which 
implies that a 10% increase in shareholder return corresponds to an increase of 0.75% (0.95%) in 
cash (total compensation). Moreover, a share-based delta is lower for UK CEOs than US CEOs. The 
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author concludes that UK corporate governance initiatives, such as the Greenbury Report (1995), 
have had little impact on linking more pay to performance (Ozkan, 2011). 
Delta examination in Australia exhibits mixed results. Izan, Sidhu and Taylor (1998), using a sample of 
99 listed companies covering 12 industries for 1987-1992, report that there is no significant 
relationship between remuneration changes and firm performance measured by return on equity or 
share price returns. Conversely, Merhebi et al. (2006) find that non-share-based CEO pay delta is 
positive, which is consistent with international findings. Similarly, Schultz et al. (2010) find that there 
is a strong relation between CEO pay and firm performance.  
Based on financial and accounting data on China's public firms from 1998 to 2002, Kato and Long 
(2006) find delta is 0.027, which is quite low by international standards, though higher than the 
original estimates by Jensen and Murphy (1990). Similarly, Buck et al. (2008) find a statistically 
significant, positive pay-performance elasticity of 0.015 in China. 
Ke, Rui and Yu (2012) find little difference in the delta of total compensation between state-
controlled H and A shares. Ke et al.’s (2012) sample includes 133 state-controlled A shares, 62 state-
controlled H shares and 36 state-controlled Red Chip shares in Hong Kong. Ke et al. (2012) show that 
the delta cash compensation and the LTIP level are significantly greater for state-controlled Red Chip 
shares than for state-controlled A and H shares. 
Delta varies across firms and industries (Gregg, Jewell & Tonks., 2005). Based on a sample of some 40 
small to medium sized manufacturing companies for 1985 to 1992, Conyon and Nicolitsas (1998) find 
positive but insignificant delta. In order to test delta in a regulated industry such as the electricity 
industry, Duru and Iyengar (1999) used a sample of 255 utilities and find a positive relationship 
between changes in total pay and changes in shareholder returns. A similar result was found in the 
banking industry; Mishra and Nielsen (2000) report both delta and the tenure of outside directors 
exhibits a positive relationship with bank performance. In contrast, using ASX-listed bank 
performance and compensation data from 1995 to 2005, Chu, Lawrence and Stapledon (2006) find 
no relationship between pay and performance as measured by the ratio of remuneration to earnings 
per share growth. 
A recent paper by Chen, Truong and Veeraraghavan (2015) highlights important evidence that delta 
is a risk-decreasing incentive. The authors find that higher-delta CEOs are likely to reduce the firm’s 
risk and thus lower the cost of equity capital due to the undiversifiable share portfolio (Fama, 1980; 
Stulz, 1984; Smith & Stulz, 1985). The authors argued  that shareholders require more compensation 
for taking the excessive risk by increasing the cost of equity capital when a CEO has an incentive to 
adopt riskier firm financing and investing policies.  
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2.7.2 The determinants of delta 
To demonstrate that shareholders can design a managerial compensation structure to balance the 
firm’s future and present stock-price performance, Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993) employed a 
sample of 430 large US corporations from 1975 to 1989 and conclude that delta is negatively related 
to total assets, market-to-book (M/B) ratio and research and development (R&D) intensity. Based on 
a sample of 6214 observations from 1992 to 1997, Core and Guay (2002) find delta is positively 
related to assets in place, firm-specific risk and CEO tenure but negatively related to book-to-market 
(B/M) ratio. Core and Guay (2002) used 228 CEO option portfolios collected by Guay (1999) and 
observe a positive relationship between in-the-money options and delta. 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2004) use a sample of firms from Execucomp for 1991 to 2000 and find 
firm size, market-to-book value of assets, capital expenditure, share price volatility, surplus cash and 
CEO tenure are significant and positively related to delta. The firm risky policy choices such as R&D 
and leverage are significant and negatively related to delta (Coles et al., 2004). Coles et al. (2004) also 
find a positive association between CEO tenure and delta.  
2.7.3 The effect of delta on shareholder value 
A firm is owned by its shareholders, however, professional managers headed by the Chief Executive 
Officer run the firm. Because of this separation of ownership and control, self-interested managers 
behave opportunistically (Jensen & Meckling, 1979). In order to alleviate the agency problem, agency 
theorists, such as Jensen and Murphy (1990), Smith and Stulz (1985) and Jensen and Meckling (1979), 
argue that the board of directors should use LTIPs to align managerial interests with shareholder 
interests.  
A firm’s shareholder value (or performance) is the present value of the future cash flows generated 
by the firm’s assets, which include assets in place and growth opportunities. There are two measures 
of shareholder value in the corporate governance literature. One type is an accounting measure such 
as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) (Adams et al., 2005; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011). 
Another measure focuses on share market price or valuation ratio such as Tobin’s Q, which is the 
ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt to the replacement cost of 
the firm’s assets in place, which can be represented by book value of assets (Aggarwal & Samwick, 
2006). Tobin’s Q is commonly used as a proxy for firm performance (e.g., Himmelberg et al., 1999; 
Dong et al., 2010). 
Delta has mixed effects on shareholder value. First, delta is regarded as an interest-aligning or effort 
incentive by corporate finance researchers (Garvey & Mawani, 2007). When a CEO holds common 
stock or stock options, his or her wealth depends on the firm’s share performance. Hence, in order to 
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profit from the allotted call options, high-delta CEOs have to adopt positive net present-value 
projects to drive up the spot market share price (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). 
However, as a firm’s share price fluctuates, the returns to the incentive plan become uncertain and 
the CEO experiences equity risk (Guay, 1999). As a result, the undiversified CEO will forgo risky, but 
value-enhancing projects (risk-aversion effect). Subsequently, a firm’s market-based performance 
decreases (Smith & Stultz, 1985; Bulan et al., 2010). 
Corporate finance literature suggests that the influence of CEO ownership on firm performance is 
substantial, but multi-dimensional (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Fama, 
1983; Smith & Stulz, 1985; Bulan et al., 2010; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011). The positive effect of CEO 
ownership on a firm’s performance is the incentive-alignment effect, whereby the mangers adopt 
value-maximizing projects that lead to increased share price when the managers own firm shares. 
However, when the managers own a great number of shares, the undiversified managers are 
exposed to more equity risk (volatility of share returns). This may cause the managers to bypass risky 
value-increasing projects (risk aversion effect). In addition, when CEOs own a substantial number of 
firm shares, they may become ‘entrenched’, i.e., have a powerful influence over the board to 
introduce polices to benefit themselves. 
The common approach in empirical studies to examine the CEO pay-firm value relationship is to 
regress the firm’s value (either ROA or Tobin’s Q) on executive compensation variables controlling for 
other firm and managerial characteristics. A significant compensation coefficient implies that 
compensation has not been set to maximise firm value, whereas an insignificant coefficient suggests 
that compensation has been set to maximise firm value (O’Connor & Rafferty, 2010). The influence of 
CEO ownership on firm performance is multi-dimensional, thus empirical findings are mixed. For 
instance, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) examined the performance of banks and find that delta is 
significant and negatively related to bank performance when controlling for vega. One plausible 
explanation for this finding is that CEOs focusing on shareholder interests took risky actions that 
were costly to the banks (Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011). Hence, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) suggest 
that the boards should decrease the portion of compensation that increases delta. However, Coles 
and Li (2011) find CEO delta and CEO delta fixed effect (residual delta) are both significant and 
positively related to Tobin’s Q and ROA. The authors attribute this improvement of performance to 
the firm fixed effect (FE) that is a proxy for managerial ability or human capital, which, in turn, 
increases firm performance. Hence, Coles and Li (2011) recommend that the boards increase the 
portion of compensation that increases delta. 
Some studies that use the firm FE model show no relationship between CEO ownership and firm 
performance. For instance, controlling for firm and manager specific variables, Palia (2001) fails to 
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find any evidence to show a relationship between CEO ownership and firm value. The author’s 
findings are consistent with Demsetz’s (1985) argument that an endogeneity issue arises when the 
firm’s optimal contract with the manger is due to market forces. In addition, Zhou (2001) and 
Benson, Davidson III, Wang, and Worrell (2009) claim that the power of the firm FE estimator is 
weak, since variation within firms is much smaller than between firms. Hence, using the firm fixed 
effects model may result in a type II error, a failure to reject the null hypothesis when it is false. 
Bulan et al. (2010) used a new method to find the relationship between CEO risk incentives and a 
firm’s performance based on panel data of 917 manufacturing firms for the period from 1992 to 
2003. Bulan et al. (2010) first set up a bridge between a firm’s productivity and Tobin’s Q and then 
relate the CEO incentives delta and vega to productivity. The authors find that productivity and firm 
performance have an inverted U-shape relationship with CEO delta and a positive relationship with 
vega, which implies that productivity initially increases as delta increases because of the interest-
aligning effect. However, as delta increases when the CEO share-based compensation is more 
sensitive to the firm’s share value, CEO risk-aversion increases, which encourages managers to 
forego productivity-enhancing projects (Bulan et al., 2010). Consequently, high-vega firm share 
options give CEOs more incentive to invest in riskier investments and therefore offset the high delta’s 
risk-decreasing effect (Bulan et al., 2010). 
Following Griliches (1981) model, O’Connor and Rafferty (2010) use a non-linear model to investigate 
the effect of CEO share-based incentives on a firm’s performance. O’Connor and Rafferty find that 
CEO cash compensation and delta have a positive, significant effect on Tobin’s Q, which implies that 
increasing cash compensation and rewarding for more share returns enhance shareholders’ value. 
Hence, O’Connor and Rafferty (2010) suggest that the board should increase cash compensation and 
tie more share grants to share returns in order to increase the firm’s value. 
Though a firm’s performance may be influenced by the CEO’s option incentives (vega and delta), it is 
also likely that the causation can go both ways. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) suggest that, because 
of asymmetrical information and performance-dependent compensation, expected firm value can 
affect managerial equity holdings. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) point out that a leveraged buyout is 
an extreme example of how expected firm value can change managerial equity holdings. Failing to 
address this potential endogeneity issue will lead to biased regression estimates (Loderer & Martin, 
1997; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). 
Because equity-based compensation consists of shares and options, the effects of two option 
incentives (delta and vega) should be tested together to investigate option incentives-firm value or 
firm performance relationships. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Haugen and Senbet (1981), Guay (1999) 
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and Coles et al. (2006) argue that a convexity payoff from option-based pay should induce managers 
to take on risky but value-adding activities. The next section presents relevant literature on vega. 
2.7.4 Vega literature 
Shareholders as owners of a firm, do not run the firm. The firm is run by a group of professional 
managers, led by the CEO. Because of the separation of ownership and control, self-serving CEOs are 
more likely to undertake projects with cash flows that are relatively certain and reject risky, but 
value-enhancing projects. Consequently, misaligned interests exist between CEOs and shareholders 
and, as a result, the classic principal-agency problem arises (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Therefore. 
firms must think of some ways to reward CEOs with more incentives to take risks that could increase 
shareholders’ value (Shiller, 2013). 
Option-based compensation influences a CEO’s wealth and can motivate a CEO to pursue riskier 
policies (Ross, 2004; Coles, Daniel & Naveen, 2006). This is because if a CEO has a greater option 
holdings, then the CEO’s wealth is not linear to the change in share prices (Hall & Liebman, 1997) but 
is very sensitive to increase in the volatility of share returns (in this case, the CEO has a high pay-
equity risk sensitivity or high-vega). Similarily, Guay (1999) finds that share options significantly 
increase the convexity of the relationship between the manager’s compensation and share price. 
Guay (1999) argues that the impact of the vega exerted by common shares is less than the 
magnitude of the vega exerted by share options. Hence, Guay suggests share-option based incentives 
can generate more wealth effect to motivate CEOs. 
Previous studies argue that a CEO’s vega is a risk-increasing incentive (Coles et al., 2006; DeYoung, 
Peng & Yan, 2013; Chen et al., 2015). Vega is defined as the change in the dollar value of a CEO’s 
wealth for a 1% change in the volatility of share returns (Core & Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006; 
Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011). Schultz (1998) points out that human brains send some signals to 
stimulate humans to take certain actions to pursue a reward when there is a high level of uncertainty 
coupled with future reward. Schultz’s paper may help to explain why high-vega CEOs (who are 
rewarded by volatility) are expected to have more incentives to take risks.  
There are many empirical studies that reveal CEO vega is a risk-increasing incentive. For instance, 
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) find that the oil and gas firms’ exploration risk, measured by the 
coefﬁcient of variation of future cash ﬂows from exploration activity, increases with the CEOs’ vega. 
Coles et al. (2006) find that CEOs’ vega leads to riskier investments, such as increased in R&D 
expenses. Armstrong et al. (2013) show that high-vega CEOs have more incentives to misreport using 
discretionary accruals and restatements. Géczy et al. (2007) show that high-vega CEOs are more 
incentivised to use derivative instruments to hedge the firm’s market risk exposure. Chava and 
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Purnanandam (2010) show that there is a negative association between vega and the firm’s less risky 
assets-cash holdings. DeYoung et al. (2013) find that high-vega banks exhibit higher systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk. Further, those banks are more likely to invest in non-traditional banking activities, 
such as subprime mortgage securitisation. Chang, Fu, Low and Zhang (2015) examined which 
incentive (vega or delta) is more important in driving a firm’s innovation. They find that non-
executive vega has a significantly positive effect on corporate innovation measured by the number of 
patents and patent citations. However, Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu (2012) find no association between a 
decrease in vega and a corresponding decline in the firm risky investment and financial policies. 
2.7.5 The determinants of vega 
Both Lewellen (2006) and Core and Guay (2002) suggest, when investigating vega, that it is critical to 
examine the moneyness measured by the market price divided by the exercise price (P/E) of options,. 
Based on UK data, Conyon and Mallin (1997) report an average discount on executive share options 
of 0.3% for the Mid 250 companies and of 0.06% for FTSE 100 companies. Conversely, Murphy (1999) 
finds that over 95% of options are granted at-the-money in the US firms.  
There exists some empirical evidence on the effect of the moneyness of options on vega. Lewellen 
(2006) finds that the higher the proportion of in-the-money options in compensation package, the 
more risk averse managers are and, as a result, firms issue more equity (Lewellen, 2006). Moreover, 
Core and Guay (2002) and Low (2009) show vega is negatively associated with the moneyness of 
options. Palmon et al. (2008) simulate the impact of moneyness on CEO compensation. They 
recommend using in-the-money options as a component of CEO compensation because par-value 
options make the compensation excessively sensitive to firm performance and too costly to 
shareholders (Palmon, Bar-Yosef, Chen & Venezia, 2008). 
To find the relationship between vega and a firm’s investment and finance policies, Guay (1999) 
conducted an OLS regression on compensation and stock-based wealth data for 278 corporate CEOs 
for 1993. The author concludes that firm size, factor score of investment opportunities, market value 
of assets and cash compensation are significant and positively related to vega. In addition, CEO age 
and delta are negatively associated with vega (Guay, 1999). Guay (1999) also demonstrates that 
option vega is many times larger than common share vega. Core and Guay (2002) find that vega is 
positively related to the natural logarithm of market value of assets and R&D intensity and negatively 
related to B/M assets. Core and Guay (2002) observe that in-the-money shares are very sensitive to 
vega. 
To examine whether there is a causal relation between the CEO compensation components and 
investment policy, debt policy, and firm risk, Coles et al. (2004) find that vega increases as share price 
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volatility increases, and decreases as firm’s leverage increases. Using a sample of 156 bank holding 
companies over 1993 to 2006, Belkhir and Chazi (2010) find that CEO tenure, ownership and a 
dummy variable deregulation of the banking industry are positively associated with vega. 
2.7.6 The effect of vega on firm risk-taking 
Previous studies argue that CEOs’ vega is a risk-increasing incentive (Coles et al., 2006; DeYoung, 
Peng & Yan, 2013). The corporate finance literature recognises that CEOs’ risk-taking incentives 
influence corporate capital structure (Chava & Purnanandam, 2010). This is because undiversified 
managers who receive share-based compensations are more exposed to the firm stand-alone risk 
and as a result, debt (leverage) level is expected to be kept low (Lewellen, 2006).  
Two schools of thought focus on the relationship between CEO compensation and leverage. One 
school focuses on CEO risk incentives delta or vega, which is estimated by the BS option valuing 
model (e.g., Berger et al. 1997; Guay. 1999; Rajgopal & Shevlin, 2002; Coles, et al., 2006). The other 
school of thought concentrates on CEOs’ wealth certainty equivalent approach and criticises the BS 
model’s restriction on CEOs’ hedging of shares or options. The wealth certainty equivalent approach 
focuses on how the impact of a change in leverage on the mean and variance of share returns affects 
the certainty equivalent of CEOs’ wealth, allowing for some short-selling of shares or options 
(Lewellen, 2006). 
Empirically, many studies document a positive relationship between risk-taking incentives (vega) and 
leverage (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; Chava & Purnanandam, 2010). Specifically, in a sample of 825 
common share offerings and 2909 debt offerings by US public companies during 1993 to 2007, Dong, 
Wang and Xie (2010) used a probit model with the probability of security issue equal to one as the 
dependent variable and CEO options incentives (delta and vega) as the regressors. The authors find 
that vega is positively related to debt issues, whereas delta is positively associated with share issue. 
Hence, the authors conclude that undiversified CEOs, whose wealth is more exposed to equity risk, 
tend to prefer debt over equity (Dong et al., 2010). 
Lewellen (2006) used the CEOs’ wealth certainty equivalent approach on a sample of 1587 large US 
firms for 1993 to 2001 and reports that in-the-money options increase CEOs’ risk aversion and 
substantially decrease leverage. Lewellen attributes the result to the volatility effect, which reveals 
CEOs’ preference for debt over equity decreases after share price increases.  
Prior studies show that vega impacts on another risky investment policy for firms: mergers and 
acquisitions. For instance, Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001) find a positive association 
between equity based compensation and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to acquiring 
shareholders surrounding acquisition announcements. However, Datta et al. (2001) define equity 
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based compensation as the natural logarithm of one plus the equity-based compensation, where 
equity-based compensation is the value of new stock options. 
Hargendoff and Vallascas (2011) examine the impact of vega on merger-related risk changes in the 
US banking industry. Based on a sample of 185 bank acquisitions, Hargendoff and Vallascas (2011) 
investigated how the distance to default changes (lower the distance to default, higher the risk) are 
affected by CEO vega. The authors find that the coefficient of vega is negative and highly significant 
at the 1% level, suggesting that CEOs whose pay is more sensitive to risk-taking engaging in 
acquisitions tend to increase the default risk of the bidding bank. The authors conclude that higher 
vega causes CEOs to engage in risk-increasing merger deals.  
A recent study by Caliskan and Doukas (2015) documents that vega decreases a firm’s dividend 
payout. Caliskan and Doukas argue that high payout is a conservative firm policy compared to 
earnings retained for investing positive net present value projects. Hence, option compensation that 
links a CEO’s wealth to stock return volatility (or high vega) could discourage a CEO to adopt 
conservative firm policies such as paying excessive dividends. 
Researchers realise that a firm’s risk-taking capital structure policy (leverage) and CEO risk initiatives 
(delta and or vega) could be endogenously determined (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; Lewellen, 2006; 
Armstrong & Vashishtha, 2012). This is because of the likelihood that a firm’s capital structure and 
risk-taking incentives depend on each other to yield the optimal risk profile (Armstrong & Vashishtha, 
2012). 
2.8 LTIPs Studies 
LTIPs comprise at least a share options programme. When share options are awarded, they give 
executives the right to buy a certain number of stocks at spot market prices within a certain time 
period. Performance hurdles are normally accounting hurdles (e.g., earnings-per-share growth rate) 
or market-based performance hurdles (such as total stock returns of a relative group of comparable 
firms). When those performance hurdles are met, the options or rights under the LTIP become 
exercisable and turn into a fully paid ordinary shares that are either purchased from the market or 
newly issued by the company. The vesting period (share-based instruments becoming exercisable) 
for a LTIP ranges from two to five years. 
2.8.1 LTIPs peer section 
LTIP payments include performance shares, options or rights are not vested (exercised) until some 
performance hurdles, such as earnings per share growth rate or Total Stock Return (TSR) of a 
relevant group of comparable firms are met. There are two schools of thought related to evaluating 
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‘comparable firms’ used to compare the TSR in LTIPs. Cadman and Carter (2013) and Morgenson 
(2006) suggest that firms select the peer group in an opportunistic way. Conversely, Holmstrom and 
Kaplan (2003) argue that peer selection is efficient, because ‘benchmarking’ is from a similar 
industry, size and return covariance. Besides the opportunistic view, there are some controversies 
related to LTIPs. Porac, Wade, and Pollock (1999) point out that LTIPs are used ex post in the US in 
designing executive compensation packages rather than ex ante as in the UK. In addition, the boards 
carefully select peer groups to their advantage and even include poor-performing companies from 
other industries when the firm performs poorly.  
2.8.2 LTIPs in the US 
Murphy (1999) points out that the empirical relationship between the pay of top-level executives 
and firm performance is small and there is a decoupling between incentive plans and firm 
performance. On the other hand, Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt (1993) oppose Murphy’s view and 
argue that firm size should be relative to the structure of the executive compensation packages 
rather than the size of the compensation. Lambert et al. (1993) show that LTIPs have incentive 
effects and play a significant role in the structure of the executive compensation contracts (Gerhart 
& Milkovich, 1990). 
Brockie Leonard and Mishra (1996) examined the incentive effect of LTIPs by comparing a sample of 
175 firms that adopted LTIPs with 175 control firms for the period from 1971 to 1980. The authors 
find that LTIPs did not provide incentives for firms to outperform the control firms (Brockie Leonard 
& Mishra, 1996). Westphal and Zajac (1994) studied the 669 largest US industrial and service 
companies from 1972 to 1990 and find that CEO power and firm poor performance are the main 
causes of the failure in using LTIPs. Although most firms adopted LTIPs, some do not actually use 
LTIPs because of the political actions by the influential CEOs and poor prior performance (Westphal & 
Zajac, 1994). 
2.8.3 LTIPs in the UK 
The use of LTIPs to motivate managers in the UK started in 1995 (Buck et al., 2001). In 1995, the 
Greenbury Report recommended that the UK companies should adopt performance related long-
term incentive plans for senior executives, preferring them to traditional share options (Buck et al., 
2001). The report pointed out that share options had a number of shortcomings: they sometimes led 
to windfall gains simply as a result of general movements in share prices and did not encourage 
directors to build up significant shareholdings in their employing companies (Buck et al., 2001). Pass 
et al. (2000) conducted a survey of 150 UK companies from 1994 to 1998 and show that a substantial 
number of companies adopted LTIPS (Pass, Robinson, & Ward, 2000). In 2009, LTIPs comprised 
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around 38% of the total earnings of executives in the FTSE 100 and 33% in the FTSE mid-250 (Pepper, 
Gore, & Crossman, 2013).  
Buck, Bruce, Main, and Udueni (2003) studied UK non-financial firms that used LTIPs during 1997-98 
and suggest that LTIPs are positively associated with total executive pay, but negatively associated 
with pay-performance sensitivity. Similarly, Pepper et al. (2013) studied FTSE 350 companies and 
suggest that LTIPs are not an effective nor efficient way of motivating CEOs, considering risk, time 
discounting, uncertainty and fairness. 
2.8.4 Valuing LTIPs 
Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Stathopoulos et al. (2004) value LTIP performance share grants at 
the face value of the shares on the grant date and deduct a certain percentage because the award of 
the shares is contingent on the executive’s attainment of performance criteria. Guy (1999), Conyon, 
Peck, and Sadler (2001), Conyon and Murphy (2000) and Stathopoulos et al. (2004) value LTIP share 
options using the modified BS model to incorporate the impact of dividend payments. However, 
there are criticisms of the BS model. First, share options in LTIPs are not tradable within a short time 
and the vesting period often lasts three to six years (McKnight & Tomkins, 1999). Huddart (1994), 
Murphy (1999) and Cuny and Jorion (1995) argue that the best exercise policy is different from the 
BS assumption because of CEOs’ risk aversion. LTIP share options are not tradable and are usually 
forfeited if the director leaves the company. In addition, risk-averse CEOs, who are prohibited from 
hedging (i.e., short-selling) their firm’s shares and have their human capital tied up in the company, 
are less able than the ordinary investors to diversify away the risk of the options. In addition, Conyon 
and Murphy (2000) point out that the value of options to both the company and its executives 
depends on the performance criteria that determine whether the share options will be vested. 
Empirically adjusting the BS model to accommodate the above limitations is not easy (Guay, 1999). 
For one reason, there is no clear method of valuing share options from the CEO’s perspective, as 
opposed to the firm's perspective. Second, it is difficult to estimate the remaining time-to-maturity 
of options until the options are vested (Guay, 1999). 
2.8.5 Event study of LTIPs  
Gaver et al. (1992) examined the share market reaction for a sample of 209 LTIPs that occurred 
between 1971 and 1980. The authors calculated the abnormal daily returns from day -170 to day -21, 
and find no significant market reaction to the adoption of LTIPs (Gaver, Gaver and Battistel, 1992). 
Conversely, Mishra and Nielsen (2000) and Westphal and Zajac (1998) present significant positive 
excess returns around the announcement of LTIP adoption for the adopting companies and report a 
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positive association between excess returns around the announcement of LTIP adoption and changes 
in some accounting based performance measures. 
2.8.6 Summary of LTIPs 
The findings on LTIPs are mixed. There has been debate on the use of LTIPs to align CEO interests 
with shareholder interests. Smith and Stulz (1985), Yermack (1997) and Arora and Alam (2005) 
suggest that LTIPs increase the relationship between CEOs’ wealth and firm performance, thus 
providing more incentives for the CEOs to maximize the shareholders’ wealth. However, Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2001) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) suggest that LTIPs have less to do with 
interest alignment and more to do with enriching CEOs.  
2.9 Investment Opportunity Sets (IOS) 
Myers (1977) was the first researcher to introduce the concept of growth opportunity. The author 
suggests that the firm’s market value is a sum of the market value of assets already in place and the 
present value of future investment growth opportunities. Those growth opportunities could be 
regarded as call options. If the firm has a lot of ‘growth options’, then it will carry a substantial level 
of investments in different projects (Kallapur and Trombley, 1999). 
IOS are very important to firms’ sustainability. Myers (1977) suggests IOS are potentially profitable 
projects that firms should discover and exploit them for economic rents. The value of IOS depends on 
the future discretionary expenditures by managers which depend on the internal funds of the firm 
and also the corporate capacity to issue low risk debt (Myers,  1977; Triantis, 2000). Smith and Kim 
(1994) suggest that firms with financial slack have the opportunity to invest in IOS with positive net 
present value without bearing the burden of the issuance of risky securities. 
There is a positive relation between IOS and CEOs’ risk-aversion (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). In 
firms with substantial investment opportunities, CEOs are more likely to pass up risky, positive NPV 
projects (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Hence, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) suggest that the expected 
loss from valuable projects forgone by risk-averse CEOs is hypothesised to be positively associated 
with the proportion of assets that represent growth options.  
Theoretically, IOS and the level of CEO share-based compensation are positively correlated (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992; Smith and Watts, 1992). Assuming information asymmetry between CEOs and 
shareholders, CEO monitoring in high IOS firms is a tough job (Smith and Watts, 1992). CEOs are 
likely to hold inside information about the value of growth opportunities (Smith and Watts, 1992). As 
a result, firms with a lot of growth options should tie managers' wealth more closely to the firm 
performance (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Smith and Watts, 1992). Hutchinson and Gul (2002) 
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suggest that IOS is a mediating force between those corporate governance practices such as non-
executive director, management share ownership and CEO’s remuneration that weakens the 
shareholders’ interests and performance of shares. However, there is mixed empirical evidence. 
While Lewellen, Loderer and Martin (1987), Mehran (1995), and Ittner, Larcker and Meyer (2003) 
find a positive association between IOS and the level of CEO share-based compensation, Yermack 
(1995) concludes that IOS are not an important determinant for grants of CEO stock options. 
In addition, IOS has a deep influence on corporate financing and dividend policy (Smith and Watts, 
1992). Some researchers find that IOS is negatively related to debt-equity ratios and dividend pay-
outs (Gaver and Gaver, 1993). 
Moreover, IOS has an effect on the characteristics of the board of directors, such as the ratio 
between outside directors and executive directors (Mak and Roush, 2000). Belghitar and Khan (2013) 
suggest that internal governance mechanisms are more effective for firms with high IOS, whereas 
external governance mechanisms are more effective for firms with low IOS. 
Because the value of the real growth opportunities relies on future discretionary investment by the 
firm, it is challenging for empirical researchers to measure IOS accurately, thus proxies are used 
instead. Kallapur and Trombley (1999) introduced price-based, investment-based and variance-based 
proxies. Price-based proxies are based on the idea that if the market price reflects a firm’s growth 
perspective to some degree, then the firm will have a higher market value than assets which are 
already in place. Price-based proxies include market value to book value of equity (Gaver and Gaver, 
1993; Barclay and Smith, 1995), market value to book value of assets (Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Adam 
and Goyal, 2008), book value of assets to book value of the firm (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and 
Gaver, 1993),  ratio of earnings and price (Gul, 1999), ratio of property, plant, and equipment to firm 
value (Skinner, 1993), and ratio of depreciation to firm value (Smith and Watts , 1992). Stathopoulos 
et al. (2004) point out that book-to-market ratio is not only a proxy for growth opportunities, but also 
for bankruptcy risk.Variance measures are derived from the idea that the value of ‘real’ or ‘growth’ 
options derives from variability of market return. Variance measures include variance or volatility of 
share returns (Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Smith and Watts, 1992) and asset betas (Skinner, 1993). 
Investment measures include ratio of research and development to assets (Gaver and Gaver, 1993), 
R&D to sales (Skinner, 1993), R&D to firm value (Smith and Watts, 1992), and capital expenditure to 
firm value (Smith & Watts, 1992). 
Common factor analysis is used in some studies to form a single proxy for IOS in order to run 
regressions (Smith and Watts, 1992; Guay 1999; Adam and Goyal, 2004; Hutchinson and Gul, 2004). 
Extracting a common factor may result in a better proxy for investment opportunities, because it 
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reduces some noise in the regression analysis and captures variation common to the observable 
variables (Adam and Goyal, 2004; Hutchinson and Gul, 2004). 
2.10 CER Engagement of the M&M Industry 
2.10.1 Challenges and issues surrounding the M&M industry 
The M&M industry has been the pillar of Australia’s economic development for decades. For 
example, the M&M industry contributed about 10% of Australia's Gross Domestic Product in 2008 - 
09 and around 55% of Australia's exports between 2010 and 2011 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
201229). The M&M companies also account for a large portion of public companies listed on the ASX. 
Overall, the resources sector (M&M, plus energy) represents almost 29% of the ASX market by 
capitalisation and almost one third of the companies listed in 201030. 
Australia is blessed with abundant valuable natural resources. The value of those natural resources, 
such as iron ore, is translated through intensive exploration, extraction, processing and handling 
activities by M&M firms (Kinnear and Ogden, 2014). These processes absorb substantial water and 
energy and cause severe environmental pollution. 
The need for valuable natural resources are unlimited; however, mineral resources (such as metals 
and ore) are finite and not renewable. For instance, Mudd (2009) suggests that the present resources 
for gold, lead and zinc will last for less than 30 years. In addition, Mudd argues that the M&M 
industry faces more challenges – average ore grades have been deteriorating over time; the degree 
of waste rock/overburden and tailings exceeding the ore mined has been increasing. 
In Australia, the public is concerned about the increasing environmental and economic costs of the 
M&M industry in terms of water and energy consumption and pollution. Realising the imminent 
challenges and pressures from the public, the M&M industry started to examine the relationship 
between mining and sustainability. In 2000, nine of the largest M&M firms reacted to the 
controversies by launching a ‘Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development’ (MMSD) project. The 
MMSD project calls on the industry as a whole to contribute to ‘sustainable mining’ – mineral 
resources should be continuously available and productive and M&M firms should maintain a healthy 
environment at both previous and current mining sites (Gordon, Bertram, & Graedel, 2006; Mudd, 
2010). 
                                                            
29 Available from: 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/1301.0~2012~Main%20Features~Mining%20Industry~15
0, accessed 05/08/2014. 
30 30 Available from: http://www.asx.com.au/documents/resources/mining_indices_fact_sheet.pdf, accessed 15/07/2014. 
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2.10.2 Environmental legislations in Australia 
Since the release of the Environment Protection Act 1997, there has been an increased commitment 
in Australia to environment protection and firms’ sustainability by both government and the 
industry. Table 2.1 presents a chronological outline of key legislations and regulations relating to 
sustainability and environment protection.  
2.10.3 Environmental reporting 
There is a number of reporting guidelines assisting firms to develop environmental or sustainability 
reports. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines are the most widely adopted. The goal of GRI 
is to help firms to account for their contributions made to natural environments and to make 
sustainability reporting as routine as financial reports31. In year 2005, 51% of sustainability reports in 
Australia adopted the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines. There are also guidelines 
developed just for the Australian firms. In 2003, the Triple Bottom Line Reporting in Australia –a 
guide to reporting against environmental indicators was released by the Department of Environment 
and Heritage (now the Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts). Also in 2003, 
Sustainability-a Guide to Triple Bottom Line Reporting was released by the Group of 100 (an 
association representing the CFOs in large Australian corporations).  
The only legislative obligation on sustainability or environmental reporting can be found in the 
Corporations Act 2001 including: 
 s299(1)(f) which requires firms to indicate details of any breaches of environmental legislations 
in their annual reports and 
 ss1013(A) to (F) which requires firms providing investment financial products to disclose the 
degree to which labour standards or environmental, social or ethical considerations are taken 
into account in investment decision-making32.  
                                                            
31Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Available from: https://www.globalreporting.org/information/sustainability-
reporting/Pages/default.aspx, accessed 20/05/2014. 
32 Corporations Act 2001. Available from: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/, accessed 
21/04/2014. 
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Table 2.2 Chronological outline of key events relating to Australian environmental protection, 1997-
2012 
Year Event Impact 
1997 Environment Protection Act If the environment audit shows that a land is 
contaminated, then an order is issued by the 
authority to the person causing the contaminated 
land to move the risk of harm to human health 
and/or to the environment.33 
 
1999 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act The Act provides a legal framework to protect 
important flora, fauna, ecological communities 
and heritage places in Australia.34  
 
2005 Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management Act The Act is to facilitate the siting of a radioactive 
waste facility in the Northern Territory to manage 
low and intermediate level radioactive waste from 
2005 until its repeal in 2012.35 
 
2007 Water Act The Act establishes a Commonwealth 
Environmental Water Holder to manage the 
Commonwealth's environmental water. 
Moreover,  
the Act gives the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) more authority in 
developing and enforcing water market rule and 
water charge.36 
 
2007 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act The Act introduces the National Greenhouse and 
Energy Reporting (NGER) Scheme for Australian 
corporations to report on greenhouse gas 
emissions, energy use and energy production.  
Information collected through the NGER Scheme 
serves as the benchmark for evaluating liability 
under the carbon pricing mechanism.37  
 
2011 Climate Change Authority Act The Act establishes The Climate Change Authority, 
which role is to provide basis for the government 
on the setting of carbon pollution limits, to 
implement reviews of the carbon pricing 
mechanism, and to report on progress towards 
meeting the national targets.38 
 
2011 Clean Energy Act Introduced by the Labour Government in 2011, 
the Act establishes an emissions trading scheme 
to replace the fixed carbon tax, aiming to reduce 
the global warming by decreasing carbon dioxide 
emissions.39 
 
According to the report State of Sustainability Reporting released by the Centre for Australian Ethical 
Research, only 24% of largest 500 Australian firms voluntarily disclosed sustainability reports in 2005. 
Mining and manufacturing sector (such as BHP Billiton and Energy Australia) contributes the most-
                                                            
33Environment Protection Act. Available from: http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/1997-92/current/pdf/1997-92.pdf, 
accessed 05/18/2014. 
34Available from: http://www.environment.gov.au/topics/about-us/legislation/environment-protection-and-biodiversity-
conservation-act-1999, accessed 05/19/2014. 
35From:http://www.innovation.gov.au/resource/RadioactiveWaste/RadioactivewastemanagementinAustralia/Commonwea
lthRadioactiveWasteManagementAct2005/Pages/default.aspx, accessed 05/20/2014. 
36 Available from: http://www.environment.gov.au/topics/water/australian-government-water-leadership/water-
legislation, accessed 05/22/2014. 
37 Available from: http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/National-Greenhouse-and-Energy-
Reporting/Pages/default.aspx, accessed 05/22/2014. 
38Available from: http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011A00143, accessed 05/21/2014. 
39Available from: http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011A00131, accessed 05/21/2014. 
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55% to the sustainability reporting rate is and the financial services sector contributes the least. The 
Australian reporting rate falls behind of international levels of sustainability reporting. The average 
reporting rate across 16 countries was 41%, according to the KPMG International Survey of 
Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2005. The United Kingdom had a sustainability reporting rate of 
71% and Japan had the highest rate of 82%.  
The low sustainability reporting rate in Australia led to the Joint Committee on Corporation and 
Financial Services investigation into Corporate Responsibility Reporting in 2005. The report 
‘Corporate Responsibility-Managing Risk and Creating Value’ was released in 2006, suggesting a 
framework encouraging firms to undertake more sustainable business practices. Among the six 
recommendations, three recommendations are directly related to sustainability reporting, including: 
  Improving business sustainability reporting. 
  Demonstration of sustainable, responsible behaviours by government agencies. 
  Better coordination of government initiatives40. 
In 2002, the landmark Sarbanes-Oxley Act was introduced to improve corporate governance of the 
companies registered with SEC in the United States. Although the focus of Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to 
tighten firm’s audit quality and director independence, firms are required by the Act to disclose 
whether they have followed a code of conduct, and if they have not, why not. Public US corporations 
are also required by SEC regulations (Items 101 and 103 of Regulation S-K) to disclose their 
environmental performance.  
European Union (EU) firms are required by EU Accounts Modernisation Directive to insert a non-
financial section in their annual reports. Part of the Nouvelles Regulations Economiques (NRE) in 
France act as a disclosure framework requiring public companies to disclose environmental 
management. To build on the EU directive, the United Kingdom released the Operating and Financial 
Review (OFR) in 2005 requiring firms to disclose more strategic information and long-term policies. In 
2006, a partnership called European Alliance for Corporate Social Responsibility was established by 
the European Commission and the European business community, aiming to help businesses to 
incorporate CSR into their routine operations. 
                                                            
40 Available from: http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-
07/corporate_responsibility/report/report.pdf, accessed 09/05/2014. 
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2.10.4 M&M firms’ CER and CFP relationship 
There are various definitions of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Friedman (1970) first defines 
CSR as actions to make as much profit as possible in order to meet shareholders’ ends while 
complying with legal and ethical requirements. McWilliams and Siegel (2001) emphasise CSR as 
actions to contribute some social wellbeing beyond the financial interests and legal obligations. Hill, 
Ainscough, Shank and Manullang (2007) expand the CSR definition to cover legal, economic, ethical 
and philanthropic actions that could benefit the firm’s stakeholders. Since corporate environmental 
responsibility falls under the definition of CSR by McWilliams and Siegel (2001) and Carroll (2008), 
the current study reviews prior literature on the CSR-CFP relationship to generate our hypothesis on 
the CER-CFP relationship. 
There is much literature on the CSR-CFP relationship. As argued by Freeman (1983) and shown by Jo 
and Harjoto (2012), CSR activities reduce conflicts between executives and other stakeholders; 
subsequently, CFP will increase. The stakeholder theory proposed by Freeman (1983) states that 
executives should act as coalition- builders among the external stakeholders including governments, 
community, consumer, competitors, the media, the environment and others. Therefore, a firm could 
use CSR as an extended corporate governance mechanism to resolve conflicts between executives 
and other stakeholders (Freeman, 1983). To refine the stakeholder theory, Donaldson and Preston 
(1995) examined the normative, descriptive and instrumental dimensions of the theory in an 
integrative manner. Donaldson and Preston (1995) conclude that those three dimensions are 
mutually supportive and, among them, the normative dimension is fundamental. Freeman (1994) 
adds the metaphorical dimension to the stakeholder theory; this addresses the question – “How 
should human beings live?”. Another literature strand argues that CSR has a positive impact on CFP 
because CSR increases a firm’s competitive advantage, such as customer and employee loyalty 
(Ribstein, 2005) and reputation (Turban & Greening, 1997). 
On the other hand, Jensen (2002) criticises the stakeholder theory in not accounting for the 
necessary trade-offs among the competing interests of stakeholders. The author proposes the 
enlightened stakeholder theory, which states that a firm’s long-term value maximisation dictates the 
firm’s multiple objectives and the firm’s stakeholders can benefit from this enlightened value 
maximisation. According to Jensen, as long as a firm’s main objective is value maximisation, there is 
no problem for the firm to engage in CSR. 
Another view assumes that CSR reduces CFP. Friedman (1970) suggests that CSR destroys CFP 
because economic costs exceed the economic benefits produced by activities related to social 
responsibility. Based on the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Barnea and Rubin (2010) 
find that insiders (executives and large blockholders) are more likely to overinvest in CSR to increase 
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their reputation as good global citizens. Hence, CSR overinvestment tends to increase the 
opportunity cost of wasted resources and reduces the firm’s value (Barnea & Rubin, 2010). 
Jo and Harjoto (2012) describe the value-irrelevance view, which is similar to irrelevance theory of 
capital structure of Modigliani and Miller (1958). Jo and Harjoto (2012) argue that CSR may not affect 
CFP because CSR factors may not proxy risk that could impact on a firm’s value. The last view of the 
CSR-CFP relationship assumes a non-constant relationship between CSR and CFP, because of the 
possibility that the costs and profits produced by CSR are different over time (Soana, 2011). 
Waldman and Siegel (2008) argue that it is problematic not to consider the effects of leadership 
characteristics when examining the differences in firms’ CSR initiatives. Manner (2010) suggests that 
observable CEO characteristics, to some degree, predict a firm’s level of CSR engagement. The CEO 
characteristics used by Manner include concentration area of bachelor degree, breadth of career 
experience, gender, and levels of compensation. Manner finds that a Bachelor degree in Humanities, 
breadth of stakeholder experience, female CEO and short-term compensation are positively 
associated with a firm’s level of CSR engagement. Manner suggests that the high level of long-term 
CEO compensation is an indication of a lack of focus on CSR. However, Manner examines only the 
effect of compensation on CSR engagement and suggests further study is needed to explore the 
effect of incentives embedded in CEOs’ long-term compensation plans on CSR engagement. 
Most studies on the relationship between sustainability and market performance use multivariate 
regression methods. For instance, Konar and Cohen (2001) regress Tobin’s Q against firm’s 
environmental performance for 321 S&P firms for 1989. As a proxy for environmental performance, 
Konar and Cohen (2001) use the total mass of emitted toxic chemicals normalised by the firm’s gross 
revenue and the number of environmental lawsuits against the firm. After controlling for R&D 
expenditure, market share, industry concentration, firm growth rates and firm size, Konar and Cohen 
(2001) find that toxic chemical emissions have a negative effect on the firm’s market performance. 
The authors emphasise the importance of R&D and advertising expenditure in the relationship 
between the firm’s sustainability and economic performance. 
Dowell, Hart and Yeung (2000) construct a panel data of 89 manufacturing and mining US firms for 
1994 to 1997 to examine whether the adoption of the global environmental management standards 
adds Tobin’s Q. Consistent with Konar and Cohen’s (2001) findings, Dowell et al. (2000) find that the 
implementation of global environmental management standards has a positive effect on firm’s value. 
Dowell et al. (2000) also point out that the level of environmental technology may contribute to the 
relationship between the firm’s sustainability and economic performance.  
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Wagner (2010) regresses Tobin’s Q against an overall corporate sustainability performance index in a 
set of S&P firms for 1992 to 2003. The sustainability performance index ranges from 0 to 19 with a 
mean value of 10.1 and approximates the degree of all firms’ activities relating to social responsibility 
and environmental management (Hull and Rothenberg, 2008). The index covers the firm’s natural 
environment, product characteristics, interaction with community, management/labour relations, 
corporate governance, to human rights issues  (Hull and Rothenberg, 2008). Wagner (2010) finds that 
sustainability is positively related to the firm’s Tobin’s Q, moderated by the firm’s advertising 
expenditure. Wagner hence suggests that there is a potential trade-off between a firm’s 
sustainability and economic performance, i.e., the additional cost of sustainability management 
activities would exceed the additional benefits, without a high level of advertising diffusing the firm’s 
sustainability management activities to its stakeholders (Wagner, 2010).  
2.10.5 M&M firms’ foreign exchange derivatives and market performance 
For M&M firms are exposed to foreign exchange rate risk. Since 98% of Australian M&M firms in our 
sample export minerals to other developing countries, this study attempts to examine the impact of 
foreign exchange derivatives use by M&M firms. Foreign exchange derivatives such as forwards 
and/or futures, are designated as hedging mechanisms against the risk of unfavourable foreign 
exchange rate movements. 
Theoretically, firms use derivatives effectively to address market imperfections such as information 
asymmetries, taxes, financing constraints and bankruptcy costs, resulting in a potential positive 
impact on the firm’s value (Smith & Stulz,1985; Froot, Scharfstein & Stein, 1993; Mello & Parsons, 
2000). However, because of managerial risk-aversion and poor board monitoring on managerial 
discretion, managers may misuse derivatives for their own interests, resulting in a potential negative 
effect on the firm’s value (Stulz, 1984; Faulkender, 2005). 
Empirical evidence on the effect of derivatives on firm value is inconclusive. Using panel data of 1746 
US firms from 1991 to 2000, Fauver and Naranjo (2010) find a negative association between 
derivative usage and a firm’s value. Fauver and Naranjo (2010) argue that poor board monitoring and 
managerial risk-aversion account for the negative relation. In contrast to the negative valuation 
effect, based on a sample of 720 large US non-financial companies from 1990 to 1995, Allayannis and 
Weston (2001) find that currency derivative use and the firm value denoted by Tobin’s Q are 
positively related. 
2.11 Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature and recent empirical studies on the links between CEO 
remuneration incentives, firm policy and firm share market performance. The literature shows a 
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consensus that high-vega or low-delta CEOs are more likely to implement risky firm policies, such as 
more leverage, more R&D expense and more business acquisitions. In addition, the risk-decreasing 
delta may have an inverted-U effect on the firm’s market performance. The next chapter will present 
the hypotheses and the methodology used to examine the effects of CEOs’ vega and delta on the 
firms’ corporate polices and market performance in the Australian share market.    
 
  
 54
Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 documents the hypotheses of this study. Section 3.3 
presents the methods to compute delta and vega. Section 3.4 describes the alternative methods to 
calculate the value of LTIPs. Section 3.5 documents the sampling and data-collection processes. 
Model constructions are presented in section 3.6. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Hypotheses Development 
3.2.1 CEO option incentives and firm risky policies 
Coles et al. (2006) and Chava and Purnanandam (2010) used US data to examine the vega-risky firm 
policy relationship. Coles et al. (2006) argue that higher vega implies higher leverage because one 
way to increase firm risk is to increase leverage.  Chava and Purnanandam (2010) expand Coles et 
al.'s (2006) study by regressing book leverage on both CEOs and CFOs lagged options incentives. 
Using a pooled OLS model with industry and year fixed effects, Chava and Purnanandam (2010) find a 
positive association between vega and book leverage. To address endogeniety, the authors regress 
changes in book leverage on changes in vega and delta instead of using an instrumental variable (IV) 
method. 
Hypothesis (1a): vega is positively associated with a firm’s risky financing policy measured by book 
leverage. 
Hagendoff and Vallascas (2011) examined the impact of vega on acquiring banks’ default risk due to 
mergers. Most importantly, they find that CEOs are responsive to the vega embedded in their 
compensation contracts when engaging in acquisitions. Thus, higher pay-risk sensitivity causes CEOs 
to engage in risk-increasing deals. We interpret this as evidence of a causal relationship between 
executive compensation and the riskiness of CEOs' investment choices. 
In addition, Coles et al. (2006) suggest that vega makes risk more valuable to CEOs, therefore, high-
vega CEOs are expected to implement riskier investment policies. A firm’s business acquisition 
activities are regarded as high-risk investments compared with capital expenditure on plant, property 
and equipment (PPE) or even R&D. One way to increase the risk is to reallocate investment funds 
from PPE and R&D to the firm’s business acquisition activities.  
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Hypothesis (1b): vega is positively associated with the firm’s risky investment policy on business 
acquisition activities. 
To show that delta is a risk-decreasing incentive, Low (2009) compared the risk changes between 
Delaware firms and non-Delaware firms before and after the Delaware takeover regime shift in the 
US in the mid-1990s. Low (2009) finds that high delta leads to a reduction in total risk measured by 
the firm’s share return volatility. Consistent with Low (2009), Chava and Purnanandam (2010) show 
that high-delta CEOs are more risk averse and, as a result, firms have more cash holdings and less 
leverage. DeYoung et al. (2013) find that CEO delta is negatively associated with business loans by 
large US commercial banks. Chen et al. (2015) show that CEOs with higher deltas are likely to 
decrease the firm’s overall risk and thus lower the cost of equity capital. 
The following relationship is hypothesised: 
Hypothesis (1c): delta is negatively associated with the firm’s risky financing policy measured by book 
leverage. 
Hypothesis (1d): delta is negatively associated with the firm’s risky investment policy business 
acquisition activities. 
3.2.2 CEO option incentives and shareholder value 
Because of delta’s multiple incentives effects (see Section 2.6.3), empirical studies show inconclusive 
results about delta’s effect on shareholder value. For instance, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) 
examined the performance of banks and find that delta is negatively related to a firm’s performance. 
One plausible explanation for this finding is that CEOs who focus on shareholders’ interests take risky 
actions that are costly to the banks (Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011). However, Coles and Li (2011) find 
that CEO delta and CEO delta fixed effect (residual delta) are both significant and positively related to 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. The authors attribute this improvement to the performance of the firm fixed 
effect, which is a proxy for managerial ability or human capital that in turn increases the firm’s 
performance. 
Bulan et al. (2010) test the relationship between a CEO’s option incentives and a firm’s productivity. 
The authors find that productivity, as measured by total factor productivity, has an inverted U-
shaped relationship with a CEO’s delta. This finding implies that productivity initially increases as 
delta increases because of delta’s effect; however, when a CEO’s share-based compensation is more 
sensitive to a firm’s share returns, a CEO’s risk-aversion increases, which discourages CEOs from 
adopting productivity-enhancing projects; the firm’s productivity consequently decreases (Bulan et 
al., 2010).  
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We expect that CEO delta has a mixed effect on a firm’s capital market performance. This because 
some studies have set up a bridge between a firm’s productivity and capital market performance. For 
instance, Allen et al. (1989) used a two sector general equilibrium model to show that a firm’s capital 
market performance is an increasing function of the firm’s productivity. Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) 
find that productivity, as measured by total factor productivity, has a strong positive relationship 
with Tobin’s Q. Thus, the authors suggest that the market rewards firms with higher level of 
productivity. Based on the feedback mechanism of productivity on firm value, we hypothesise the 
following: 
Hypothesis (2): CEO delta has an inverted U-shaped relationship with firm market-based performance 
(as measured by Tobin’s Q). 
3.2.3 CEO characteristics, CER and CFP relationships 
This study also aims to test the effect of risk-aversion from a CEO’s tenure and CEO option-based 
compensation incentives, on the CER-CFP relationship. A long-tenured CEO who has been serving a 
firm for a relatively long period is assumed to formulate and implement long-term environmental 
sustainability decisions. This rationality is based on the upper echelon argument that a CEO’s 
experiences affect the CEO strategic choice (Hambrick, 2013). Further, the stakeholder theory 
suggests that senior executives make important corporate decisions in the shareholders’ interests 
rather than in their own immediate self-interest (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). 
It is possible for long-tenured CEOs to become less willing to engage in value-enhancing CSR 
initiatives than a short-tenured CEO. There are two possible reasons. First, Ormiston and Wong 
(2013) examine the effects of CEOs’ psychological processes on CSR commitment by presenting a 
‘moral licensing’ view. The ‘moral licensing’ view argues that CEOs who have previously implemented 
CSR initiatives will collect ‘moral credits’ from their past behavior, which leads them to formulate a 
immoral strategy undermining the interests of the firm's stakeholders. Further the long-tenured 
CEOs who were engaged in CSR initiatives are more likely to engage in moral licensing than short-
tenured CEOs who were not engaged in previous CSR initiative. Second, as CEO tenures increase, 
CEOs’ sources of information become “increasingly narrow and restricted, and the information is 
more finely filtered and distilled” (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996, p82). Hence, the information 
regarding CSR activities could not reach long-tenured CEOs.  
On the other hand, a short-tenured CEO is more likely to be motivated to undertake long-term value-
enhancing CER initiatives. This is because the short-tenured CEO is less-entrenched and needs more 
recognition and support from the firm’s shareholders in order to secure a long-term employment 
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contract. Hence, the level of CER engagement is more likely to have a positive impact on CFP in firms 
managed by short-tenured CEOs. The following relationship is hypothesised: 
Hypothesis (3a): a firm’s financial performance (as measured by Tobin’s Q) is negatively associated 
with the CEO’s tenure. 
Hypothesis (3b): Corporate environmental responsibility engagement (as measured by provisions for 
site rehabilitation) has a positive impact on corporate financial performance only in firms managed 
by short-tenured CEOs.  
During a mining-boom period, a CEO is willing to invest more financial resources to CER initiatives 
because of the firm’s profits increase from the boom. However, as the firm’s market value goes up 
and the CEO share-based wealth increases, it is likely that the CEO has little financial incentive to 
continue committing to value-increasing CER engagement. Further, when an industry experiences a 
boom period, the dismissal risk is low for CEOs whose employment contract are highly contingent 
upon the performance evaluation (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015).  On the other hand, when the market 
cools off, the CEO may have more financial incentive to improve the firm’s share performance 
because part of the CEO’s pay is share-based. Thus, in the mining slowing-down period, a CEO is 
more likely to increase CRE engagement level, which may lead to increase in the firm’s CFP. Hence, 
during an industry slowing-down, CEOs have more financial incentive to implement value-enhancing 
CER engagement as a compensation management tool. The following relationship is hypothesised: 
Hypothesis (3c): Corporate environmental responsibility engagement (measured by provisions for site 
rehabilitation) has a positive impact on corporate financial performance only in the non-boom period. 
3.3 Option-based Incentives Computation 
Core and Guay (2002) suggest that there are two measures of option incentives: dollar change 
measure and percentage change measure for the firm’s value. For instance, Guay (1999), Coles et al. 
(2006), Burns and Kedia (2006) and Aggarwal and Samwick (2006) define option incentives or delta as 
the change in the modified BS (1973) model value of the CEO’s options for a 1% change in the stock 
price. In contrast, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Yermack (1995) measure 
CEO option incentives as the dollar change in CEO options for a dollar change in the firm’s value. 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) assume that option incentives increase as a CEO’s fractional ownership of 
the firm increases, whereas Core and Guay (2002) assume that incentives increase with a CEO’s 
dollar ownership of the firm.  
It is straightforward to compute a measure for shareholding incentives. For example, if share value 
increases by 1% for each 1% increase in the share price, then the common share delta equals 1 (Core 
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& Guay, 2002; Burns & Kedia, 2006). However, it is more complicated to calculate the incentives 
provided by options because the percentage increase in the value of an option is less than the 
percentage increase in the underlying share price, and depends on the parameters contained in the 
option contract (Core & Guay, 2002). Core and Guay (2002) obtained a sample of non-financial firms 
from the Execucomp database from 1992 to 1997 and find that the delta (the change in the dollar 
value of the CEO’s share and options for a 1% change in the share price) for a new option is 
approximately 0.75, which implies that the option value increases by $0.75 when the stock price 
increases by $1.00. Both Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002) estimate the total incentives from 
the CEO’s option portfolio as the weighted average of the deltas of each option held by the CEO 
multiplied by 1% of share price, and the total incentives provided by an option award as the 
weighted average of the deltas of each option awarded multiplied by 1% of the share price.  
There are two methods to calculate delta and vega with regard to data collection. The first is the ‘full 
information’ (FI) method, whereby researchers use hand-collect data from as many as 10 years’ 
annual reports of a company that awards ten-year-maturity options to construct a CEOs’ option 
portfolios (e.g., Hall and Liebman, 1998; Guay, 1999). Even though the FI method process is tedious, 
it does not involve any assumptions of option exercise price. 
Core and Guay (2002) provide an easy alternative to the FI method and term this technique the ‘one-
year approximation’ (OA) method in which the data are retrieved from a single-year firm annual 
report and newly awarded options, prior awarded unvested (unexercisable) and vested (exercisable) 
options are treated as three separate awards. Core and Guay (2002) find that the OA proxies yield 
almost the same results as those of the FI method, but one limitation of the OA method is the 
underestimation of the average exercise price of the out-of-the-money options.  
This current study uses the FI method for two reasons. First, the study’s research time span is from 
2003 to 2012 when CEO turnover was quite high. Second, the exercise prices of the CEO’s option 
portfolio are readily available from the firm’s annual reports. 
Vega and delta in this current study refer to the dollar value of vega and delta of a CEO’s option 
portfolio. The BS formula is a commonly used method to calculate vega and delta. There is a large 
debate about the appropriateness of the BS formula in valuing ESOPs. Lambert, Larcker and 
Verrecchia (1991) argue that a market-based valuation formula such as BS does not capture the real 
executive incentives provided by ESOPs. More specifically, Lambert et al. (1991) suggest that 
measuring the magnitude of a CEO’s incentive effect to increase a performance variable such as 
share price is not equal to the partial derivative of the value of the CEO’s option with respect to a 
change in the performance variable, because of the huge differences in pay levels, degree of risk-
aversion and degree of personal diversification among CEOs.  
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In contrast, Core and Guay (2001) argue that option grants are meant to increase incentives. Core 
and Guay maintain that the BS formula can be used to value option incentives delta and vega under 
the assumption that executives can adjust their equity portfolios when the risk level is higher than 
the contracted level. If this assumption holds, then option delta and vega are market value delta and 
vega. 
This current study assumes that option grants in Australia are meant to increase CEOs’ incentives. 
Consistent with previous studies (Coles et al., 2006; Dong, Wang & Xie, 2010), we use the modified 
the BS formula (Merton, 1973) to value a CEO’s outstanding option portfolio delta and vega. We 
assume the time to expiry for non-vested (non-exercisable) options is equal to the term to expiry of 
the vested options plus two years, since the options become exercisable (vested) two years after the 
options were granted to the CEOs. Therefore, the fair price of the outstanding option portfolio, 
option portfolio delta and vega in any given year is equal to the weighted average of the fair price, 
deltas and vegas of recent issued vested, non-vested options, previously issued vested, and 
previously issued non-vested options. Detailed construction of CEOs’ option portfolio fair price, vegas 
and deltas are presented in Appendix A. 
3.4 Methods for Calculating LTIPs’ Value 
Most LTIP option valuation methods depend on the dividends of the modified BS model (Guay, 1999; 
Coles et al., 2006). However, when it comes to valuing LTIP performance shares, Core et al., (1999), 
Core and Guay (2002) and Bettis, Bizjak and Lemmon (2005) suggest that it is inappropriate to use 
the BS model because executives are prohibited from hedging equity risk by short-selling the 
underlying shares.   
The main LTIP performance shares valuation method is based on a discount method, whereby LTIP 
shares are discounted by a certain percentage of the underlying share price at the issue date given 
the probability that the CEO might not meet the performance-related vesting conditions. For 
example, based on a sample of the 100 largest UK stock market companies (accounting for 63% of 
the market capitalisation of all companies on the London Stock Exchange) in 1997-1998, Conyon et 
al. (2001) calculate LTIP performance share value as the firm share price multiplied by the maximum 
potential number of shares that can satisfy certain performance hurdles of the award. Specifically, 
the authors take into account the probability of the award vesting in full, where the resulting LTIP 
performance shares are discounted by 20% of the underlying share price at issue date (see Conyon et 
al., 2001; Stathopoulos et al., 2004).  
Burns and Kedia (2006) use a three-to-five-year moving average of firm performance as a proxy for 
LTIP performance shares value based on a sample of firms that announced a restatement of their 
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financial statements over 1995 to 2001. The authors find that vested options are more highly 
associated with misreporting than LTIPs because short-term-focused managers are influenced heavily 
by vested options to adopt aggressive accounting practices than by long-term based incentive plans. 
Because of the uncertainty involved in the amount of LTIP compensation actually received by 
executives, Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Core et al. (1999) recognise that valuing long-term 
restricted shares (or performance rights) is challenging. Hence, restricted shares are valued using the 
year-end price or the price per share at issue date. However, the authors admit that their LTIP 
estimation method is over-simplified and could limit the interpretation of the results. 
The total value of a CEO’s option-based LTIP in this current study is calculated as the sum of the 
CEO’s option portfolio fair price, value of performance shares, and value of performance rights. Both 
performance shares and performance rights (options with an exercise price of zero) are valued at 
80% of the year-end share price because of the restrictions (performance hurdles) attached to 
executing those options or shares (Conyon & Murphy, 2000; Stathopoulos et al., 2004). 
3.5 Data Collection and Sampling Process 
3.5.1 CEO option incentives, firm risky policy and shareholder value relationships 
We select an initial sample of companies from the ASX and S&P Dow Jones 200 index consisting of 
the 200 largest public companies, which captures 80% of total market capitalisation41. Our sampling 
period is 2003 to 2012. We choose 2003 as the starting year because Section 300A of the 
Corporations Act was further developed that year in ASX Corporate Governance Council Principles of 
Good Governance and Best Practices Recommendations. The ASX document emphasises the need to 
compensate executives relative to firm performance42. 
The following process is used to screen the original list. The Australian financial year usually ends on 
30 June each year. Thus, a financial year from the 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003 is treated as an 
observation for 2003. 16 international companies (incorporated in foreign countries such as the US, 
UK or Singapore) were excluded from the sample because they have different financial reporting 
requirements and financial year. We deleted 47 firms listed in 2003 which were delisted 
subsequently to address the survivorship issue. As a result, the final sample in this current study is 
137 firms and 1370 total observations.  
                                                            
41 Available from http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-asx-200, accessed 05/12/2013. 
42 Available from: http://www.asx.com.au/regulation/corporate-governance-council.htm, accessed 25/10/2013. 
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Table 3.1 presents the sample firms’ distribution across type of industry. We use the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) sector code, which is also adopted by ASX to categorise industry type43. 
The final sample covers 18 industries. Given the importance of natural resources in the Australian 
economy, it is not surprising to see that metals and mining sector have the highest relative frequency 
(19%) followed by the energy (oil and gas exploration) industry, which accounts for 13% of the final-
sample firms. Consumer durables and apparel and software have the smallest relative frequency 
(2%). 
We retrieve the CEOs’ and firms' characteristics data from the sample firms’ 2003-2012 annual 
reports, downloaded directly from the firms’ websites. We obtain the firms’ daily share returns from 
Thomson Reuters DataStream.  
Table 3.1 Distribution of the sample firms by industry 
 Frequency Relative frequency 
Banking & insurance 8 5.84% 
Capital goods 15 10.95% 
Commercial equipment & 
services 
4 2.92% 
Consumer durables & apparel 3 2.19% 
Consumer services 4 2.92% 
Diversified financials 5 3.65% 
Energy 18 13.14% 
Food, beverages & tobacco 5 3.65% 
Health care 4 2.92% 
Materials 12 8.76% 
Metals & mining 26 18.98% 
Media 3 2.19% 
Pharmaceutical & biotechnology 7 5.11% 
Real estate 7 5.11% 
Retailing 10 7.30% 
Software  3 2.19% 
Telecommunications 4 2.92% 
Transportation 4 2.92% 
Utilities 5 3.65% 
Total 137 100% 
Source: the GICS index and the official list of the ASX S&P 200 companies. 
3.5.2 CEO characteristics, CER and CFP relationships 
The current study retrieves a sample of the 40 largest M&M firms from the ASX and S&P Dow Jones 
200 index. We use annual sales growth rate (the difference between current year sales and previous 
year sales divided by previous year sales) as the criterion for the M&M industry’s boom-cooling cycle. 
                                                            
43 The GICS information is obtained from the Official List of the ASX listed companies. Available from: 
http://www.asx.com.au/asx/research/listedCompanies.do, accessed 26/6/2014. 
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This is because the M&M industry boom results in an increase in output and thereafter sales. In 
addition, the M&M industry sales revenue account for a large portion of Australian gross national 
product (from 6% of GDP in 2000 to 14% in 201044). We apply the criterion to our data and note that 
the industry-average sales growth rates in our sample firms have a positive slope before 2007. This is 
likely due increased demand for natural resources from emerging economies. Figure 3.1 shows the 
slope of the average sales growth turns negative on and after 2008, which is possibly due to falling 
prices for high quality metallurgical coal, thermal coal and iron ore. Thus, we test our hypothesis (3c) 
using two sub-periods based on the boom-cooling cycle of the Australian M&M industry; the mining 
boom 2003 to 2007 (inclusive) and the cooling-off period 2008 to 2012 (inclusive). 
 
Figure 3.1 Mean sales growth rates for the 40 sample M&M firms, 2003-2012 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Table 3.2 presents the further breakdown of the M&M firms using ASX GICS sector index. M&M firms 
in this study cover three sectors: materials (steel producers), metals and mining (producers of 
aluminium, gold, precious metals and minerals) and energy (producers of coal, gas, and oil). These  
Table 3.2 Further breakdown of the sample M&M firms  
 Frequency Relative 
frequency 
Materials  7 17.5% 
Metals & mining 25 62.5% 
Energy 8 20% 
Total 40 100% 
Source: the GICS index of the ASX listed companies. 
                                                            
44 Australian Bureau of Statistics, retrieved from http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/8415.0, accessed on 
20/02/2017. 
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three sectors are relevant to minerals and metals, mining and exploration of natural resources.   
3.6 Model Construction 
3.6.1 CEO option incentives and firm risk-taking relationship 
We use equation (3.1) to estimate the effect of CEO option-based incentives (vega and delta) on 
firms’ risky financial policy (book leverage) and risky investment policy (business acquisitions 
intensity), holding other variables constant: 
݈݊ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩ ௜,௧  ݋ݎ ܣܥܷܳܫܵܫܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵܸܧܩܣ௜,௧ + ߚଶܦܧܮܶܣ௜,௧ + ߚଷܤܯ௜,௧ +
ߚସ݈݊ܵܣܮܧܵ௜,௧  +ߚହܴ&ܦ௜,௧    +ߚ଺ܥܣܵܪ௜,௧   +ߚ଻ܣܩܧ௜,௧   +ߚ଼ܶܧܷܴܰܧ௜,௧  + ߚଽܻܧܣܴ +
 ߚଵ଴ܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ + ߚଵଵܥܧܱ_ܥܪܣܰܩܧ + ܧ௜,௧ ,                                                                                   (3.1)       
where lnLEVERAGE is the natural logarithm of book leverage; ACQUISITION is annual business 
acquisitions expense normalised by market value of assets.  We choose book leverage instead of 
market leverage as the leverage measure because Coles et al. (2006) argue that book leverage better 
reflects CEOs’ decision making, whereas share market performance easily affects market leverage 
and therefore is not a good indicator of active managerial discretion. Further, we choose book 
leverage because a few sample firms in this study have their debts measured in terms of tradable 
bonds and some of the firms’ debt are non-tradable debts such as bank loans which are recorded in 
book value terms.  On the other hand, we use Coles et al.’ (2006) method to estimate the market 
market leverage as a robustness check45. 
This study also aims to examine the effects of CEO option incentives on firms’ risky investment policy. 
We use firms’ business acquisitions intensity as the measure for the CEOs’ risky investment decisions. 
This is because Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) argue that merger and acquisition decisions are the 
most important investment decisions made by CEOs.  
We control the following variables in equation (3.1): firm size, firm growth opportunities and R&D 
expenses. One possible firm debt policy determinant is firm size. Because of the difficulty in 
monitoring as a firm’s size increases, Dong et al. (2010) argue that larger firms are more likely to 
adopt high leverage in their capital structure than smaller firms. Consistent with Dong et al. (2010), 
we use the natural logarithm of sales (lnSALES) as the proxy for firm size. We also control for firms’ 
growth opportunities, represented by book to market value of assets (BM). Myers (1977) argues that 
a firm’s assets are categorised into assets in place and future growth opportunities. Firms with great 
growth opportunities are expected to have a low leverage in their capital structure, because equity 
financing could better address an underinvestment problem through risky external borrowing 
                                                            
45 Thank for the examiner’s comments. 
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(Myers, 1977; Billett, King & Maucer, 2007). Another control variable is R&D expenditure. Hall (2002) 
argues that banks are reluctant to lend credit to R&D-intensive firms that do not have enough 
physical assets as collateral. Further, R&D investments have greater uncertainty to generate stable 
funds in order to service the debt (Hall, 2002).  
Table 3.3 Variable definitions for equations (3.1) and (3.2) 
 Variable name Variable Definition 
Dependent variable  
LEVERAGE Book leverage. Book value of assets minus book 
value of equity, over book value of equity 
ACQUISITION Business acquisitions expense scaled by market 
value of assets 
Independent variable  
Delta (A$000’s) Pay-performance sensitivity. Change in the dollar 
value of a CEO’s option portfolio for a 1% change 
in share price (Core and Guay, 2002) 
DELTA Dollar delta/CEO total compensation. 
Vega(A$000’s) Change in the dollar value of a CEO’s option 
portfolio for a 1% change in volatility of share 
return (Core and Guay, 2002) 
VEGA Dollar vega/CEO total compensation 
Control variables   
AGE Age of CEO 
BM Book to market value of assets. Book value of 
assets over the sum between book value of debt 
and market value of equity. 
CASH (CEO cash salary + bonus + short term cash 
incentives)/ CEO total compensation 
CEO_CHANGE CEO change dummy 
INDUSTRY Industry dummy 
INSIDER Number of executive directors over total number 
of board directors 
PPE Property, plant and equipment scaled by market 
value of assets 
R&D Research and development expenses scaled by 
market value of assets 
SALES Dollar value of gross sales in millions 
TENURE Number of years the CEO has been employed 
holding the current position 
VOLATILITY Annualised standard deviation of logarithmic 
daily share return 
YEAR Year dummy 
P/E  Option Moneyness. Year-end (30 June) 
underlying share price over option exercise price 
at year end (30 June) 
Note: CEO total compensation is defined as cash compensation plus option-based compensation fair 
price, non-cash benefits and superannuation.   
 
In equation (3.1), we also control for CEOs’ cash compensation (CASH), because Guay (1999) suggests 
that the higher the CEOs’ outside wealth the more the risk-taking CEOs are going to be. If a CEO has 
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more power over other directors in the boardroom, then the CEO will have more influence in setting 
his or her compensation incentives. Thus, we control for the CEO power proxies, including CEO age 
(AGE) and CEO tenure (TENURE), 
Further, we control the following dummy variables in equation (3.1): YEAR, CEO_CHANGE and 
Industry. We use YEAR as  a dummy variable to capture the year effects which is  equals to 1 for a 
given year excluding 2003, and zero  otherwise. We include a CEO change dummy (CEO_CHANGE), 
which takes a value of 1 when the firm has a new CEO that year; 0 otherwise, to control for the 
possible impact of CEO turnover on the firm’s debt policy. Industry is the industry dummy. We code 
Industry using the GICS sector code. If a firm is in the corresponding industry group, then Industry 
value is 1; otherwise 0. The cross-sectional error term, E, is composed of two effects: the unobserved 
firm specific effect and an idiosyncratic error, which varies across time and section. Table 3.3 
provides the detailed definitions of the variables used in equation (3.1). 
The firms’ financial and investment policy may be influenced by the CEOs’ option incentives (vega 
and delta). It is also true that the CEOs’ option incentives are affected by the firms’ risky corporate 
policies. For example, John and John (1993) argue that shareholders of high-leverage firms 
discourage high-vega executives’ incentives in order to be less exposed to the bankruptcy risk. Géczy, 
Minton, and Schrand (2007) find that firms speculating using derivatives are more likely to use 
option-based compensation scheme in order to encourage the executives to take more risks. Further, 
Low (2009) finds that the decrease in risk is associated with low vega, which suggests that vega and 
delta are correlated with each other. Thus, we specify a simultaneous system of equations  (three-
stage least squares or 3SLS) taking into account the covariances across equation error terms46: 
݈݊ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜,௧  = ݂൫ܸܧܩܣ௜,௧ , ܦܧܮܶܣ௜,௧ , ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൯,                                                           (3.2)                    
ܸܧܩܣ௜,௧ = ݂൫ܫ݊ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜,௧ , , ܦܧܮܶܣ௜,௧ , ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൯,                                                           (3,3)                       
ܦܧܮܶܣ௜,௧ = ݂൫ܫ݊ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜,௧ , , ܸܧܩܣ௜,௧ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൯.                                                             (3.4)        
3.6.2 CEO option incentives and shareholder value relationship 
We use the following equation to estimate the effects of CEO option-based incentives (vega and 
delta) on the firms’ current market value, holding other variables constant: 
                                                            
46 We calculated the cross-equation correlation of error to detect the endogeneity of simultaneous correlations between 
the error terms. The results show the correlation coefficient between the first equation is 0.302 and the second equation 
error terms; 0.347 between the second equation and the third equation error terms; 0.412 between the first equation and 
the third equation error terms. 
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݈݊ܶ݋ܾ ᇱݏ  ௜ܳ,௧  = ߠ଴ + ߠଵܦܧܮܶܣ௜,௧  + ߠଷܦܧܮܶܣ௜,௧ଶ + ߠଷܸܧܩܣ௜,௧ +  ߠସܴ&ܦ௜,௧  +  ߠହܲܲܧ௜,௧ +
+ ߠ଺ܥܣܵܪ௜,௧  +  ߠ଻ܥܧܱ_ܥܪܣܰܩܧ௜,௧  +  ߠ଼ܶܧܷܴܰܧ௜,௧  +  ߠଽ ܣܩܧ௜,௧ + ߠଵ଴ ܫܰܵܫܦܧܴ௜,௧ +
 ߠଵଵܻܧܣܴ +  ߠଵଶܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ + ܧ௜,௧  ,                                                                                          (3.5) 
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is defined as the book 
value of debt plus market value of equity, scaled by book value of assets. YEAR is the year dummy; 
INDUSTRY is the industry dummy; CEO_CHANGE is the CEO change dummy. The detailed definitions 
of the variables used in equation (3.5) are also documented in Table 3.2. 
There are two measures of a firm’s value or performance as noted in the corporate governance 
literature. The first are accounting ratios, such as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) 
(Hutchinson 2003; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011). The second measure focuses on the share market 
price such as Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is equal to the ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and 
the book value of debt, to the book value of assets (Aggarwal & Samwick, 2006). We chose Tobin’s Q 
rather than ROA or ROE as the proxy for firm market-based performance because: (1) Tobin’s Q is a 
better reflection of a firm’s market-based performance (Aggarwal & Samwick, 2006; Dong et al., 
2010); and because: (2) the chief dependent variables such as delta and vega are market-based 
incentives.  
We use a squared form of delta (ܦܧܮܶܣ௜,௧ଶ ) in equation (3.5) in order to test our hypothesis (2) that 
there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between delta and Tobin’s Q. In addition, there is a need 
to control risk-increasing incentive vega, which offsets delta’s risk-aversion effect. This is because, as 
the firm’s share price fluctuates, the high-delta CEO experiences equity risk (Guay, 1999). As a result, 
risk-averse CEOs would require additional compensation to assume an additional non-diversifiable 
risk (Bulan et al., 2010; Smith & Stultz, 1985).  
We control the following firm characteristics in equation (3.5): firm size, R&D, PPE, and board of 
directors’ insider ratio. We use the logarithmic transformation of gross sales as the proxy for firm 
size. Larger firms are subject to more public monitoring, resulting in less information asymmetry and 
less CEO risk-aversion (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). R&D expense (compared with capital expenditure 
such as PPE) implies higher risk, i.e., more R&D-intensive firms will experience high volatility of share 
returns (Chan, Lakonishok & Sougiannis, 1999). Coles et al. (2006) argue that high-vega CEOs are 
more incentivised to reallocate investment funds away from tangible assets, such as capital 
expenditure, toward intangibles such as R&D expenses. Hence, if shareholders choose value-
maximising investment decisions, then more R&D-intensive firms will be more valued because of the 
high risk. Further, we control for the proportion of non-executive directors on the board of directors 
because, if a CEO is a board member, then it is very likely that other executive directors will be 
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influenced to vote in favour of the CEO when it comes to voting on compensation policies. Moreover, 
CEOs will be asked to undertake more risk-increasing and value-enhancing projects when there are 
more non-executive directors monitoring CEOs closely than executive directors on the board 
(Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002).  
We also control for the following CEO characteristics: CEO cash compensation, CEO age, and CEO 
tenure. As cash compensation increases, CEOs’ risk aversion may increase, thus CEOs are more likely 
to pass up risky, but value-enhancing projects (Coles et al., 2006). A long-tenured CEO, who has been 
serving a firm for a relatively long period, is assumed to formulate and implement long-term 
environmental sustainability decisions. However, as a CEO becomes more experienced , the CEO may 
have greater power to influence the board of directors to introduce less-risky firm polices, such as 
high-delta compensation plans, at the expense of reduced shareholders’ value (Bulan et al., 2010; 
Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011). We also control for CEO age; Hallock (1998) suggests that a CEO’s age 
can serve as a proxy of a CEO’s referent power because it is an estimate of human capital. 
Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) suggest that older CEOs are less subject to monitoring by regulators, 
which encourages risky investment.  
A firm’s performance may be influenced by the CEO’s option incentives (vega and delta), but it is also 
likely that high-performance firms may grant their CEOs more option-based compensation. Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) suggest that there is a reverse causation in which the firm performance affects 
the management compensation in the form of share options. Demsetz and Villalonga  (2001) 
attribute this reverse causation to the possible discrepancy between the investors and insiders 
expectations for the firm’s performance. This divergence of expectations generates an incentive for 
executives to alter their equity-holdings to meet their expectations regarding the firm’s future 
market performance. To address this potential endogeneity issue47, we specify a simultaneous 
system of equations (3SLS) as follows: 
݈݊ ܶ݋ܾ݅݊′ݏ ௜ܳ,௧ = ݂൫ܸܧܩܣ௜,௧ , ܦܧܮܶܣ௜,௧ , ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൯,                                                               (3.6)                                                 
ܸܧܩܣ௜,௧ = ݂൫ܫ݊ܶ݋ ᇱݏ ܳ௜,௧ , ܸܧܩܣ௜,௧ , ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൯,                                                                      (3.7)                                                                  
ܦܧܮܶܣ௜,௧ = ݂൫ܫ݊ܶ݋ܾ݊ᇱݏ ௜ܳ,௧ ,  ܸܧܩܣ௜,௧ , ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൯,                                                                     (3.8)                                                                  
                                                            
47 We calculated the cross-equation correlation of error to detect the endogeneity of simultaneous correlations between 
error terms. We have found that the correlation coefficient between the first equation and the second equation error terms 
is 0.412; 0.302 between the second equation and the third equation error terms; 0.262 between the first equation and the 
third equation error terms.  These large correlations show the necessity of applying the 3SLS method to our equation 
system. 
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3.6.3 M&M firms’ CER and CFP relationship 
Both Waddock and Graves (1997) and Jo and Harjoto (2012) suggest that CER engagement may 
increase firm value, vice versa may also hold, i.e, higher-market-performance firms may invest more 
in CER related activities. In order to disentangle the unclear direction of causation between the 
endogenous CER engagement (as measured by REHAB) and firm financial performance (as measured 
by lnTobin’s Q), we use a 2SLS estimation method with the following equation system: 
݈݊ܶ݋ܾ ′ݏ ܳ௜,௧ = ݂൫ܴܧܪܣܤ௜,௧ , ܶܧܷܴܰܧ௜,௧ , ܦܧܮܶܣ௜,௧ , ܥܣܵܪ௜,௧ , ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൯,               (3.9)                   
ܴܧܪܣܤ௜,௧ = ݂൫ܫ݊ݏݐݎݑ݉݁݊ݐ௜,௧ , ܶܧܷܴܰܧ௜,௧ , ܦܧܮܶܣ௜,௧ , ܥܣܵܪ௜,௧ , ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൯.                (3.10)            
Table 3.4 Variable definitions for equations (3.9) and (3.10). 
Variable  Definition 
CFP proxy  
Tobin’s Q (Book value of debt + market value of equity)/book 
value of asset 
CER proxy  
REHAB Provision for site rehabilitation/sales 
CEO and firm characteristics  
AGE Age of a CEO 
CASH CEO cash salary + bonuses + short term cash incentives 
DELTA Change in the dollar value of a CEO’s options portfolio 
for a 1% change in the share price/total compensation 
DERIVATIVE Year-end fair value of foreign exchange derivative from 
a firm's financial report/sales 
E&D Investment in exploration and mine development/sales  
LEVERAGE (Book value of assets - book value of equity)/book value 
of equity 
SALES Sales in AUD$ millions 
TENURE Number of years a CEO has been employed in the 
current position 
YEAR Year dummy 
CEO_CHANGE CEO change dummy: the value of 1 when the firm has a 
new CEO that year; 0 otherwise 
FIRM_CASH Cash balance in balance sheet 
 
We take the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q, sales, and book leverage in order to improve the skewed 
variables to be more normally distributed. In addition, we use CEO total compensation to scale delta, 
because both Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) and Liu and Mauer (2011) argue that a CEO’s large 
absolute dollar values of delta may be relatively small compared with the CEO’s wealth; hence, 
scaled delta provides a better representation of the magnitude of economic incentives in CEO 
incentive plans. We insert another control variable FIRM_CASH (the firm’s cash at bank and in hand 
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in the firm’s balance sheet) to control  for the firm’s resources48. The detailed definitions of the 
variables used in equations (3.9) and (3.10) are documented in Table 3.4. 
The IV for provisions for REHAB is E&D expenses. Mudd (2010) argues that for the M&M firms, true 
environmental sustainability commitment depends on technology innovation and scientific 
knowledge, additional to social and environmental factors. Similarly, Filippou and King (2011) argue 
that the biggest exploration and development expense in the M&M industry is in improving 
extraction and metallurgical processes such as remote control systems and robots for underground 
mines. Thus, we use the investment in exploration and mine development (the sum of exploration 
and mine development expenses, divided by sales) as an IV for REHAB. We report the OLS first-stage 
partial F-statistics and Sargan Hansen over-identifying restriction test results in the estimation results 
section to show that our IVs are valid.  
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter outlines the hypotheses and the methods for computing vega, delta and LTIP values, the 
relevant sample selection procedure, research design and estimation methods. The next chapter 
presents descriptive summaries and discusses the regression results of the study models. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
48 Based on the examiner’s comments. 
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Chapter 4 
Results and Discussion 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in the current study. Section 4.3 discusses the estimation results. Section 4.4 concludes the 
chapter. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
4.2.1 CEO option incentives-firm risky financial policy relationship 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the 137 ASX sample firms for 2003 to 2012. Consistent 
with Coles et al.’s (2006) study, our study winsorises49 all variables at the first and ninety-ninth 
percentiles to ensure that outliers do not affect the results. 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics for the 137 ASX sample firms, 2003-2012 
  Mean SD. Min. Median Max. Obs. 
Panel A. Firm characteristics       
Book LEVERAGE  1.877 4.245 0.001 0.856 51.288 1370 
Market LEVERAGE 1.245 4.017 0.001 0.638 47.194 1370 
BM 0.701 0.409 0.011 0.668 4.202 1370 
ACQUISITION 0.038 0.073 0.001 0.009 0.627 506 
INSIDER 0.225 0.130 0 0.200 0.889 1370 
PPE 0.035 0.058 0 0.014    0.599 1328 
R&D 0.0493 0.106 0 0.009   0.919 836 
SALES ($A m) 3761.371 8746.766 0.008 494.322 73320.420 1370 
VOLATILITY 0.475 0.301 0.006 0.397 3.486 1370 
Panel B. CEO characteristics        
AGE (years) 51.94 6.4 28 52 69 1370 
CASH (cash/total compensation) 0.583 0.315 0 0.635 1 1370 
Delta (AUD $ 000’s) 85.309 304.533 0.006 17.909 5484.175 916 
DELTA (Delta/total 
compensation) 0.011 0.047 0 0.008 0.879 916 
Vega (AUD $ 000’s) 29.384 66.911 0.002 6.590 774.004 916 
VEGA (Vega/total compensation) 0.006 0.008 0 0.003 0.112 916 
P/E 1.921 3.918 0.007 1.036 49.973 916 
TENURE (years) 5.807 4.5 1 5 27 1370 
Note: All monetary data are in 2012 prices.  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
                                                            
49 Winsorisation is used to replace values in the tail with selected values closer to the middle of the distribution. 
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Figure 4.1 Annual mean and median of book leverage for the 137 ASX sample firms, 2003-2012 
Source: authors’ calculation. 
 
Figure 4.1 reports the annual mean and median book leverage. Both the mean and median book 
leverage reached the peak in 2006 and declined afterwards. The median book leverage started to 
remain relatively stable compared to the pre-financial crisis era, which is the result of the Australian 
federal government decreasing the three-month interbank interest rate to a historical low in 200950, 
in order to recover the sluggish economy from the global financial crisis.  
The median LEVERAGE in Table 4.1 is 0.856. This implies that about 86 cents of a dollar of firm assets 
is financed by debt, which is higher than the median book leverage reported in Coles et al.’s (2006) 
study (0.21). The higher level of book leverage in the Australian share market implies that firms, on 
average, are more proactive about borrowing and have more access to debt financing than their 
American counterparts.  
The median Vega in Table 4.1 is $A6,590. In other words, the average Australian CEO receives an 
increase of $A6,590 in the options portfolio for a 1% increase in share return volatility. This median 
Vega is much lower than USD34, 000, median vega reported by Coles et al. (2006). Compared with 
the high level of vega in the US, these low levels may potentially weaken the equity incentive-risk 
policy relationship in Australia. The median Delta is $A17,909, which suggests that the average 
Australian CEO receives an increase of $A17,909 in the options portfolio for a 1% increase in share 
returns. This median Delta is much lower than Coles et al.’s (2006) median delta of USD206,000. Both 
                                                          
50Available from: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/australia/interbank-rate, accessed 05/7/2013. 
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Low (2009) and DeYoung et al. (2013) find that delta has a significant negative impact on a firm’s risk-
taking behaviour based on US data. Hence, the Australian CEOs’ delta may not be adequate to lead 
the firm’s CEO to reduce the book leverage level. 
The movements of delta and vega are associated with changes in Australia’s regulatory framework. 
Figure 4.2 shows Delta increases substantially from 2005 to 2007 as a result of the Audit Reform and 
Corporate Disclosure Act 2004, which requires firms to disclose a detailed summary of their 
performance conditions, an explanation of why a particular performance condition was chosen, and 
a summary of the methods used in assessing whether the performance conditions are satisfied51. 
Figure 4.2 also shows that delta started to decrease dramatically after 2007 to 2009, which was 
largely due to the global financial crisis decreasing delta’s wealth effect. The unfavourable tax 
treatment of employee share schemes proposed by the Australian government 2009 budget is one 
possible reason for the delta trough in 200952.  
Compared with delta mean , the slope of vega mean  is relatively stable over the 2003 to 2012 
period. Hayes et al. (2012) examine the relation between option incentives (delta and vega) and firm 
risk-taking behavior by exploiting the change in the accounting treatment of stock options in 2005 in 
the US. Hayes et al find that compared to the mean delta, the mean vega changes slightly, but not 
substantially from 2002 to 2008. This is because firms dramatically reduce their usage of stock option 
(Hayes et al., 2012) after the FAS123R (requires firms to disclose fair values of options in the income 
statement) became effective. More specifically, Hayes et al. use the number of new options granted 
to the CEO in a given year divided by shares outstanding multiplying one thousand as the ‘new option 
intensity’ and find this measure drops in the post-FAS 123R period. We use Hayes et al.’ (2012) ‘new 
option intensity’ as the measure for new option grants and find that the average ‘new option 
intensity’ decreases from 2.112 before the 2009 Australian tax reforms to 1.015 in the post-tax 
reforms period. Further, Core et al., (2010) argue that it is the new option that has the incentive 
effect on CEO risk-taking. In this study, we found that the overall level of new option grants is low 
(only 40% of our total firm-year observations granted the CEO new options). But during the global 
financial crisis (2007 to 2009), directors slightly raised the risk-increasing incentive vega by granting 
more options to counter the decreasing delta. However, vega was relatively lower in 2011 and 2012, 
which could be explained by the recent executive pay reforms such as the ‘two-strike’ rule53 (if more 
than 25% of the shareholders vote against a firm’s remuneration report at the general shareholder 
                                                            
51 Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act, (2004). Available from: http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2004A01334, 
accessed 05/11/2013. 
52 The Rudd government proposes some new tax rules, such as tax on shares or rights must be paid upfront, in order to 
reduce the non-taxable effect of the share-based compensation. For detail information on the tax changes can be found at 
http://www.budget.gov.au/2009-10/, accessed 06/11/2013. 
53 Australian Government Productivity Commission, (2009). Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No. 49, Executive 
Remuneration in Australia, Recommendation 15.  
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meeting for two consecutive years, then the board of directors will be re-elected) and the ‘clawback’ 
clause proposal54 (CEOs’ bonuses and other components of remuneration would be clawed back 
when there is a material misstatement in the financial report). These restrictive governance 
measures may potentially decrease the CEOs’ option-based pay. 
 
Figure 4.2 Annual mean vega and delta for the 137 ASX sample firms, 2003-2012 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Both Lewellen (2006) and Core and Guay (2002) suggest, when investigating vega, that it is critical to 
examine the moneyness measured by the market price divided by the exercise price (P/E) of options. 
More specifically, Lewellen (2006) argues that CEOs who are granted out-of-the-money options are  
Table 4.2 Decomposition of CEO dollar vega based on option moneyness, P/E 
P/E Mean SD. Min. Median Max. Obs. % in total 
obs. 
In-the-
money  28.012 57.436 0.003 6.545 551.706 433 47.27% 
At-the-
money 34.199 72.785 0.002 8.874 774.004 320 34.93% 
Out-of-the-
money 9.303 23.734 0.002 2.150 231.597 163 17.79% 
Note: In-the-money refers to the year-end-price/exercise price (P/E) larger than 2; at-the-money 
refers to P/E is between 1 and 2, inclusive; out-of-the-money refers to P/E smaller than 1. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
                                                          
54 ‘The Clawback of Executive Remuneration: Where Financial Statements are Materially Misstated,’ (2010). Discussion 
Paper. Released by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer. 
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incentivised to take risky initiatives in order to increase the spot price and profit from their call 
options. Further, in-the-money options makes CEOs’ portfolio more sensitive to changes in share 
price, and as a result, CEOs will be more risk-averse (Lewellen, 2006). Empirically, both Core and 
Guay (2002) and Low (2009) show that vega is negatively associated with the moneyness of options. 
Table 4.2 shows that about 82% of the 916 total observations of vega are at-the-money or in-the-
money. This high level of in or at-the-money options may potentially offset vega’s risk-increasing 
effect.  However, there is still a small portion of out-of-the-money vega, which may influence CEOs to 
become risk-taking. 
 
Figure 4.3 The relationships between vega, term and moneyness of options  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
In order to better understand the relationship between option moneyness (P/E) and vega, we 
subdivide vega into three categories based on the weighted average of the remaining time to expiry 
(T) of the outstanding options in Figure 4.355: short term (T is less than or equal to 1), midterm (T 
greater than 1 but smaller than 5), and long term (T equal to or greater than 5). We focus on P/E, 
which is smaller than 10 because 97% of the observations have P/E less than or equal to 10. The 
option moneyness, P/E, Figure 4.3, is the annual share price on 30 June divided by the weighted 
average exercise price of the options outstanding. 
Figure 4.3 reveals the following interesting findings: first, the slopes of all three lines exhibit the same 
trend, i.e., the slope increases when P/E < 1 (an option is out-of-the-money), reaches the maximum 
between P/E =1 and P/E = 2 (an option is at-the-money) and starts to decline as P/E increases 
                                                          
55 We use the locally weighted scatterplot smoothing based on the predicted values from the regression to generate a 
smoothed value to construct Figure 4.3. Detail can be found at http://www.stata.com/manuals13/rlowess.pdf, accessed 
27/5/2014. 
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thereafter (more in-the-money for an option). The above findings are consistent with the argument 
that the higher the proportion of in-the-money options in the compensation package, the more risk- 
averse CEOs will be and, as a result, CEOs’ risk-taking incentives decrease (Lewellen, 2006). Second, 
the slope of long-term vega is steeper than both the mid-term and short-term vegas, which suggests 
that the longer the remaining time to expiry of the option portfolio, the larger the variability of a 
CEO’s vega relative to option’s moneyness. Finally, we observe that the mid-term and the long-term 
vegas cross between P/E equal to 4.5 and 5, which suggests that the remaining time to expiry has no 
impact on the vega-P/E relation after that point. The cross-over point for mid-term and the short-
term vegas is at P/E =7, where the short-term options phase out completely of the vega-P/E 
relationship. 
Table 4.3 presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in equation (3.1). The results show 
that there are some significant correlations between the independent variables, e.g., the highest 
correlation coefficient is -0.44 and is between the two control variables, firm size (lnSALES) and the 
insider ratio (Insider). There is a negative correlation (-0.176) between VEGA and lnP/E, which is 
consistent with our previous discussion that option moneyness has a negative effect on CEOs’ risk-
taking incentives. In addition, there are no high correlations detected between VEGA and DELTA 
(correlation coefficient = 0.082), the two option incentives measures.  
4.2.2 CEO option incentives-shareholder value relationship 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in equation (3.5). The results show 
the mean Tobin’s Q is 2.507, which is higher than 1.58 in Schultz et al.’s (2010) Australian study. One 
possible explanation for this is that the mean Tobin’s Q for the 40 sample M&M firms is 3.388, 
because of the M&M industry’s outperformance over non-M&M industries during the mining boom 
from 2003 to 2008.  
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Table 4.3 Correlation matrix variables used in equations (3.1) and (3.5). 
 VEGA DELTA CASH lnP/E lnSALES lnLEVERAGE R&D PPE INSIDER VOLATILITY TENURE AGE 
VEGA 1.000            
DELTA 0.082 1.000           
 (0.015)**            
CASH -0.042 -0.140 1.000          
 (0.213) (0.000)***           
lnP/E -0.176 0.058 -0.435 1.000         
 (0.000)*** (0.086)* (0.000)***          
lnSALES 0.015 -0.005 0.065 0.087 1.000        
 (0.661) (0.871) (0.016)** (0.009)***         
lnLEVERAGE 0.035 0.001 -0.051 0.098 0.666 1.000       
 (0.297) (0.969) (0.061)* (0.003)*** (0.000)***        
R&D 0.011 -0.039 0.062 -0.185 -0.417 -0.240 1.000      
 (0.794) (0.355) (0.075)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***       
PPE -0.009 0.016 0.033 -0.014 0.127 0.066 -0.050 1.000     
 (0.784) (0.634) (0.232) (0.688) (0.000)*** (0.016)** (0.153)      
INSIDER 0.001 -0.032 -0.107 0.027 -0.440 -0.341 0.225 -0.016 1.000    
 (0.965) (0.344) (0.000)*** (0.421) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.564)     
VOLATILITY -0.108 -0.011 -0.094 -0.139 -0.397 -0.421 0.317 -0.036 0.232 1.000   
 (0.001)*** (0.742) (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.193) (0.000)***    
TENURE 0.049 -0.010 0.004 -0.051 0.077 0.014 -0.101 0.035 0.093 -0.012 1.000  
 (0.149) (0.755) (0.876) (0.125) (0.004)*** (0.608) (0.004)*** (0.204) (0.001)*** (0.649)   
AGE 0.035 0.015 -0.028 0.031 0.124 0.058 -0.046 0.034 -0.110 -0.086 0.282 1.000 
 (0.295) (0.655) (0.295) (0.352) (0.000)*** (0.030)** (0.180) (0.221) (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)***  
Note: p-values are in the parenthesis. ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 4.4 Mean and median of Tobin’s Q for the 137 ASX sample firms, 2003-2012 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 4.4 shows that Tobin’s Q started to decline after 2008 (perhaps because of the global financial 
crisis in 2008), reached its peak in 2010 and then decreased again. The substantial increase in Tobin’s 
Q in 2010 may be the result of the Australian federal government decreasing the three-month 
interbank interest rate to a historical low in 2009 in order to stimulate the sluggish economy.56 One 
possible cause for the decrease in Tobin’s Q after 2010 is the cooling of the mining boom because of 
the economic slow-down in emerging economic giants such as China (Filippou & King, 2011). 
4.2.3 M&M firms’ CER-CFP relationship 
Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the 40 largest ASX-listed M&M firms for 2003 to 2012. 
We winsorise57 all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to ensure that outliers do not affect the 
results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
56 Available from: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/australia/interbank-rate, accessed 05/07/2013. 
57 Winsorisation is used to replace the extreme values in the data with selected values closer to the middle of the 
distribution to decrease the impact of possible outliers (Coles et al., 2006). 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics for the 40 largest ASX M&M firms, 2003-2012 
 Mean SD Min Median Max Obs 
Firm characteristics       
Tobin's Q 3.388 4.911 0.251 1.97 43.537 400 
LEVERAGE 0.668 1.803 0.001 0.299 25.275 400 
E&D 16.312 84.222 0 0.357 1196.92 400 
DERIVATIVE 1.382 5.12 0 0.0349 52.377 400 
INSIDER 0.278 0.141 0 0.25 0.75 400 
REHAB 3.318 43.308 0 0.069 863.3 400 
Sales (AUD$ millions) 1868.689 8492.369 0.008 21.632 73320.42 400 
CEO characteristics       
AGE (years) 51.7 6.601 33 52 69 400 
CASH (Cash pay/total 
pay) 0.493 0.349 0 0.468 1 400 
Delta (AUD $ 000’s) 62.392 121.053 1.005 15.377 886.196 271 
DELTA (Delta/total 
compensation) 0.009 0.01 0 0.01   0.1 271 
Vega (AUD $ 000’s) 17.461 35.822 1.003 5.725 321.161 272 
VEGA (Vega/total 
compensation) 0.005 0.008 0 0.003 0.085 272 
TENURE (years) 5.305 3.593 1 4 19 400 
FIRM_CASH (AUD $ 
millions) 0.946 0.724 0.002 0.421 5.147 400 
Note: All monetary data are in the 2012 prices.  
Source: Author’s calculation. 
The mean Tobin’s Q for the 40 sample M&M firms is 3.388, which is higher than the 1.58 reported for 
the 200 largest Australian firms in a previous study (Schultz et al., 2010). This difference could be  
 
Figure 4.5 Mean REHAB for the 40 sample M&M firms, 2003-2012 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
explained by the M&M industry outperforming over the non-M&M industries during the mining 
boom of 2003 to 2008. 
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The mean REHAB for the full panel data is 3.318 (see Table 4.4). Figure. 4.5 shows the mean REHAB 
declined steadily from 2003 to 2010, except for the year 2005 (likely because of wide adoption of the 
GRI reporting protocol in 2005). The GRI guidelines are the most widely adopted reporting guidelines 
that assist firms to develop sustainability reports. The goal of GRI is to help firms account for their 
contributions to the natural environment and to make sustainability reporting as routine as financial 
reporting (GRI, 2013). According to Dowling and Preffer (1975) and Lindblom (1994), legitimacy-
seeking firms have a strong incentive to use the GRI reporting protocol as a legitimising tool. As a 
result, the REHAB expense increased in 2005 when the GRI reporting protocol was adopted. 
 
Figure 4.6 Mean E&D for the 40 sample M&M firms, 2003-2012 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The decline in the mean REHAB from 2003 to 2010, in Figure 4.5, is due to the decrease in the 
provision for site rehabilitation and the increase in company sales from the mining boom. The rapid 
increase in REHAB after 2010 is likely because of increased provision for site rehabilitation and 
decreased company sales as a result of the cooling of the mining boom.  
We use E&D (investment in exploration and development/sales) as the proxy for technology 
innovation. Table 4.4 reports the E&D mean is 16.312, which suggests that, on average, firms invest 
about 16% of their sales in E&D activities. Figure 4.6 shows the mean E&D was about 7% in 2003, 
then it increases dramatically from 2004 to 2006. The rapid decrease of E&D after 2007 is likely due 
to the cuts made in E&D spending after 2006 and the negative impact of the global financial crisis on 
the demand for minerals and metals. 
Table 4.5 presents the correlation variables used in equations (3.9) and (3.10). The Pearson 
correlation matrix shows that some correlations exist between the explanatory variables. We note 
that CEOs tenure (TENURE) is positively correlated with the CEOs’ risk-deceasing incentive delta, 
which implies that long-tenured CEOs are more likely to influence their followers to introduce higher-
delta compensation schemes at the expense of reducing the firm’s value. We also observe that long- 
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Table 4.5 Correlation matrix variables used in equations (3.9) and (3.10) 
 REHAB DERIVATIVE E&D DELTA CASH lnLEVERAGE lnSALES AGE TENURE INSIDER 
REHAB 1.000          
DERIVATIVE 0.040 1.000         
 (0.422)          
E&D 0.346 0.081 1.000        
 (0.000)*** (0.108)         
DELTA -0.011 -0.035 0.048 1.000       
 (0.855) (0.569) (0.433)        
CASH 0.005 0.113 -0.047 -0.351 1.000      
 (0.918) (0.023)** (0.350) (0.000)***       
lnLEVERAGE -0.032 -0.213 -0.089 -0.146 0.041 1.000     
 (0.524) (0.000)*** (0.078)* (0.017)** (0.410)      
lnSALES -0.147 -0.188 -0.297 -0.035 -0.013 0.276 1.000    
 (0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.566) (0.792) (0.000)***     
AGE -0.078 -0.114 0.005 0.077 0.003 -0.011 0.064 1.000   
 (0.117) (0.022)** (0.919) (0.204) (0.947) (0.822) (0.205)    
TENURE -0.046 -0.153 -0.035 0.201 -0.023 0.169 0.165 0.213 1.000  
 (0.356) (0.002)*** (0.491) (0.001)*** (0.645) (0.164) (0.001)*** (0.000)***   
INSIDER -0.010 0.127 0.073 0.065 -0.093 -0.292 -0.147 -0.216 -0.004 1.000 
 (0.842) (0.011)** (0.142) (0.286) (0.063)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.934)  
Note: p-values are in the parenthesis. ***. **, * significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 4.7 Comparison of vega and delta (in thousands dollars) between M&M and Non M&M firms 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
tenured CEOs are more likely to manage larger firms (the correlation coefficients between TENURE 
and lnSALES is 0.165). There is a positive correlation between REHAB and E&D (0.346), which is 
consistent with the argument that CER engagement for the M&M industry depends on technology 
innovation. 
Table 4.6 Mean Difference between M&M and Non-M&M firm CEO and Firm Characteristics 
  
Difference (M&M minus 
Non-M&M) t-Score 
   
Firm Characteristics   
Sales($mil)  23.1690***           5.2530 
Volatility 0.2584***   14.4381 
Tobin's Q 1.2450***  6.0382 
ROA             -0.0109 -0.1863 
Book Leverage -1.7071***  -9.5256 
Book-to-Market Assets -0.1021***  -3.7516 
Insider 0.0747***  9.3178 
 
CEO Characteristics   
Age             -0.3370** -2.5300 
Tenure -0.7080***          -3.4017 
Cash/TC -0.1270***  -6.4114 
LTIPs/TC  0.1285***   5.9210 
Delta ($thou) -34.3867*   -1.8381 
Vega ($thou)  -18.6649***   -4.9559 
Price-to-Exercise              0.1620   0.6356 
Notes: This table contains unpaired comparison with unequal variance between 40 M&M and 97 
non-M&M firms listed on ASX S&P 200 index. *, ** and *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
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Because of Australia’s unique industry landscape, it is beneficial to compare M&M firms to non-
M&M firms. Based on Figure 4.7 and Table 4.6 (the table presents detailed information of t-test 
statistics and standard errors of unpaired mean comparison between M&M firms and non-M&M 
firms), this study shows that on average, non-M&M firms exhibit higher vega and delta than M&M 
firms. On the other hand, M&M firms outweigh non-M&M firms in sales, volatility, LTIPs proportion 
in CEO total wealth, inside directors and Tobin’s Q. These results are statistically significant at 1% 
level. 
4.3 Estimation Results 
4.3.1 CEO option incentives and firm risk-taking relationship 
This section investigates the effects of CEO option incentives (vega and delta) on the firm’s book 
leverage and business acquisition expenses. Table 4.7 reports the estimation results of equations 3.2 
to 3.4 using 3SLS58.  
The results in Table 4.7 provide evidence that high-vega CEOs have more incentive to use more book 
leverage. Specifically, the results reveal that VEGA has a significant positive effect on the firm’s book 
leverage at the 5% level. This significant magnitude of the estimated coefficient on vega (10.122) 
supports our hypothesis (1a) that vega is a risk-increasing incentive. The positive relation between 
vega and book leverage is not only statistically significant, but also economically significant. The 
effect of a standard deviation increase in VEGA increases LnLEVERAGE by about 0.08;  and an average 
level of VEGA increases the book leverage by 0.06. 
The reason for this positive relation is that high-vega CEOs’ wealth is convex relative to share price 
(Guay, 1999; Core & Guay, 2002). We argue that vega exposes the share volatility to CEOs to 
implement risky value-maximising policies. The risky firm policies (such as high leverage), in turn, 
determine the firm’s profits and share returns (Coles et al., 2006). Hence, we can conclude that 
Australian shareholders are successful in making risky financial policy feed back through the CEO 
option compensation to impact on the CEO utility. Thus, we find the evidence to support our 
hypothesis (1a). 
More, we conduct a thorough scanning of our sample firms and find that nearly 80% of them 
adopted the option-based compensation scheme exhibiting performance-based vesting conditions. 
This finding confirms Hill, Masulis and Thomas’s (2011) argument that the performance-contingent 
vesting conditions of options are widespread in Australian CEO’s employment contracts, but 
                                                            
58 We have performed the Hausman test to check whether there is difference between OLS and 3SLS estimates. The p-value 
of the Hausman test is less than 0.005, indicating that the coefficients from OLS and 3SLS regressions are significantly 
different. And this result confirms the existence of endogeneity which requires endogenous techniques. 
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uncommon in the US. These tight performance-contingent contractual provisions may serve as 
another mechanism explaining why a high-vega CEO has more incentives to use more book leverage. 
In order to satisfy the options’ vesting requirements, the CEO may wish to increase the firm’s share 
value through increasing leverage.  
The results in column (1) in Table 4.7 show the estimated coefficient of CEO DELTA is negative. This 
evidence confirms our expectation that high-delta CEOs are less likely to adopt risky firm financial  
Table 4.7 Simultaneous equations (3SLS): book leverage, vega and delta 
Independent 
variables 
 (1) lnLEVERAGE  (2) VEGA 
 
 (3) DELTA 
 
VEGA        ( + ) 10.122    6.634 
  (3.893)***    (2.369)*** 
DELTA   (  ̶  ) -2.223  0.007   
  (0.793)***  (0.002)***   
BM   -0.419  -0.062  -0.009 
  (0.156)***  (0.018)***  (0.003)*** 
lnSALES   0.104  0.001  -0.002 
  (0.031)***  (0.007)  (0.002) 
R&D   -0.252     
  (0.184)     
CASH  -0.457  -0.001  0.029 
  (0.215)**  (0.001)  (0.011)*** 
TENURE  0.005    0.021 
  (0.019)    (0.010)** 
AGE  -0.004  -0.002  0.000 
  (0.002)**  (0.001)**  (0.001) 
INSIDER  0.042  0.003  -0.008 
  (0.040)  (0.003)  (0.025) 
lnLEVERAGE   ( + ) 0.002 (  ̶  ) -0.001 
    (0.001)**  (0.0004)** 
lnP/E   (  ̶  ) -0.002 ( + ) 0.004 
    (0.0003)***  (0.001)*** 
VOLATILITY   ( + ) 0.002 ( + ) -0.017 
    (0.001)**  (0.011) 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes 
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes 
CEO_CHANGE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2_adjust   0.432  0.453  0.540 
N  820  820  820 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients on intercepts, industry, year and CEO 
turnover dummies are not reported. ***, **, and * significant at the 1% ,5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Yes means control. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
policies such as financial leverage. Hence, this finding supports the view that delta has a significant 
negative impact on firms’ risk-taking (Low 2009; Chava & Purnanandam,  2010; DeYoung et al., 
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2013).  Thus, we find the evidence to support our hypothesis (1c) that delta reduces the firm’s risky 
financial policy in the Australian capital market.  
Table 4.7 also provides evidence that firm size (lnSALES) is positive and significantly related to the 
firms’ book leverage at the 1% level. This suggests that larger firms are more likely to grant more 
options to CEOs than mid-sized and small firms, probably because of the difficulty in monitoring as 
firm size increases (Dong et al., 2010). Guay (1999) suggests that the higher the CEOs’ outside wealth 
the more the risk-taking CEOs will be. Additionally, the higher the cash compensation,  the more 
likely the CEO is risk-averse and will avoid seeking risky projects (Coles et al., 2006). We note that 
CEO CASH coefficient is negative and significant at the 5% level in column 1, Table 4.7. This finding 
presents evidence that cash compensation is negatively associated with firm risky financial and 
investment policy (Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006).  Further, we find evidence that CEO AGE 
coefficient is negatively assocaited with the firm’s book leverage, which implies that as CEOs aged, 
they are lesss likely to engage in risky financial policy. 
The Australian Labour government implemented some unfavourable changes in tax treatment of ESS 
in 2009. As a result, firms choose to close down ESS and the incentive effects of the managers’ 
existing option portfolio may be reduced as the option closes to vesting. The Australian 2009 
regulation reform provides an opportunity to test whether the 2009 tax reforms reduces vega’s 
positive effect on book leverage. To achieve this goal, our study breaks down the full sample into two 
sub-periods: pre-reform (2003 to 2008, inclusive) and post-reform (2009 to 2012, inclusive).  
 
Table 4.8 reports the sub-period 3SLS results of equations 3.2 to 3.4. The results in column (1) show 
that the VEGA estimate is significant and positive at the 5% level, which implies that before the 
reform, high-vega CEOs are incentivised to use more book leverage in their capital structure. 
However, the coefficient estimate on VEGA is insignificant in the ‘post-reform’ column (column (4)), 
which suggests that CEO vega has no risk-increasing effect in the post-reform period. This is likely 
due to the 2009 reform’s ‘deferred tax point’ in which managers pay tax immediately when their 
shares or options become vested (exercisable) rather than when the shares are sold. Further, we 
observe that the negative DELTA estimates are significant both in column (1) and (4). This finding 
implies that CEO deltas have the same negative impact on the firm’s risk-taking before and after the 
reform.  
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Table 4.8 Results of estimating the effect of vega on book leverage (sub-period results) 
 Pre-reform (2003 – 2008, inclusive) Post-reform (2009 – 2012, inclusive) 
 (1) lnLEVERAGE (2) VEGA (3) DELTA (4) lnLEVERAGE (5) VEGA (6) DELTA 
Independent variables       
VEGA  25.230  5.272 17.433  4.342 
 (12.014)**  (1.953)*** (32..915)  (1.550)*** 
DELTA  -0.175 0.005  -1.435 0.004  
 (0.053)*** (0.002)**  (0.531)*** (0.002)**  
BM  -0.104 -0.054 -0.006 -0.120 -0.057 -0.007 
 (0.031)*** (0.016)*** (0.003)** (0.135) (0.021)*** (0.002)*** 
lnSALES  0.034 0.001 -0.003 0.099 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.009)*** (0.004) (0.002) (0.047)** (0.003) (0.003) 
R&D  0.040   0.424   
 (0.061)   (1.556)   
CASH 0.188 -0.001 0.020 0.328 -0.001 0.037 
 (0.365) (0.001) (0.010)** (1.112) (0.000) (0.010)*** 
TENURE 0.003  0.024 0.005  0.022 
 (0.010)  (0.010)** (0.010)  (0.006)*** 
AGE -0.005 -0.003 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.002)** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.001) 
INSIDER 0.042 0.002 -0.007 0.030 0.002 -0.004 
 (0.040) (0.003) (0.010) (0.025) (0.003) (0.009) 
lnLEVERAGE  0.002 -0.002  0.003 -0.001 
  (0.001)** (0.001)**  (0.001)*** (0.0003)*** 
lnP/E  -0.004 0.003  -0.002 0.003 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)***  (0.001)** (0.001)*** 
VOLATILITY  0.002 -0.015  0.004 -0.014 
  (0.001)** (0.013)  (0.001)** (0.037) 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO_CHANGE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2_adjust  0.503 0.312 0.329 0.541 0.317 0.403 
N 480 480 480 340 340 340 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients on intercepts, industry and year dummies are not reported. ***, ** significant at the 1% and 5% level, 
respectively. Yes means control. 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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This study also tests the impact of CEO equity based compensation on business acquisitions, but 
differs from Datta et al.’s (2001) study in that we focus on the option incentives, rather than on the 
compensation levels used by Datta et al. (2001). 
Table 4.9 Simultaneous equations (3SLS): business acquisition intensity, vega and delta 
Independent 
variables 
 (1) 
ACQUISITION 
 (2)  
VEGA 
 (3)  
DELTA 
VEGA        ( + ) 2.205    2.562 
  (0.799)***    (0.753)*** 
DELTA  ( ̶ ) -0.444  0.006   
  (0.219)**  (0.003)**   
BM   -0.430  0.000  -0.007 
  (0.181)**  (0.000)  (0.002)*** 
lnSALES   0.015  0.001  0.001 
  (0.003)***  (0.007)  (0.001) 
R&D   0.103     
  (0.114)     
CASH  -0.118  -0.002  0.027 
  (0.037)***  (0.001)**  (0.010)*** 
VOLATILITY  0.022 ( + ) 0.002 ( + ) -0.015 
  (0.025)  (0.001)**  (0.010) 
TENURE  -0.001    0.001 
  (0.001)    (0.0003)*** 
AGE  0.001  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
INSIDER  -0.107  0.002  0.007 
  (0.053)**  (0.002)  (0.035)** 
ACQUISITION   ( + ) 0.005 ( ̶ ) -0.004 
    (0.003)*  (0.002)** 
lnP/E   (  ̶  ) 0.003 ( + ) 0.002 
    (0.001)***  (0.001)** 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes 
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes 
CEO_CHANGE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2_adjust   0.579  0.324  0.471 
N  506  506  506 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients on intercepts, industry, year and CEO 
turnover dummies are not reported. ***, **, and * significant at the 1% ,5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Yes means control. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Table 4.8 reports the estimation results of equations 3.2 to 3.4 with business acquisition intensity 
(ACQUISITION) as the dependent variable using 3SLS. The result shows that the VEGA coefficient is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. The effect of a standard deviation increase in VEGA increases 
ACQUISITION by about 0.02;  and an average level of VEGA increases ACQUISITION by 0.01. This 
suggests that higher vega increases the firm’s  business acquisition activities. Hence, this study finds 
the evidence to support our hypothesis (1b) that high-vega CEOs will implement riskier investing 
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policies measured by business acquisitions. Again, the coefficient estimate on CEO DELTA is negative 
and significant at the 1% level. This evidence implies that high-delta CEOs are less likely to adopt risky 
firm policies such as business acquisitions. Thus, we find the evidence to support our hypothesis (1d). 
The result also reveals that firm size (lnSALES) is positively related to the business acquisition 
intensity. One possible explanation is that large firm CEOs tend to be empire builders (Roll, 1986). 
Further, larger firms have more resources and, as a result, CEOs have fewer difficulties in making 
acquisitions decisions (Moeller et al., 2004). Further, the results in column (1) in Table 4.9 document 
that  CEOs’ risk-aversion from cash compensation and the insider director ratio have the negative 
impact on the firm’s risky investment policy. 
We run alternative specification tests to address the issue of model mis-specification as a result of 
omitted variables. First, to account for the possible dynamic endogeneity issue , we use the dynamic 
system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with one-year lagged natural logarithm of book 
leverage (lnLEVERAGEt-1) and ACQUISITIONt-1 as an alternative specification. Next, we use the second-
lagged endogenous variables such as lnLEVERAGE, DELTA and VEGA as the GMM instruments for the 
endogenous variables and we use all control variables as the instrumental variables for the 
exogenous variables. The robustness test results are available in the Appendix B.1.  
As we have discussed earlier, we use market leverage (book value of debt over market value of 
equity)59 as a robustness check. Our main findings remain after we re-run our analysis using this 
alternative specification of the dependent variable. The results are available in Appendix B.2. 
In conclusion, we find strong evidence to support hypotheses (1a) and (1b) that vega induces CEOs to 
adopt riskier financial and investement policy in the Australian capital market. We also find the 
evidence to support hypothesis (1c) and (1d) that high-delta a CEOs are less likely to adopt risky firm 
policies such as financial leverage and business acquisitions than low-delta CEOs.  
4.3.2 CEO option incentives and shareholder value relationship 
This section investigates the effects of CEO options vega and delta on the firm’s market-based 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q. Equations (3.6) to (3.8) are estimated using 3SLS. Table 4.10 
reports the results of the regression analysis. 
 
                                                            
59 Market leverage ratio, is defined as the market value of long-term debt divided by the market value of equity (Coles, et 
al., 2006). Coles et al. (2006) use book value of debt to estimate the market value of debt. This is because Bowman (1980) 
argues that book value is approximately equal to market value of debt when the debt-issuing firm faces restrictions and 
conditions (such as compensating balances) when raising debt. Hence, we use Coles et al’. (2006) method for estimating 
market leverage as a robustness check. 
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Table 4.10 Simultaneous equations (3SLS): firm value, vega and delta 
Independent 
variables 
 (1) lnTobin’s Q  (2) VEGA 
 
 (3) DELTA 
 
VEGA        ( + ) 27.001    0.254 
  (6.750)***    (0.105)** 
DELTA  ( + ) 30.168  -0.019   
  (6.285)***  (0.007)***   
DELTA2 (  ̶  ) -83.437     
  (9.679)***     
lnSALES   -0.032  0.010  -0.002 
  (0.005)***  (0.005)**  (0.004) 
R&D   -0.201     
  (0.195)     
PPE   -1.445     
  (0.481)***     
CASH  -0.324  -0.005  0.023 
  (0.107)***  (0.001)***  (0.005)*** 
TENURE  -0.002    0.001 
  (0.004)    (0.0003)*** 
AGE  -0.0002  0.001  0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
INSIDER  0.025  0.001  0.011 
  (0.030)  (0.002)  (0.011) 
LnTobin’s Q   ( + ) -0.020 ( + ) -0.004 
    (0.010)**  (0.002)** 
lnP/E   (  ̶  ) -0.001 ( + ) 0.003 
    (0.0003)***  (0.001)*** 
VOLATILITY   ( + ) 0.003 ( + ) -0.015 
    (0.001)***  (0.013) 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes 
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes 
CEO_CHANGE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2_adjust   0.621  0.153  0.240 
N  874  874  874 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients on intercepts, industry, year and CEO 
turnover dummies are not reported. ***, **, and * significant at the 1% ,5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Yes means control. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The VEGA coefficient (27.001)  in column (1) of Table 4.10, is statistically significant at the 1% level, 
which suggests that CEO vegas drive the CEO to take value-increasing projects to boost the firm’s 
market value. In addition, the positive sign of DELTA estimate is significant at the 1% level. This 
finding is consistent with the results of O’Connor and Rafferty (2010) who find that delta has a 
positive and significant effect on Tobin’s Q.  
One of the research goals of this current study is to examine whether the wealth incentive delta has 
an inverted-U relationship with a firm’s market performance. The result in column (1) of Table 4.10 
supports our expectation that delta has contradictory effects on Tobin’s Q.  More specifically, the 
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DELTAt2 coefficient (-83.437) is significant at the 1% level. Hence, we find evidence that CEO delta has 
a has an inverted-U relationship with the firm’s market performance. To explain this, we argue that 
productivity is one possible channel through which delta has the contradicting effects on Tobin’s Q. A 
firm productivity initially increases as delta increases; however, as the volatility of share-returns 
increases, a high-delta CEO is more likely to forgo risky, but value-enhancing projects, and the firm’s 
productivity decreases (Bulan et al., 2010). Some studies suggest that productivity is linked with 
capital market performance (Allen et al., 1989; Palia & Lichtenberg, 1999; Bulan et al., 2010). 
Therefore, this finding supports hypothesis (2) that the risk-decreasing incentive delta has an 
inverted-U relationship with a firm’s market performance. 
We run the following test to verify the rationality that productivity is the feedback channel through 
which delta has a mixed impact on firm market value. First, we use the Cobb-Douglas production 
function with capital (K, which is measured by property, plant and equipment or PPE) and labor (L, 
with is measured by the number of the employees) as independent variables and total sales as the 
dependent variable. Second, total factor productivity (TFP) is then calculated as the residual of the 
Cobb-Douglas production function (Zellner et al., 1966). Then we run our model using 3SLS with TFP 
as the dependent variable. Next, we find the difference between the firm-level TFP and the year 
2003 (base year) industry average to compute a productivity index TFP. The results of this test are 
available in Appendix B3. The results show that the estimated DELTA2 coefficienr is negative and 
significant, which supports our argument that delta has a mixed effect both on the firm’s productivity 
and Tobin’s Q. 
Next, the following control variables have a negative impact on a firm’s market value: PPE, lnSALES 
and CASH. The PPE coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level in column (1) Table 4.10. This 
suggests that the firm’s value reduces because of less-risky capital expenditure on fixed assets 
(compared with R&D). The firm size (lnSALES) coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level in 
column (1), which suggests that large firms are associated with lower market performance. This is 
because the performance of large firms (such as the M&M firms) is easily affected by external shocks 
such as the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and the economic recession in Australia. Similarly, the 
CEO cash compensation intensity (CASH) coefficient in column (1) Table 4.10. is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. This finding presents evidence that cash compensation increases a CEO’s 
risk-aversion and, as a result, CEOs are more likely to pass up risky, but value-enhancing projects 
(Coles et al., 2006).  
We run the alternative specification tests as follows. First, we use firms’ annual share price returns as 
the alternative specification as the dependent variable. Second, we include a CEO change dummy, 
which takes the value of 1 when the firm has a new CEO that year; 0 otherwise, to control for the 
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possible impact of CEO turnover on a firm’s policy. Our results are robust to the above alternative 
specification tests (the test results are available in Appendix B.4).  
In summary, we find evidence that CEO option incentives vega and delta have postive impact on the 
firm’s market performance. However, the wealth incentive delta has an inverted-U relationship with 
the firm’s share market value measured bys Tobin’s Q. Hence, hypothesis (2) is supported by this 
finding. 
4.3.3 M&M firms’ CER and CFP relationship 
This section presents the impact of CER engagement on CFP. Equations (3.9) and (3.10) are estimated 
using the 2SLS method to control for firm fixed effects. The preference of 2SLS over OLS is based on 
the source of endogeneity. We performed a Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test to test for 
endogeneity. More specifically, we regressed REHAB on E&D intensity and all other control variables, 
and then obtained the fitted values of REHAB. Next, we regressed lnTobin’s Q on REHAB, the fitted 
values of REHAB and all control variables. Finally, we tested the REHAB residuals and the result 
shows that the p-value of the estimated on REHAB residuals is less than 0.001 (with an F-statistic 
12.31). Thus, the coefficient estimate on REHAB residuals is significantly different from zero, and thus 
OLS is not consistent (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993).   
In the first-stage of 2SLS, current REHAB is regressed on the instrument (E&D), all independent and 
control variables; in the second stage, current lnTobin’s Q is regressed on all independent and 
control variables and the predicted values of REHAB obtained in the first-stage regression. Table 4.11 
documents the results of both stage estimates. 
The result from the second-stage regression column in Table 4.11 shows that the CER engagement 
proxy, REHAB, has a strong positive effect on Tobin’s Q. The REHAB coefficient is 0.004, which implies 
that a one-unit increase in a firm’s provisions for site rehabilitation scaled by sales will increase the 
firm’s lnTobin’s Q by about 0.4%. This finding supports the conflict-resolution hypothesis, where CER 
engagement acts as a conflict-resolution mechanism between the stakeholders and CEOs. 
As hypothesised in hypothesis (3a), the result in the second-stage regression column, Table 4.11 
shows that CEO tenure has a significant negative impact on Tobin’s Q at the 5% level. The coefficient 
estimate -0.038 suggests that a one-year increase in CEO tenure will decrease lnTobin’s Q by about 
3.8%. This finding supports the management power theory, where entrenched CEOs may have 
greater power to influence the board of directors to introduce risk-decreasing polices, such as high-
delta compensation plans, at the expense of reduced shareholders’ value (Bulan et al., 2010; 
Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011). 
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The result in the second-stage regression column, Table 4.11 also reveals that CEO cash  
Table 4.11 Impact of CER on CFP (full-sample) 
Dependent variable First-stage 
REHAB 
Second-stage 
lnTobin’s Q 
CER proxy   
REHAB  0.004 
  (0.002)** 
CEO and firm characteristics   
TENURE 0.493 -0.038 
 (1.461) (0.019)** 
DELTA 76.846 4.768 
 (357.503) (4.568) 
CASH 8.996 -1.239 
 (13.747) (0.176)*** 
lnLEVERAGE 1.283 0.016 
 (3.202) (0.041) 
lnSALES -2.785 -0.004 
 (2.122) (0.028) 
AGE -0.901 0.004 
 (0.870) (0.011) 
INSIDER 5.241 0.667 
 (33.903) (0.427) 
DERIVATIVE -0.227 -0.009 
 (0.839)   (0.107) 
FIRM_CASH 0.024   0.017 
 (0.127)   (0.021) 
INDUSTRY             Control   Control 
YEAR             Control   Control 
Instrument   
E&D 0.227  
 (0.040)***  
Partial F-statistic 5.417 (p-value = 0.000)  
Rho 0.413 0.391 
R2 (within) 0.465 0.380 
Sargan Hansen over-
identification test statistic p-
value 
  0.363 
N 369 369 
Note: The parameter estimates are shown first and standard errors are in parentheses.  
*, ** and *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Yes means control. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
compensation (CASH) including cash salary, bonuses and short term cash incentives, has a significant 
negative impact on Tobin’s Q at the 1% level. The coefficient estimate (-1.239) implies that a one 
standard deviation increase in a CEO’s cash compensation intensity decreases the firm’s lnTobin’s Q 
by about 0.43. This finding supports the argument that the higher the cash component in a CEO’s 
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total compensation, the more likely the CEO is risk-averse and will avoid seeking risky projects (Coles 
et al., 2006), subsequently, the firm’s CFP is reduced. 
We note that the option incentive delta has no impact on firm value, which is shown by the 
insignificant signs on DELTA in both columns of Table 4.11. This could be explained by the fact that 
the overall M&M industry  has lower level of both delta and vega, compared to the non-M&M firms. 
Further, only 25% of our M&M firm-year observations have granted their CEOs new options (this 
percentage is lower than 40% --- overall proportion of firm-year observations have awarded new 
options to their CEOs). It is the new option that has the motivating effect on CEO risk-taking. Hence, 
this low level of new options in the M&M industry may potentially decrease delta’s wealth effect. 
We use the following analysis to back up this argument. Because this test involves the non-M&M 
firms, there are no rehabilitation provisions (the independent variable and CER proxy) in the model 
that estimates the impact of CER on Tobin’s Q. Therefore, we multiply a non-M&M dummy 
(NONMM) with delta to estimate equation (3.5) using the pooled OLS as the baseline method, 
followed by the 2SLS with fixed effects method. We note that the coefficients on the interaction 
terms DELTA× NONMM and DELTA2× NONMM are significant. These results imply that there are 
differences in the incentive effects of delta’s effects on Tobin’s Q between the M&M and non-M&M 
firms (the results of this test are available in the Appendix B.5). 
The insignificant estimates of DELTA coefficient have high standard errors in both step regression. 
This could be due to the existence of extreme outliers. To address this issue, we winsorise DELTA 
further using the 10th and 90th percentiles (our initial winsorisation used only 1st and 99th percentiles)  
in order to ensure that potential extreme outliers do not affect the estimation results. The results 
show that the standard errors of DELTA estimates in both step estimation are reduced to some 
degree.  However, DELTA is still  insignificant in each step of the 2SLS estimation. This finding is likely 
due to the low number of new options in the M&M CEOs’ option portfolio. The results of this test are 
available in the Appendix B.6. 
Diagnostic tests are conducted to ascertain whether the IV used in 2SLS estimation is valid. First, the 
partial F-statistic (5.41) in the first-stage regression is relatively large, which suggests that the 
population parameters of IVs are not jointly zero. Second, the p-value of the Sargan Hansen test 
statistic is 0.363, which implies we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the 2SLS instruments are 
valid instruments. 
Our full-sample results show that CEO tenure has a significant negative impact on Tobin’s Q. 
However, the full-sample results in Table 4.11 did not address why different CEOs with different 
tenure, may undertake different levels of value-enhancing CER (Manner, 2010). Therefore, we test 
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hypothesis (3b) based on two subsamples: subsample (1) CEOs with tenure below the median tenure 
and subsample (2) CEOs with tenure above the median tenure. Table 4.10 reports only the second-
stage 2SLS results from regressing equations (3.9) and (3.10). 
The subsample evidence supports hypothesis (3b) that corporate sustainability performance impacts 
financial performance positively only in short-tenured-CEO firms. The results in column (1) (short-
tenured-CEO subsample), Table 4.12, show that the sign and magnitude of the coefficient estimate 
REHAB (0.004) is similar to those documented in Table 4.11. These findings support hypothesis (1b) 
which implies that short-tenured CEOs are more likely to undertake the value-enhancing CER 
engagement. On the other hand, the sign of the REHAB coefficient in long-tenured CEO subsample is 
insignificant, which supports our expectation that long-term CER engagement has no effect on firm 
value in entrenched-CEO firms. 
In addition, the sign of the TENURE coefficient in Column (2), Table 4.12 is negative and significant at 
the 10% level. Further, CEO cash compensation has a similar significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q 
across the two columns at the 1% level. These findings imply that as a CEO’s tenure becomes longer, 
the CEO is more entrenched and has greater power to influence the board of directors to set risk-
decreasing policies. 
If CEOs are entrenched, then they prefer high level of total compensation (Berger et al., 1997) and 
high level of cash compensation (Core et al., 1999); subsequently, the firm’s market value measured 
by Tobin’s Q may be reduced (Bulan et al., 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011). High-cash paid CEOs 
have some equity-based pay and they are aware of the potential loss of their equity value due to 
their cash compensation. Hence, the high-cash paid CEOs have more incentive to engage in value-
increasing CSR as a way to maximise their personal wealth. To test this claim, we divide the full 
sample into two sub-samples based on the CEOs’ CASH (weight of cash compensation in total 
compensation), high-cash paid and low-cash paid CEOs. If a CEO’s CASH is below or equal to the 
median (0.49), then the CEO is categorised as a low-cash paid CEO; a high-cash paid CEO otherwise.  
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Table 4.12 Second-stage 2SLS results of the impact of REHAB on lnTobin’s Q (subsample results based 
on CEO tenure) 
Dependent Variable: lnTobin’s Q 
   Subsample (1) Subsample (2) 
REHAB 0.004 0.010 
 (0.001)*** (0.035) 
TENURE -0.030 -0.098 
 (0.089) (0.053)* 
DELTA -13.975 7.425 
 (34.440) (6.493) 
CASH -1.576 -1.344 
 (0.536)*** (0.337)*** 
lnLEVERAGE 0.025 0.136 
 (0.101) (0.120) 
lnSALES 0.001 0.037 
 (0.047) (0.067) 
AGE 0.000 0.019 
 (0.019) (0.024) 
INSIDER 0.351 1.654 
 (0.977) (0.998) 
DERIVATIVE 0.012 0.022 
 (0.022) (0.121) 
FIRM_CASH 0.016 0.006 
 (0.018) (0.017) 
INDUSTRY    Yes Yes 
YEAR    Yes Yes 
Partial F-statistic 3.258 (p-value = 0.000) 2.967 (p-value = 
0.000) 
Sargan Hansen over-
identification test statistic 
p-value 
0.327 0.286 
Rho 0.524 0.485 
R2 (within) 0.492 0.368 
N 113 115 
Note: The parameter estimates are shown first and standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Yes means control. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The results in column (2) in Table 4.13 reveal that the estimated coefficient REHAB (0.004) is 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that cash compensation has a moderating effect on the 
firm’s CSR engagement; high-cash paid CEOs are more likely to undertake value-increasing CSR 
engagement than low-cash paid CEOs. This is because high-cash paid CEOs are short-tenured CEOs 
(the median of the high-cash paid CEO tenure is 3.8; while the low-cash paid CEO tenure is 5). 
Another possible explanation is that, as Table 4 .11 shows, shareholders undervalue firms with high-
cash paid CEOs; hence high-cash paid CEOs are more likely to engage in value-increasing CSR 
initiatives to increase their own equity-based pay.   
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Table 4.13 Effect of CSR engagement on CFP (sub-sample results based on CEO cash compensation) 
Dependent Variable: lnTobin’s Q 
 (1) CASH<=Median (2) CASH>Median 
REHAB 0.009 0.003 
 (0.061) (0.001)*** 
TENURE -0.042 -0.047 
 (0.059) (0.039) 
DELTA 31.578 78.118 
    (30.630)   (92.479) 
VEGA -40.084 -21.887 
 (39.010) (56.190) 
CASH -1.318 -0.354 
 (0.506)*** (1.092) 
lnLEVERAGE 0.102 0.263 
 (0.155) (0.862) 
lnSALES -0.037 -0.376 
 (0.066) (0.402) 
AGE 0.001 0.034 
 (0.017) (0.024) 
INSIDER 0.329 1.523 
 (0.561) (1.288) 
DERIVATIVE -0.022 -0.015 
 (0.027) (0.013) 
FIRM_CASH 0.009 0.014 
 (0.016) (0.017) 
YEAR Yes Yes 
CEO_CHANGE Yes Yes 
Sargan Hansen over-
identification test statistic 
p-value 
0.276                                        0.304                 
Rho 0.50 0.96 
R2 (within) 0.23 0.22 
N 260 126 
 
Note: The parameter estimates are shown first and standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Yes means control. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
This section tests hypothesis (3c) using two subperiods based on the boom-cooling cycle of the 
Australian M&M industry; the mining boom 2003 to 2007 (inclusive) and the cooling-off period 2008 
to 2012 (inclusive). Like Table 4.13, Table 4.14 reports only the second-stage 2SLS results from 
equations (3.9) and (3.10). 
The results in the ‘cooling-off’ column, Table 4.14, show the REHAB coefficient estimate (0.002) is 
significant and positive at the 1% level, which implies that a one-unit increase in a firm’s 
rehabilitation intensity will increase the firm’s Tobin’s Q by about 0.2%. However, this coefficient 
estimate is insignificant in ‘boom’ column. These findings provide evidence to support hypothesis (3) 
  
96 
 
that CER engagement level is more likely to have a positive impact on CFP in the Australian M&M 
industry’s cooling-off period. Our sub-period results, hence, show that the industry cycle has a 
moderating effect on the CER-CFP association; a CEO, whose pay is partially equity-based, may have 
more incentive to engage in value-enhancing CER as a compensation management tool when the 
firm’s market value is low because of an industry slow-down; on the other hand, during a boom, a 
CEO is less likely to engage in CEO compensation management, since the firm’s market value is 
already high. 
Table 4.14 Effect of CER engagement on CFP (sub-period results based on the M&M industry boom-
cooling off cycle) 
Dependent Variable: lnTobin’s Q 
 Boom period 
(2003 – 2007)  
Cooling-off period 
(2008 - 2012) 
REHAB 0.074 0.003 
 (0.063) (0.001)*** 
TENURE -0.033 -0.072 
 (0.027) (0.036)** 
DELTA 30.189 18.483 
    (29.010)   (17.293) 
VEGA -38.084 -23.483 
 (37.010) (24.583) 
CASH -0.247 -1.199 
 (0.297) (0.378)*** 
lnLEVERAGE 0.188 0.108 
 (0.053)*** (0.072) 
lnSALES -0.038 -0.576 
 (0.035) (0.505) 
AGE 0.000 -0.295 
 (0.015) (0.190) 
INSIDER 0.176 2.248 
 (0.453) (1.745) 
DERIVATIVE -0.001 0.313 
 (0.018) (0.261) 
FIRM_CASH 0.003 0.021 
 (0.014) (0.027) 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes 
YEAR Yes Yes 
Rho 0.482 0.962 
R2 (within) 0.494 0.931 
Sargan Hansen over-
identification test statistic 
p-value 
0.280 0.374 
N 260 90 
Note: The parameter estimates are shown first and standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Yes means control. 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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The results in the ‘cooling-off ’ column further reveal that cash compensation has a significant 
negative effect on CFP only at that time. This suggests that when the Australian M&M industry is 
slowing down, high-cash paid CEOs are more likely to use CER as a tool to boost the firm’s share 
market performance and offset the potentially negative impact of cash compensation on the firm’s 
CFP. The results in ‘boom’ column show that book leverage (lnLEVERAGE) has a significant positive 
effect on CFP then. This suggests that in the boom before the global financial crisis, the firm’s market 
value increases because of more debt financing in a firm’s capital structure (the mean book leverage 
in the mining boom period was 0.68, which is higher than 0.55 of the mean book leverage in the 
cooling-off period). On the other hand, in the post-boom, book leverage has no significant impact on 
CFP, which is likely because of the firm’s reduction in debt financing. 
Table 4.15 Mean difference between cooling-off and boom period for 40 M&M firms 
  Difference  t-Score 
   
Firm Characteristics   
Sales($mil)  -1764.3756***           -4.1424 
Tobin's Q -0.7254***  -4.3481 
Book Leverage             -0.0726  -2.2765 
Provision for 
rehabilitation  0.0671*** 3.3247 
Volatility 0.3612*** 6.3412 
   
CEO Characteristics   
Tenure -0.0736***          -4.0513 
Cash 
Compensation($mil)              0.6528  0.4539 
LTIPs Value ($mil)             -0.2653** -2.2146 
Delta ($thou)             -19.3643*           -1.8464 
Vega ($thou)  13.2649**   2.4369 
Notes: This table contains unpaired comparison with unequal variance between 40 M&M and 97 
non-M&M firms listed on ASX S&P 200 index. *, ** and *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
We run simple mean t-test to support our argument that CEOs have more incentives to input more 
resources in CER in the cooling-off period. Table 4.15 shows that firms have a higher REHAB mean 
value in the cooling-off period than in the boom period. This is possibly due to the higer risk-
increasing vega, which is accompanied by the larger volatility in the cooling-off period.  
Further, we perform the Wald significant test60 to test if the coefficient estimate on REHAB is equal 
to 0. The p-value of the chi square statistic of REHAB is less than 0.01 in the cooling-off period, which 
indicates  that the estimated coefficient for REHAB in the cooling-off period is not equal to zero; 
                                                            
60 Thanks for the advice from one of the examiners. 
  
98 
 
whereas the p-value of the chi square statistic of REHAB is equal to 0.214 in the boom period, which 
suggests that the estimated coefficient for REHAB in the cooling-off period is not significant. In 
addition, the p-value of the chi square statistic of TENURE is less than 0.04 and the p-value of the chi 
square statistic of CASH is less than 0.01 in the cooling-off period, which suggest that the two 
estimated coefficients in the cooling-off period are not equal to zero. On the other hand, the p-values 
of the chi square statistic of TENURE and CASH are larger than 0.1 (p-value of TENURE is 0.325 and p-
value of CASH is 0.217) in the boom period, which suggest the two estimated coefficients in the 
boom period are not significant. Further, the p-value of the chi square statistic of lnLEVERAGE is less 
than 0.01 in the boom period, which suggest that the lnLEVERAGE coefficient in the boom is not 
equal to zero. However, the p-value of the chi square statistic of lnLEVERAGE is 0.176 in the boom 
period, which implies that the estimated coefficient on lnLEVERAGE in the cooling-off period is not 
significant. 
We run alternative specification tests to address the issue of model mis-specification as a result of 
omitted variables or the choice of our 2SLS instruments. First, we include a CEO change dummy, 
which takes a value of 1 when the firm has a new CEO that year; 0 otherwise, to control for the 
possible impact of CEO turnover on a firm’s financial performance. Second, Dybvig and Warachka 
(2012) argue that Tobin’s Q (market value/investment scale) is endogenous to managers’ decisions 
regarding a firm’s investment scale. Dybvig and Warachka (2012) use the following example to 
illustrate the importance of a firm’s investment scale and the inefficiency of Tobin’s Q as a measure 
for ﬁrm performance. Assume a ﬁrm with a Tobin’s Q of 1.6 whose $16 market value is based on a 
$10 investment. If the ﬁrm’s investment scale decreases by $5 and the market value decreases by $6, 
then Tobin’s Q increases to 10/5=2. Hence, Dybvig and Warachka (2012) conclude that using Tobin’s 
Q as a measure for firm performance could lead to a spurious conclusion because higher values of 
Tobin’s Q fail to capture better firm performance. To address this potential endogeneity issue with 
Tobin’s Q, we use firms’ yearly share return as market-based performance measure to generate 
more robust results. The signs and the significance of the parameter estimates of REHAB and CEO 
tenure remained unchanged. The robustness test results are available in the Appendices B.7 and B.8  
In addition, we use the Hausman test to test that the 2SLS estimates in Tables 4.9 to 4.13 are valid. 
The results of the Hausman test indicate that we strongly reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of 
our independent variables vega, delta and rehabilitation expense (p-values of the Hausman test 
statistic are all equal to 0). Based on these results, we conclude that the 2SLS estimates in this study 
are valid and appropriate. 
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In conclusion, we find strong evidence to support hypothesis (3a) that CEO tenure decreases a M&M 
firm’s financial performance. Further, our hypotheses (3b) and (3c) are also strongly supported by 
the results.  
4.4 Conclusions 
The large number of US studies provides important empirical evidence on the relationships among 
CEO incentives, and CEO risk-taking behaviour and shareholder value (Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009; 
Dong et al., 2010). However, results in the US studies with regard to option incentives may not be 
transferable to the Australian market where CEO compensation practices and taxation environment 
are different from those in the US.  
The results of this current study support some key findings from the literature on the relationship 
between CEO option incentives and corporate policies. On average, in the Australian capital market, 
CEO risk incentive vega leads the firm to implement riskier financial policy measured by book 
leverage. In addition, we find evidence that CEO wealth incentive delta has an inverted-U 
relationship with a firm’s share market value. The results of this study add some new evidence to the 
literature in which CEO characteristics have some important effects on the CER-CFP relationship. In 
addition, the results indicate that the M&M ‘boom-bust’ cycle has some moderating effect of on the 
CER-CFP relationship. We also observe the following important findings: first, the higher the 
proportion of in-the-money options in the compensation package, the more risk-averse CEOs will be 
and, as a result, the CEOs’ risk-taking incentives decrease; second, the longer the remaining time to 
expiry of the option portfolio, the larger the variability of a CEO’s vega relative to the options’ 
moneyness. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Discussions 
5.1 Introduction 
Section 5.2 reiterates the objectives of the current study and the study’s major findings. Section 5.3 
presents policy implications of the results. The contributions of the study are discussed in section 5.4. 
Section 5.5 indicates the opportunities for future research.  
5.2 Objectives of the Study 
The current study has four objectives. First, to investigate whether high-vega or low-delta CEOs are 
more likely to implement risky financial and investment policies. Second, we investigate whether 
delta has an inverted-U relationship with a firm’s share market performance in the Australian share 
market. Third, the study tests whether short-tenured M&M CEOs are more likely to use CER 
engagement as a compensation management tool. Finally, we examine whether the CEOs differ in 
their commitment to CER engagement during the M&M industry boom-cooling off cycle. 
The results show that high-vega CEOs have more incentive to use more book leverage; however, 
there is no evidence to support the idea that vega has a significant positive effect on a firm’s risky 
investment policy-business acquisitions. The results also support our expectation that delta has an 
inverted-U effect on Tobin’s Q. Further, the results support our hypothesis that less-seasoned CEOs 
are more likely to undertake the value-enhancing CER engagement. CER engagement level is more 
likely to exhibit a positive impact on CFP in the Australian M&M industry’s cooling-off period. 
5.3 Policy Implications of the Results 
5.3.1 CEO Option incentives and firm risk-taking relationship 
The results show that high-vega or low-delta CEOs implement more book leverage and the size of the 
vega-leverage relationship is large. The results of this study provide the following corporate 
governance implications. First, if a firm’s risky financial policy can lead to increases in shareholder 
value, there is no need to depress high-vega CEO compensation, considering that high-vega CEOs 
have more incentive to maximise shareholders’ wealth. A common way to increase vega is to grant a 
CEO more options; thus, soft-law makers such as ASX Corporate Governance Council should 
encourage firms to increase high-vega compensation by granting more at- or out-of-the money 
options with a longer time to expiry. Further, the ASX Corporate Governance Council should tighten 
executive remuneration disclosure requirements regarding option moneyness in their best-practice 
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guidelines. This is because option moneyness decreases CEOs’ incentive to take risky, but value-
enhancing projects. Second, as the ‘say-on-pay’ and ‘two-strike’ governance reform unfolds, 
shareholders should make full use of such an investor protection opportunity to urge the board of 
directors to adopt and use equity-based executive long term incentive plans, which are composed of 
long-term, out or at-the-money option payments. Long term incentive plans could better tie CEOs’ 
compensation to the firm’s long-run performance. Out or at-the-money option payments could 
decrease CEOs’ risk-aversion due to options’ moneyness. Similarly, firms should continue to promote 
performance-based vesting conditions and specific performance hurdles in CEOs’ compensation 
contracts in order to encourage them to take value-increasing risks.  
5.3.2 CEO option incentives and shareholder value relationship 
The empirical results show that the wealth incentive delta has a mixed effect on a firm’s market 
value. This implies that the regulators of Australian public companies still face challenges in 
identifying suitable policies that best mitigate the high-delta CEOs’ risk aversion. In addition, public 
company directors fail to monitor closely the high-delta CEOs’ risk-averse behaviour on behalf of 
their shareholders. Charged with the responsibility of contracting with CEOs, remuneration 
committees have not been successful in designing effective compensation contracts that maximise 
shareholders’ value. Further, the regulation agencies should pay more careful attention to CEOs’ risk-
aversion because of high-delta and high-cash compensation and encourage CEOs to adopt more risk-
taking decisions to maximise shareholders’ value. The soft-law makers such as the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council should continue to design best-practice guidelines in order to aid firms in 
developing their corporate governance mechanisms, which will better monitor CEO risk-averse 
behaviour. Furthermore, remuneration committees should reshape CEOs’ compensation incentives 
to tie compensation more closely to share return volatility (increase vega) to alleviate the delta’s risk-
aversion effect. 
5.3.3 M&M firms’ CER and CFP relationship 
The negative moderating effect of CEO tenure on the CER-CFP relationship in our results implies that 
corporate governance mechanisms (such as board monitoring of CEOs) fails in firms with long-
tenured and/or high-cash paid CEOs and the firms’ shareholders may not benefit from increased CER 
engagement. The results show that the high-cash paid CEOs have more incentive to implement CER 
initiatives. Hence, to encourage CEOs to increase CER engagement level, the proportion of cash 
compensation should not be reduced. During an industry boom, a CEO may not have appropriate 
incentives to implement CER initiatives because of the increased market value from the boom. To 
incentivize CEOs to be more socially responsible, especially during a boom, the firm’s board of 
directors may detach the CEOs’ pay from share price (decreasing delta) and increase the CEOs’ pay-
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share risk sensitivity (vega) by granting them options with strict exercisable conditions. Option-based 
compensation influences CEOs’ wealth and can motivate CEOs to pursue riskier firm policies (Ross, 
2004; Coles et al., 2006). If CEOs have greater option holdings, then their wealth is not linear to 
change in share price (Hall & Liebman, 1997) and their wealth is very sensitive to increase in the 
volatility of share returns (Coles et al., 2006). 
The Australian federal government should provide M&M firms with more incentives (such as tax cuts 
or subsidies) to commit to site rehabilitation in order to improve shareholders’ value and 
communicate the benefits of CER engagement to the overall M&M industry. Further, new 
environmental management technology, such as an environmental sustainability system that can 
track, manage, and report the firm’s environmental data, should be introduced into the M&M 
industry in order to increase the CER engagement level and slow down the rate of depletion of finite 
mineral resources.  
5.4 Research Contributions 
The current research presents a good understanding of Australian CEO option-based compensation 
incentives. For instance, the study results show strong evidence that out-of or at-the-money options, 
coupled with longer time to expiry, have a significant positive impact on risk-increasing incentive 
vega.  
Our study contributes to the current literature by revealing important evidence that vega increases a 
firm’s risk-taking in the Australian capital market. The Australian capital market is unique in terms of 
the dividend tax system, which is different from the US market. In addition, the low level of new 
options may potentially undermine the firm’s willingness to take more risks. Our results show that 
vega still can have a positive impact on firms’ risk-taking. The results show the importance of vega 
exposing the share volatility to a CEO. Further, this study finds the evidence that the 2009 tax 
reforms reduces vega’s positive effect on book leverage. This is likely due to the 2009 reform’s 
‘deferred tax point’ in which managers pay tax immediately when their shares or options become 
vested (exercisable) rather than when the shares are sold. 
The negative impact of CEO delta on firms’ risk-taking and firms’ value is likely due to the CEO’s risk 
aversion from moneyness of the options in our sample. The high level of option moneyness may 
potentially reduce delta’s wealth effect. Further, Bulan et al. (2010) find mixed relationship between 
CEO delta and firm productivity. This study expands Bulan et al.’  work by setting up a direct link 
between a CEO’s delta and capital market performance.  
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Our findings add new evidence to the literature on delta’s mixed effects on shareholders’ value. Our 
study on the delta-firm value relationship is based on the fact that not all Australian public firms 
provide their CEOs with LTIPs, which may contain share options, performance shares and 
performance rights (Matolcsy & Wright, 2007). Further, for Australian firms adopting some type of 
equity compensation scheme, they do not frequently use LTIPs (Matolcsy & Wright, 2011). 
Therefore, this study contributes to the current literature by showing the effects of CEO LTIP 
incentives on firm market-based performance do not differ across different corporate landscapes, 
given the relatively smaller scale of firms adopting and using LTIPs. 
In addition, this study contributes to current literature by identifying the important effects of CEO 
tenure on the CER-CFP relationship. This study adds new evidence to the literature by using the 
M&M industry as an example to show how an industry’s ‘boom-bust’ cycle, CEO cash compensation 
and CEO tenure can have strong impact on the CER-CFP relationship. This study also uses provision 
for site rehabilitation, as a new measurement for the firm’s corproate environmental responsibilty 
engagement. Prior studies use an aggregate measurement (e.g. Kinder, Lydenberg & Domini’s (KLD) 
ratings (Manner, 2010; Jo & Harjoto, 2012) for the firm’s corporate social responsibility  engagement. 
The measurement for CER engagement is industry-specific, which can better reflect the M&M firms’ 
commitment to ‘sustainable mining’ – mineral resources should be continuously available and 
productive and M&M firms should maintain a healthy environment at both previous and current 
mining sites(Gordon, Bertram & Graedel, 2006; Mudd, 2010).  
5.5 Opportunities for Future Research 
This study considers deltas and vegas of only the CEO option portfolio. Common shares deltas and 
vegas are not included in our analysis since our study aims to investigate the incentives embedded in 
Australian CEOs’ option payments. There are several ways to estimate the vega of a common share. 
According to Black and Scholes (1973) and Smith (1976), if a company uses debt to finance assets, 
then common stocks are regarded as a European call option on the company’s assets, therefore, the 
option pricing framework could be used to value common shares. In addition, the partial derivative 
of share option value with respect to changes in volatility can be used to estimate vega of common 
share (Guay, 1999). 
Future research can investigate the option incentives of other executives such as CFOs, who also 
have significant influence on a firm’s decision-making at both the strategic and operation level.  
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Appendix A 
Consistent with previous studies (Coles et al., 2006; Dong et al., 2010), we use the (Merton, 1973) 
modified BS formula to value a CEO’s newly granted option at year t:  
Vt = S݁ିௗ் N(Z)−ܺ݁ି௥் ܰ൫ܼ − ߪ√ܶ൯                                                                                        (A1)                                
Delta per option (DELt) in our study is defined as the change in the dollar value of a CEO’s option 
granted at year t for a 1% change in share price. Dollar delta is equal to delta per option times the 
number of share options granted. A CEO’s portfolio dollar delta at the end of each year is equal to 
the weighted average of all dollar deltas in the CEO’s option portfolio. Following Core and Guay 
(2002), we use the following formula to obtain DEL: 
DELt = ߲V/ ߲S = 0.01݁ିௗ N (Z) S                                                                                               (A2)                                           
Vega per option (VEGt) is defined as the change in the dollar value of a CEO’s option granted at year t 
for a 1% change in share return volatility. Dollar vega is equal to vega per option times the number of 
share options granted. A CEO’s portfolio dollar vega at the end of each year is equal to the weighted 
average of all dollar vegas in the CEO’s option portfolio. Similarly, following Core and Guay (2002), 
we use the following formula to value VEG: 
VEGt  = ߲V/ ߲ߪ = 0.01݁ିௗ்N' (Z) S√ܶ                                                                                   (A3)   
Where Z = (lnቀௌ
௑
ቁ + ܶ(ݎ − ݀ + ఙ
మ
ଶ
))/ σ√ܶ in Equations (A1) to (A3). N(Z) is the normal cumulative 
probability function, we use the EXCEL command NORMSDIST(Z) to calculate the normal cumulative 
probability. N'(Z) is the normal probability density function: ݂(ݖ)= ଵ
√ଶగ
݁
ష೥మ
మ . Table A1 presents the 
definitions of the variables used in equations (A1) to (A3). 
We use Acrux Ltd (ASX: ACR) as an example in Table A2 to illustrate how we compute the portfolio 
value of a CEO’s options, deltas and vegas61. In our calculation, we use the Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA) zero coupon bond yields with the same maturity as the options to estimate the risk-free 
interest rates. The expected dividend rate is the dividends paid per share divided by the year-end 
closing share price.  
 
                                                            
61 Acrux 2005 Annual Report, available from http://www.acrux.com.au/irm/content/financial-reports1.aspx?RID=306, 
accessed 26/05/2012. 
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Table A. 1 Variable Definitions for Equations (A1) to (A3). 
Variable  Definition 
d ln (1+ the expected dividend rate). 
DELt Delta per option granted at year t. 
DELt_vested Delta per vested option at year t. 
DELt_unvested Delta per vested option at year t. 
r ln (1+ the risk-free interest rate). 
S Price of the underlying share on 30th June each year. 
σ Annualised standard deviation of logarithmic daily return. 
T Time to maturity of the option. 
Tvested Time to maturity of the vested option. 
Tunvested Time to maturity of the unvested option. 
Vt Fair price of an option granted at year t. 
Vt_vested Fair price of a vested option at year t. 
Vt_unvested Fair price of a unvested option at year t. 
VEGt Vega per option granted at year t. 
VEGt_vested Vega per vested option at year t. 
VEGt_unvested Vega per unvested option at year t. 
X Strike price of the option. 
 
In column 1, Table A2, we observe from the 2003 annual report that, in September 2002, the CEO 
was granted 8,612,178 options with an exercise price (X) of 0.85, a term to maturity (T) of 7 years. 
The market price is 0.32 at the end of the year; hence, S/X = 0.3765. The volatility of share return (σ) 
is 0.5289, and the risk-free rate of interest is 0.0552 (r = 0.0537). We use the year-end dividend rate 
as the expected dividend for the next year, in this case, the expected dividend pay-out rate is 0 (from 
the annual financial report, we observe that there was no cash dividend paid to shareholders for ACR 
Ltd for any given year for the 2003-2012 period; hence, d = 0).  
Because 25% of options become vested on each of 6, 12, 18, and 24 months after the grant date 
reported in the 2005 annual report, we multiply 8,612,178 options by 25%62, which result in 
2,153,045 (row 4, column 1) vested and 6,459,133 (row 5, column 1) unvested options at the end of 
2003. 
Based on the above information, for vested options, Z = (lnቀௌ
௑
ቁ + ܶ(ݎ − ݀ + ఙ
మ
ଶ
))/ σ√ܶ = 0.2703, Z −
σ√T = 0.1294, N(Z) = 0.6066, N(Z − σ√T) = 0.1294, N' (Z) = ଵ
√ଶπ
e
షబ.మళబయమ
మ =0.3846.  
                                                            
62 To be exact, at 30th of June 2003, 9 months have passed from September 2002. However, we still use 25% to estimate the 
proportion of vested options. 
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Next, we calculate the fair price, delta and vega per vested option. V2003_vested in Equation (A1) =
0.32 × e଴×଻ ×  0.6066 − 0.85 × eି଴.଴ହଷ଻×଻ × 0.1294 = 0.1186 (row 12, column 1).  
Table A. 2 Example of Calculations for the Portfolio Value of a CEO’s Options, Deltas and Vegas. 
 Variable  2003 2004  2005  
 
 
  
Options 
granted in 
2003 
Options 
granted in 
2005 
Option 
portfolio at 
the end of 
2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) d 0 0 0 0  
(2) r 0.0537 0.0542 0.0511 0.0511  
(3) No. of options granted 8,612,178   3,528,08663  
(4) No. of options vested  2,153,045 4,306,089 6,459,134 882,22264  
(5) No. of options unvested 6,459,133 4,306,089 2,153,045 2,645,864  
(6) No. of outstanding of 
options 8,612,178 8,612,178   12,140,264 
(7) S 0.32 0.35 0.5 0.5  
(8) Tvested 7 6 5 7  
(9) Tunvested 9 8 7 9  
(10) X 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.75  
(11) σ 0.5289 0.5106 0.5165 0.5165  
(12) Vt_vested 0.1186 0.1119 0.1802 0.2468  
(13) Vt_unvested 0.1487 0.1468 0.2318 0.2867  
(14) DELt_vested 0.0019 0.0020 0.0032 0.0037  
(15) DELt_unvested 0.0022 0.0023 0.0036 0.0040  
(16) VEGt_vested 0.0033 0.0034 0.0036 0.0042  
(17) VEGt_unvested 0.0034 0.0036 0.0043 0.0043  
(18) Weights of year 2003 
options      0.709465 
(19) Weights of year 2005 
options      0.290666 
(20) Weights of vested options 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25  
(21) Weights of unvested 
options 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.75  
(22) Value per option portfolio 0.1367 0.1294 0.1931 0.2767 0.2174 
(23) Delta per option portfolio 0.0029 0.0022 0.0033 0.0039 0.0035 
(24) Vega per option portfolio 0.0033 0.0035 0.0038 0.0043 0.0039 
All variables are defined in Table A.1. Source: Acrux 2003 and 2005 Annual Report and authors’ 
calculation. 
 
DEL2003_vested in Equation (A2) = 0.01×e଴×଻× 0.6066× 0.32 = 0.0019 (row 14, column 1).  
VEG2003_vested in Equation (A3) = 0.01 ×e଴×଻× 0.3846×0.32 ×√7 = 0.0033 (row 16, column 1).  
For 6,459,133 unvested options at the end of 2003, we add two years to 7, the time to expiration for 
vested options. Other inputs are the same as the vested options. Omitting the calculations, we have 
                                                            
63 3,528,086 options were granted on 28 Sep, 2004 to CEO Igor Gonda’s. Detailed options information can be found at 
‘Share options’ section in Directors’ Report. Page 30 of the Acrux 2005 Annual Report. 
64 25% of options become vested on each of 6, 12, 18, and 24 months after the grant date. Note to ‘Share Options’, Page 30 
of the Acrux 2005 Annual Report. 
65 0.7094= 8,612,178 (No of grants in 2003)/12,140,264 (Total options outstanding in 2005). 
66 0.2906= 3,528,086 (No of grants in 2005)/12,140,264 (Total options outstanding in 2005). 
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V2003_unvested = 0.1487 (row 13, column 1), DEL2003_unvested = 0.0022 (row 15, column 1) and 
VEG2003_unvested = 0.0034 (row 17, column 1). 
Because the CEO has no options granted before 2003, the 8,612,178 options granted in 2003 are the 
outstanding amount of the CEO’s options. Further, because the CEO has both vested and unvested 
options, we have to calculate the weighted average value of vested and non-vested options to obtain 
the fair price, delta and vega per CEO option portfolio. 
Weighted average fair price per option portfolio = 0.25 ×  0.1186 − 0.75 × 0.1487 = 0.1367.  
Weighted average delta per option portfolio = 0.25 ×  0.0019 − 0.75 × 0.0022 = 0.0029.  
Weighted average vega per option portfolio =0.25 ×  0.0033 − 0.75 × 0.0034 = 0.0033.  
There was no new options granted in 2004. Hence, the outstanding option balance at the end of 
2004, for the same CEO, is equal to 8,612,178 (which is the 2003 ending option balance), in column 2, 
Table A2. After applying the inputs in the year 2004 and calculating the weighted average of vested 
and unvested options, we have the fair price per option portfolio equal to 0.1294 (row 22, column 2), 
delta per option portfolio equal to 0.0022 (row 23, column 2) and vega per option portfolio equal to 
0.0035 (row 24, column 2). 
Next, in column 3, we calculate the option portfolio fair price, delta and vega of the 2003 grant at the 
end of 2005 (from the ‘Share Options’ section of the directors’ report in 2005, we found that 
8,612,178 options granted in 2003 have not been exercised at the end of the financial year 2005): 
weighted average fair price per option portfolio = 0.1931 (row 22, column 3), weighted average delta 
per option portfolio = 0.0033 (row 23, column 3) and weighted average vega per option portfolio = 
0.0038 (row 24, column 3) (those option portfolio values are the weighted average values of vested 
and unvested options as well; details of calculations are omitted).  
We also observe from the 2005 annual report, that in 2005 (column 4), the same CEO received 
another option award of 3,528,086 options with X equal to 0.75, T is 7 years for the vested options; 9 
for the unvested options, S is 0.5 at the end of the year, S/X = 0.6667, σ is 0.5165, r = 0.0511 and d= 
0. Thus, the CEO has an outstanding option portfolio of 12,140,264 options (8,612,178 options 
granted in 2003 plus the newly granted 3,528,086 options in 2005). 
Next, we calculate the weighted average fair price, delta and vega per option portfolio of the newly 
issued 3,528,086 options in 2005 (again, 25% of the newly issued is vested and the rest is unvested). 
Omitting the detailed calculations, we obtained weighted average fair price per option portfolio = 
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0.2767 (row 22, column 3), weighted average delta per option portfolio = 0.0039 (row 23, column 4) 
and weighted average vega per option portfolio = 0.0043 (row 24, column 4).  
Finally, because the fair price, delta and vega per option portfolio at the end of year 2005, are the 
weighted average of the current fair prices, deltas and vegas of the two grants (remaining 8,612,178 
options granted in 2003 and the 3,528,086 options granted in 2005), we have the following 
computation in column 5:  
The weighted average fair price per option portfolio = 0.1931 × (8,612,178/12,140,264) + 0.2767 × 
(3,528,086/12,140,264) = 0.2174 (row 22, column 5). 
The weighted average delta per option portfolio = 0.0033 × (8,612,178/12,140,264) + 0.0039 × 
(3,528,086/12,140,264) = 0.0035 (row 23, column 5). 
The weighted average vega per option portfolio = 0.0038 × (8,612,178/12,140,264) + 0.0043 × 
(3,528,086/12,140,264) = 0.0039 (row 24, column 5). 
Hence, at the end of year 2005, the total dollar value for delta is 0.0035 ×12,140,264 = $42, 364.924 
and the total dollar value for vega is 0.0039 ×12,140,264 = $47,206.63. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
109 
 
Appendix B 
B.1 A system GMM results of effects of option incentives on risky financial policy (Dependent 
variables lnLEVERAGE or ACQUISITION) 
 lnLEVERAGE ACQUISITION 
Independent variables System GMM System GMM 
lnLEVERAGEt-1 0.599  
 (0.193)***  
ACQUISITION-t-1  0.204 
  (0.063)*** 
VEGA 8.505 1.560 
 (2.932)*** (0.481)*** 
DELTA -0.037 -0.552 
 (0.021)* (0.184)*** 
BM -0.086 -0.516 
 (0.027)*** (0.156)*** 
lnSALES 0.122 0.110 
 (0.023)*** (0.020)*** 
CASH -0.345 -0.276 
 (0.171)** (0.139)** 
R&D -0.220 -0.330 
 (0.431) (0.541) 
CEO_SHARE 0.018 0.020 
 (0.026) (0.030) 
VOLATILITY 0.001 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
TENURE -0.001 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.006) 
AGE -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001)** (0.001) 
INSIDER 0.032 -0.201 
 (0.030) (0.230) 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes 
CEO_CHANGE Yes Yes 
YEAR Yes Yes 
Hansen’s J over-
identification test 
0.301 0.232 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.001*** 0.000*** 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.263 0.154 
N 776 495 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, *** significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively. Yes means control. 
CEO_SHARE = number of common shares owned by a CEO/total number of common shares.   
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B.2 3SLS results of the effects of option incentives on firm market leverage (Dependent variable-log 
market leverage or lnMVLEVERAGE) 
Independent 
variables 
 (1) 
lnMVLEVERAGE 
 (2) VEGA 
 
 (3) DELTA 
 
VEGA        ( + ) 8.203    4.415 
  (2.771)***    (1.576)*** 
DELTA   (  ̶  ) -1.575  0.005   
  (0.570)***  (0.002)**   
BM   -0.410  -0.072  -0.007 
  (0.112)***  (0.020)***  (0.002)*** 
lnSALES   0.095  0.000  -0.002 
  (0.026)***  (0.002)  (0.003) 
R&D   -0.364     
  (0.294)     
CASH  -0.451  -0.001  -0.020 
  (0.210)**  (0.001)  (0.009)** 
TENURE  0.003    0.018 
  (0.002)    (0.008)** 
AGE  -0.004  -0.002  0.001 
  (0.002)**  (0.001)**  (0.001) 
INSIDER  0.039  0.002  -0.005 
  (0.034)  (0.002)  (0.020) 
LnLEVERAGE   ( + ) 0.002 ( ̶ ) -0.001 
    (0.0008)**  (0.0005)** 
lnP/E   (  ̶  ) 0.004 ( + ) 0.003 
    (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
VOLATILITY   ( + ) 0.003 ( + ) -0.009 
    (0.001)**  (0.010) 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes 
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes 
CEO_CHANGE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2_adjust   0.375  0.332  0.493 
N  820  820  820 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients on intercepts, industry, year and CEO 
turnover dummies are not reported. ***, **, and * significant at the 1% ,5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Yes means control. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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B.3 3SLS results of the effects of option incentives on firm productivity (TFP) 
Independent 
variables 
 (1) TFP index  (2) VEGA 
 
 (3) DELTA 
 
VEGA        ( + ) 10.101    5.125 
  (3.236)***    (1.601)*** 
DELTA  ( + ) -3.473  -0.003   
  (0.472)***  (0.001)***   
DELTA2 (  ̶  ) -65.418     
  (19.823)***     
lnSALES   -0.076  0.001  -0.003 
  (0.027)***  (0.001)  (0.003) 
R&D   -0.470     
  (0.416)     
PPE  -1.327     
  (0.428)***     
CASH  -0.417  -0.002  -0.018 
  (0.208)**  (0.002)  (0.005)*** 
TENURE  0.002    0.020 
  (0.002)    (0.010)** 
AGE  -0.004  -0.003  0.000 
  (0.004)  (0.001)***  (0.001) 
INSIDER  0.027  0.000  -0.004 
  (0.030)  (0.001)  (0.007) 
LnTobin’s Q   ( + ) -0.017 ( + ) -0.003 
    (0.010)*  (0.0015)** 
lnP/E   (  ̶  ) -0.001 ( + ) 0.002 
    (0.0002)***  (0.001)** 
VOLATILITY   ( + ) 0.004 ( + ) -0.009 
    (0.001)***  (0.010) 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes 
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes 
CEO_CHANGE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2_adjust   0.637  0.330  0.430 
N  800  800  800 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients on intercepts, industry, year and CEO 
turnover dummies are not reported. ***, **, and * significant at the 1% ,5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Yes means control. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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B.4 3SLS results of alternative dependent variable (annual share return)  
Independent 
variables 
 (1) annual 
share return 
 (2) VEGA 
 
 (3) DELTA 
 
VEGA        ( + ) 5.172    5.101 
  (2.573)**    (1.236)*** 
DELTA  ( + ) 4.351  -0.004   
  (1.576)***  (0.001)***   
DELTA2 (  ̶  ) -42.734     
  (15.262)***     
lnSALES   0.065  0.002  -0.002 
  (0.024)***  (0.002)  (0.003) 
R&D   -0.450     
  (0.440)     
PPE  -1.036     
  (0.428)**     
CASH  -0.410  -0.003  -0.014 
  (0.205)**  (0.010)  (0.003)*** 
TENURE  0.002    0.017 
  (0.002)    (0.010)* 
AGE  -0.003  -0.002  0.001 
  (0.004)  (0.001)**  (0.001) 
INSIDER  0.025  0.001  -0.006 
  (0.027)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
LnTobin’s Q   ( + ) -0.012 ( + ) -0.004 
    (0.007)*  (0.002)** 
lnP/E   (  ̶  ) -0.002 ( + ) 0.001 
    (0.001)**  (0.0005)** 
VOLATILITY   ( + ) 0.003 ( + ) -0.007 
    (0.001)***  (0.011) 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes  Yes 
YEAR  Yes  Yes  Yes 
CEO_CHANGE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2_adjust   0.575  0.270  0.332 
N  820  820  820 
 
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients on intercepts, industry, year and CEO 
turnover dummies are not reported. ***, **, and * significant at the 1% ,5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Yes means control. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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B.5 Estimation results of the effects of CEO incentives on LnTobin’s Q with non-M&M firms dummy 
NONMM 
 
OLS 2SLS with FE 
Dependent variable LnTobin’s Q LnTobin’s Q 
DELTA× NONMM 12.171 -22.460  
(4.043)*** (11.064)** 
DELTA2× NONMM -12.410 -17.638 
 (4.529)*** (6.581)*** 
R&D -2.150 -2.350  
(2.180) (2.355) 
PPE -1.763 -1.829  
(0.657)*** (0.667)*** 
lnSALES 0.056 0.076  
(0.067) (0.017)*** 
lnLEVERAGE -0.038 0.047  
(0.013)*** (0.023)** 
CASH -0.721 -0.010  
(0.240)*** (0.003)*** 
VOLATILITY -0.124 -0.004  
(0.126) (0.002)** 
TENURE -0.001 0.001  
(0.003) (0.000) 
AGE 0.003 -0.000  
(0.004) (0.000) 
INSIDER 0.325 0.004  
(0.404) (0.005) 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes 
YEAR Yes Yes 
R2  0.545 0.681 (within) 
   
Rho 
 
0.613 
Sargan Hansen over-identification 
test statistic 
 
79.238 (p-value=0) 
N 550 448 
Notes: The parameter estimates are shown first and standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Yes means control.  
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B.6 Impact of CER on CFP (full-sample) using 10th and 99th percentile winsorisation 
 First-stage 
REHAB 
Second-stage 
lnTobin’s Q 
CER proxy   
REHAB  0.004 
  (0.002)** 
CEO and firm characteristics   
TENURE 0.493 -0.037 
 (1.461) (0.017)** 
DELTA 42.324 3.432 
 (136.401) (2.568) 
CASH 8.996 -1.239 
 (13.747) (0.176)*** 
lnLEVERAGE 1.283 0.016 
 (3.202) (0.041) 
lnSALES -2.785 -0.004 
 (2.122) (0.028) 
AGE -0.901 0.004 
 (0.870) (0.011) 
INSIDER 5.241 0.667 
 (33.903) (0.427) 
DERIVATIVE -0.227 -0.009 
 (0.839) (0.107) 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes 
YEAR Yes Yes 
Instrument   
E&D 0.227  
 (0.040)***  
Partial F-statistic 5.417 (p-value = 0.000)  
Rho 0.413 0.391 
R2 (within) 0.465 0.380 
Sargan Hansen over-
identification test statistic p-
value 
  0.363 
N 369 369 
Note: The parameter estimates are shown first and standard errors are in parentheses.  
*, ** and *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Yes means control. 
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B.7 2SLS subsample results of impact of REHAB on shareholder value (based on CEO tenure) 
Dependent Variable: Annual Share Return 
   Subsample (1) Subsample (2) 
REHAB 0.003 0.009 
 (0.001)*** (0.010) 
TENURE 0.020 -0.090 
 (0.045) (0.054)* 
DELTA2 -3.465 1.265 
 (4.010) (2.060) 
DELTA -22.742 8.134 
 (19.010) (7.894) 
CASH -1.560 -1.348 
 (0.486)*** (0.335)*** 
lnLEVERAGE 0.030 0.100 
 (0.091) (0.110) 
lnSALES 0.009 0.040 
 (0.010) (0.050) 
AGE 0.001 0.020 
 (0.015) (0.018) 
INSIDER 0.410 1.700 
 (0.510) (1.520) 
DERIVATIVE -0.010 0.030 
 (0.020) (0.028) 
YEAR Yes Yes 
CEO_CHANGE Yes Yes 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.000                                          0.000 
Rho 0.46 0.52 
R2  0.52 0.29 
N 138 195 
Notes: The parameter estimates are shown first and standard errors are in parentheses.  
*, ** and *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1% , respectively. Yes means control. 
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B.8 Sub-period 2SLS results of impact of REHAB on annual share return 
Dependent Variable: Annual Share Return 
 Boom period 
(2003 – 2008)  
Cooling-off period 
(2009 – 2012) 
REHAB 0.003 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.001)** 
TENURE -0.022 0.070 
 (0.024) (0.060) 
DELTA 29.220 42.220 
 (30.010) (40.479) 
VEGA -40.075 -53.483 
 (40.010) (48.583) 
CASH -0.800 0.480 
 (0.810) (0.620) 
lnLEVERAGE 0.130 0.094 
 (0.090) (0.070) 
lnSALES -0.037 -0.574 
 (0.030) (0.505) 
AGE 0.000 -0.280 
 (0.010) (0.200) 
INSIDER 0.180 2.240 
 (0.400) (1.800) 
DERIVATIVE -0.001 0.310 
 (0.010) (0.260) 
YEAR Yes Yes 
CEO_CHANGE Yes Yes 
Hausman test (p-value) 0.000                                         0.000                  
Rho 0.50 0.67 
R2 (within) 0.62 0.87 
N 257 88 
Notes: The parameter estimates are shown first and standard errors are in parentheses.  
*, ** and *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Yes means control. 
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